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commerce.” Trial court properly allowed officer, based on his experience, to testify that amount of drug found on defendant indicated an intent to distribute. Jones v. State, 277 Ga. 36, 586 S.E.2d 224 (September 15, 2003). Trial court properly ruled out lay opinion testimony as to whether a gun could be hidden under the carpet at the crime scene without the occupant being aware of its presence. “OCGA § 24-9-65 provides that any witness may give her opinion, with reasons therefor, when the issue to be decided by the jury is one of opinion. If, however, the issue for the jury is one of fact, ‘the opinions of witnesses shall be generally inadmissible.’ A lay witness may give the opinion she reached based upon facts she observed as to the competency of a defendant to stand trial ( Spencer v. State, 236 Ga. 697(4c), 224 S.E.2d 910 (1976); whether a defendant was under the influence of intoxicants ( Hayes v. State, 208 Ga.App. 627(1), 431 S.E.2d 430 (1993); whether a defendant was defending himself ( Campbell v. State, 269 Ga. 186(5), 496 S.E.2d 724 (1998)), because these are issues of opinion. In the case at bar, the issue of the visibility of the bulge produced by an object placed under carpeting is not one of opinion, but of fact, so ‘the opinions of witnesses shall be generally inadmissible.’ OCGA § 24-9-65. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling was not error.” Murphy v. State, 263 Ga.App. 62, 587 S.E.2d 223 (September 4, 2003). Even though only expert testimony as to defendant’s sanity came from his witness who said he was insane at time of crime, jury was “not bound by the opinions of the expert” and could conclude from other evidence that defendant was mentally ill, but knew right from wrong. Farid v. State, 258 Ga.App. 429, 574 S.E.2d 460 (November 18, 2002). Police officer need not be “offered as an expert simply because the officer testifies as to his training in the visual estimation of speed.” Dillingham v. State, 275 Ga. 665, 571 S.E.2d 777 (October 28, 2002). Investigator/former police officer was properly allowed to give a lay opinion without being qualified as an expert, based on her years of experience setting up police line- ups, on the relative merits of live and photographic line-ups. “[W]hen the subject matter of an inquiry relates to numerous facts perceived by the [lay witness’] senses, to a series of instances passing under the observation of a witness, or to a variety of circumstances … which under the limitations of language, cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury with the same force and clearness as they appeared to the witness, the witness may state his … opinion based upon the facts and circumstances observed by him.” Roberts v. State, 257 Ga.App. 251, 570 S.E.2d 595 (August 16, 2002). “‘[A] witness’s opinion concerning the identity of a person depicted in a surveillance photograph is admissible if there is some basis for concluding that the witness is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than is the jury. This criterion is fulfilled where the witness is familiar with the defendant’s appearance around the time the surveillance photograph was taken and the defendant’s appearance has changed prior to trial.” Here, even though the police officers were not eyewitnesses to the crime, they were able, unlike the jury, to observe Defendant at the time of the crime before his appearance had changed. “Thus ... their opinions [were] based upon their personal knowledge of the facts to which they testified.” Compare Carter (March 31, 2004), above. Distinguished, Mitchell (February 6, 2007), above (error to admit witness’s opinion of identity of person in photograph; no evidence of changed appearance or similar circumstance). Accord, Dawson (March 17, 2008), above. Simmons v. State, 271 Ga. 563, 522 S.E.2d 451 (October 18, 1999). “‘Where counsel elicits testimony unfavorable to his client, he will not be heard to object to it, no matter how prejudicial it may be, if it is a direct and pertinent response to the question propounded.’ Mosely v. State, 269 Ga. 17, 21(4), 495 S.E.2d 9 (1998).” Defense counsel here asked state’s pathologist why more blood wasn’t found on murder victim, opening door to witness’s opinion that defendant had raped the victim and wiped away the blood. Thompson v. State, 240 Ga.App. 26, 521 S.E.2d 876 (August 30, 1999). Witness was properly allowed to give an opinion as to “whether the other victims appeared afraid or scared after being gathered in the living room.” “‘[A] person's state of mind or mental condition is properly the subject of opinion testimony and that after narrating the facts and circumstances upon which his conclusion is based, a nonexpert witness may express his opinion as to the state of mind or mental condition of another. Leonard v. State, 157 Ga.App. 37, 38(1), 276 S.E.2d 94 (1981).’ O'Kelley v. State, 175 Ga.App. 503, 507(3), 333 S.E.2d 838 (1985).” “[Witness] Raul Briones certainly could testify that he himself was afraid in these circumstances. He also could relate what he observed about the others similarly situated in his presence. In our view, this was a sufficient factual predicate to authorize the trial court's admission of Raul Briones' opinion testimony as a nonexpert witness. O'Kelley v. State, supra.”