☢ test - Í

Green v. State, 239 Ga.App. 617, 521 S.E.2d 441 (August 3, 1999). “It is well established that opinion testimony of an eyewitness may be used to establish speed and that such evidence is sufficient to authorize a factfinder to conclude that the speeding laws have been violated. Dunbar v. State, 228 Ga.App. 104, 111(4), 491 S.E.2d 166 (1997); Jackson v. State, 223 Ga.App. 27, 28(2), 477 S.E.2d 28 (1996); Nairon v. State, 215 Ga.App. 76, 78(3), 449 S.E.2d 634 (1994).” Barnes v. State, 239 Ga.App. 495, 521 S.E.2d 425 (July 30, 1999). Evidence supported court’s award of victim restitution for property damage; estimates of cost of repair were properly admitted to support victim’s opinion of value of damage. “In Maddox v. State, 157 Ga.App. 696, 697, 278 S.E.2d 480 (1981), this Court held that ‘[t]he question of value is a matter of opinion, and as to questions of opinion, the witness may swear to his opinion or belief, giving his reasons therefor. One need not be an expert or dealer in the article, but may testify as to value if he has had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion. The owner of property is considered to be qualified to state his opinion as to value. Opinion evidence as to the value of an item, in order to have probative value, must be based upon a foundation that the witness has some knowledge, experience or familiarity with the value of the property or similar property and he must give reasons for the value assessed and also must have had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion.... The victim in this case proved her knowledge and familiarity with the items, and gave reasons for the value she assessed as to each item. It is not objectionable that her opinion as to value might, in some cases, be based on hearsay. Moreover, she did not purport to represent such hearsay as truth or fact, but used it to show the foundation or basis for her opinion. ...’ (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) See also OCGA §§ 24-9-65; 24-9-66; Vitello v. Stott, 222 Ga.App. 134, 136, 473 S.E.2d 504 (1996); Loggins v. Mitchell, 201 Ga.App. 358, 359(1), 411 S.E.2d 98 (1991); Dixon v. Williams, 177 Ga.App. 702, 704, 340 S.E.2d 286 (1986); B & L Svc. Co. v. Gerson, 167 Ga.App. 679, 681, 307 S.E.2d 262 (1983) (valuations may be based in whole or in part on hearsay, and this would go to its weight, not admissibility); Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga.App. 328, 331-332(1), 147 S.E.2d 782 (1966) (value is necessarily a matter of opinion, and such opinion is admissible as long as the witness provides the foundation underlying such opinion). … The State admitted the written estimates in order to establish part of the basis of McCrary's opinion as to such costs, not as evidence going to the truth of the matter asserted. See OCGA § 24-3-1(a); Hurston v. State, 194 Ga.App. 226, 390 S.E.2d 119 (1990).” Distinguishing In re: A.F., 236 Ga.App. 60(1), 510 S.E.2d 910 (1999) (estimate were tendered as proof of cost and not to support owner’s opinion). Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 512 S.E.2d 896 (March 1, 1999). “A jailer who had observed Speed every day for at least eight months testified as a mitigation witness [at sentencing phase of death penalty trial] and stated that Speed was a quiet, compassionate inmate. On cross-examination, the prosecutor, apparently anticipating the testimony of the defense psychologist that Speed had a dependent personality disorder, asked the jailer if Speed had a dependent or independent personality. Speed objected that the jailer was not qualified to answer the question, but the trial court overruled the objection. The jailer answered that Speed had a strong, independent personality based on his demeanor and character and that he did not seem to depend on any jailer or inmate. The jailer also testified over objection that he was surprised that the defense psychologist had diagnosed Speed with a dependent personality disorder because Speed ‘hasn’t exuded any of those qualities.’ Although the jailer was not an expert, ‘ after narrating the facts and circumstances upon which his testimony is based, a nonexpert witness may express his opinion as to the state of mind or mental condition of another.’ O'Kelley v. State, 175 Ga.App. 503, 507(3), 333 S.E.2d 838 (1985); see also Peebles v. State, 260 Ga. 430, 432-33(3), 396 S.E.2d 229 (1990).” 2. IDENTIFICATION Durham v. State, 296 Ga. 376, 768 S.E.2d 512 (January 20, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly permitted “[witness] Ragins to testify that [victim] Baldwin had a habit of pronouncing the letter ‘J’ as a ‘Y’ and that he would pronounce Durham's name as ‘Yavon’ instead of ‘Javon.’ … Even if it were otherwise, a layperson may provide his opinion about the distinctive mannerisms of a person whom he has observed. See Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 320–321(4) (658 S.E.2d 755) (2008).” Owens v. State, 317 Ga.App. 821, 733 S.E.2d 16 (October 9, 2012). Convictions for robbery by sudden snatching reversed based on improper admission of identification opinion evidence based on surveillance video. 1. Evidence properly admitted based on identification based on “‘distinctive but presently inaccessible characteristic of the defendant's appearance,’ i.e., his mannerisms and walk. See Bradford v. State, 274 Ga.App. 659, 661(3) (618 S.E.2d 709) (2005) (permitting identification when witnesses identified masked perpetrator based on familiarity with defendant's “quirky body movements”); see also Dawson [ v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 319(4) (658 S.E.2d 755) (2008) (permitting identification testimony when witness identified defendant by movement, body language, and mannerisms, and defendant