☢ test - Í

Turner v. State, 241 Ga.App. 431, 526 S.E.2d 95 (November 22, 1999). Physical precedent only. Defendant’s conviction for vehicular homicide affirmed; trial court properly permitted “the State's expert witness to testify as to what effect a 0.16 BAC has on a person's ability to drive a motor vehicle. The qualitative relationship between a quantitative BAC and driving ability is beyond the ken of the average juror. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 214 Ga.App. 830, 832(1), 449 S.E.2d 535 (1994).” No indication what type of expert involved . Driver v. State, 240 Ga.App. 513, 523 S.E.2d 919 (October 22, 1999). A court in its discretion may allow a trained and experienced officer to render an opinion as to whether the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that she was less safe to drive, based on the officer’s personal observations of the defendant. A trained and experienced officer can render an opinion based on the officer’s personal observations of the defendant as to whether the driver was less safe. Accord, Holman v. State , 329 Ga.App. 393, 765 S.E.2d 614 (October 29, 2014). Knight v. State, 271 Ga. 557, 521 S.E.2d 819 (October 18, 1999). Trial court properly allowed detective to testify that defendant didn’t appear to be intoxicated when he gave his statement. “Any individual may testify, on the basis of personal observation, about whether another person did or did not appear to be intoxicated on a given occasion. Sweetenburg v. State, 197 Ga.App. 36, 37(3), 397 S.E.2d 451 (1990). Moreover, because of experience and training, a police officer can testify about the state of an individual's sobriety. See Church v. State, 210 Ga.App. 670, 671(2), 436 S.E.2d 809 (1993). Knight solicited the detective's opinion on sobriety at the time of the interview, qualifying the detective about his experience with crack cocaine users. And because Knight initiated the inquiry into the issue of crack cocaine use, ‘the prosecution was authorized to further explore that area.’ Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 447(4), 480 S.E.2d 18 (1997).” Heller v. State, 234 Ga.App. 630, 507 S.E.2d 518 (October 5, 1998). Experienced, highly-trained officer was properly allowed to testify that defendant swayed more than a normal person. Based on State v. Pastorini, 222 Ga.App. 316, 474 S.E.2d 122 (1996). 4. LEGAL OPINIONS/ULTIMATE ISSUE See new OCGA §§ 24-7-701, 702, 704 New case! Everhart v. State, A16A0652, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3064872 (May 25, 2016). Child cruelty conviction reversed on other grounds, but no ineffective assistance based on failure to object to DFCS witness’s testimony. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the testimony wasn’t improper comment on credibility and didn’t invade jury’s province. Witness testified that she didn’t find defendant’s explanation of delay in seeking treatment of child’s injuries “satisfactory.” “In context, this was not a statement of disbelief; indeed, the State made explicit before asking the question that the State was ‘not asking [her] to gauge [Everhart’s] truthfulness,’ and on cross- examination, the witness stated that she ‘didn’t draw any conclusions about [Everhart] misleading me.’ Rather, the DFCS witness simply testified that Everhart’s explanation, even if true, did not constitute a sufficient reason for failing to seek immediate medical care for the victim.” Saffold v. State, S15A1375, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1085241 (March 21, 2016). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Under pre-2013 Evidence Code, fire marshal’s testimony that house fire “was intentionally set” didn’t go to the ultimate issue, which was “deciding whether Appellant had committed arson, because the testimony did not address other elements of the crime of arson or directly implicate Appellant as the perpetrator of that crime. See Parker v. State, 145 Ga.App. 205, 207, 243 S.E.2d 580 (1978) (‘The factual conclusion that the fire was set by a human, rather than accidentally, is a far cry from the legal conclusion that the appellant here was criminally responsible for arson.’). Moreover, the conclusion that the fire was intentionally set was not one jurors would ordinarily be able to draw for themselves. See id. See also Smith v. Smith, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981) (‘Expert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman.’).” Lamar v. State, 297 Ga. 89, 772 S.E.2d 636 (May 11, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; under pre- 2013 Evidence code, detective’s testimony about his conclusions based on his investigation was proper. Defendant contended that another man, Stallings, was the murderer, but detective testified “that, at a certain point in his investigation, he ‘was confident that Mr. Stallings was not involved in this homicide.’” Held, this didn’t go to ultimate issue, “namely whether Lamar shot and killed McCrae.” “In this instance, the investigating officer testified only regarding