☢ test - Í

the course of his investigation concerning Stallings.” Wright v. State, 327 Ga.App. 658, 760 S.E.2d 661 (June 19, 2014). Child molestation conviction reversed; no improper comment on ultimate issue where victim’s aunt testified: “When I asked her what—he really done that, she said yeah. But it was like—she was crying. And I knew.” “[T]he aunt was not giving her opinion as to Wright's guilt. See Carter v. State, 320 Ga.App. 454, 461(4)(b) (740 S.E.2d 195) (2013). Rather, she was testifying as a fact witness, describing the circumstances of the outcry and her reaction to it. See Dubose [ v. State, 294 Ga. 579, 587(6)(b) (755 S.E.2d 174) (2014)].” Thus, no ineffective assistance for failure to object. Jordan v. State, 293 Ga. 619, 748 S.E.2d 876 (September 23, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no improper comment by investigator who “testified on re-direct examination that early in his interrogation appellant ‘was playing games back and forth, didn’t want to give us the full truth even though we knew so much of the truth’ and that appellant kept giving them ‘the run-around.’” No “ultimate issue” violation here: “[Investigator] Otts was not asked for and did not give his opinion about whether appellant committed the crimes. Instead, the challenged testimony describes the circumstances of the custodial interview and explains why, based on Otts’ own observations, the interview lasted several hours. The fact that appellant initially denied any involvement in the crimes and was not forthcoming in his statements to police, made evidence by his subsequent admissions, was relevant to the issue of his guilt or innocence and was properly presented to the jury for its consideration.” Trial court charged jury that “it was their duty to determine the credibility of all witnesses.” “The State offered Otts’ testimony on re-direct in response to a defense implication that appellant had been subjected to an overly burdensome interrogation. Fouts v. State, 322 Ga.App. 261, 744 S.E.2d 451 (June 14, 2013). Vehicular homicide conviction affirmed (but evidence didn’t support conviction for no proof of insurance); no ineffective assistance based on failure to object to the testimony of two troopers “who both opined that the collision was caused by Fouts's reckless driving. ‘A witness generally is not permitted to express his or her opinion regarding an ultimate issue in the case because to do so would invade the fact- finding province of the jury[.]’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Medlock v. State, 263 Ga. 246, 248(3) (430 S.E.2d 754) (1993). ‘Expert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the layman.’ (Footnote omitted.) Fortner v. Town of Register, 289 Ga.App. 543, 546(1) (657 S.E.2d 620) (2008). ‘It has long been recognized that a police officer with investigative training and experience on automobile collisions is an expert.... Such an officer is an expert even if he is not trained to reconstruct traffic accidents ... [and] is allowed to testify about what he observed at the accident scene and to give his conclusions from those observations about what happened (as opposed to which party was at fault).’ (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Id. at 545(1). Thus, an investigating officer may testify that one of the drivers was the sole cause of the collision, but he may not opine as to whether the driver was at fault or whether he was negligent. Id. at 546(1); Strickland v. Stubbs, 218 Ga.App. 279, 281(4) (459 S.E.2d 473) (1995).” Any error in failing to object didn’t prejudice defendant, as “[t]here is no dispute that Fouts crossed the centerline and drove into oncoming traffic, providing evidence of her guilt.” Brown v. State, 321 Ga.App. 198, 739 S.E.2d 118 (March 20, 2013). RICO conviction affirmed; admission of evidence that defendant was fired from his job as a result of his actions didn’t “invade the province of the jury.” Defendant was convicted of falsifying company records to pay unearned overtime to employees, then splitting the extra pay with them. “Here, the witness did not give her opinion as to whether Brown was guilty of the allegations as alleged in the indictment; rather, she testified that Brown was terminated from his employment with KMM based on their investigation of him.” Chandler v. State, 320 Ga.App. 516, 740 S.E.2d 256 (March 19, 2013). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; victim’s testimony “that Chandler did not have permission to have any of his property or to enter his residence” didn’t violate “ultimate issue” rule. “‘The [victim] did not testify that he thought [Chandler] had committed a burglary, and therefore did not testify as to the ultimate issue.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Escoe v. State, 306 Ga.App. 321, 323(2), 702 S.E.2d 652 (2010).” Young v. State, 292 Ga. 443, 738 S.E.2d 575 (February 18, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no “ultimate issue” violation where autopsy report, stating “Manner of Death: Homicide” was admitted into evidence. “[T]he ultimate issue for the jury in this case was not whether Bowers was the victim of a homicide, because it was undisputed that someone killed Bowers by shooting him 11 times with a .40–caliber pistol. Instead, the ultimate issue for the jury was whether Young was the killer, and the autopsy report set out no opinion on that. See Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 679(4) (681 S.E.2d 130) (2009).”