☢ test - Í

Thomas v. State, 318 Ga.App. 849, 734 S.E.2d 823 (November 28, 2012). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no improper “ultimate issue” testimony. Defendant here married victim’s sister days after the incident in question. Victim’s mother testified that she had not spoken to the sister since she married defendant because “‘[my daughter] made her choice ... [s]he married [Thomas] several days after all this happened, and ... I can't condone her marrying somebody that would do this to her sister. That's just wrong.’” Held, this was not improper comment on ultimate issue of defendant’s guilt, distinguishing Patterson v. State, 278 Ga.App. 168, 628 S.E.2d 618 (2006). “ Patterson stands for the well-established rule that an expert may not offer an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact—including the issue of the defendant's guilt—where the jury is capable of making that determination without expert assistance. Id. at 170–171, 628 S.E.2d 618. Here, the mother testified not as an expert, but as an presumptively-biased parent. Her testimony merely showed that she believed her child, and it did not impermissibly intrude upon the jury's fact-finding function.” Possibly improper bolstering, but defendant didn’t make this objection. Accord, Heard v. State , 322 Ga.App. 37, 743 S.E.2d 597 (May 29, 2013). Brockington v. State, 316 Ga.App. 90, 728 S.E.2d 753 (May 31, 2012). Aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions affirmed. Paramedic’s testimony that the incident appeared to be a “domestic situation” didn’t go to the “ultimate issue” because “the jury was not called upon to determine whether this was a ‘domestic situation.’ It had already heard the 911 call dispatching the police to Brockington's house in response to a ‘domestic situation’ and the first officer on scene had already testified that he was responding to a possible domestic disturbance. The ultimate issue was whether Brockington assaulted and battered the victim.” Sharpe v. State, 291 Ga. 148, 728 S.E.2d 217 (May 29, 2012). Malice murder convictions affirmed; no error in allowing medical examiner to testify that deaths were “homicides.” “Testifying that it was part of his job to determine both the cause and manner of death, the witness clarified that his classification of the manner of death as a homicide was limited to the medical aspect for the autopsy report and was not a legal charge. As the medical examiner's testimony regarding the manner of death did not improperly invade the province of the jury on the ultimate issue of whether the deaths were intentional killings or accidents, the trial court did not err in allowing him to explain his classification. See Willis v. State, 274 Ga. 699 (558 S.E.2d 393) (2002).” Accord, Clarke v. State , 292 Ga. 305, 737 S.E.2d 575 (January 7, 2013); Dyer v. State , 295 Ga. 173, 758 S.E.2d 301 (May 5, 2014) (testimony that cause of death was homicide not improper). Jefferson v. State, 312 Ga.App. 842, 720 S.E.2d 184 (November 3, 2011). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; State’s witness was properly allowed to testify to opinions about whether torn pieces of duct tape found at scene matched roll found in defendant’s possession. “[T]he witness's opinion on this subject was based on her skill and experience in observing and comparing torn pieces of material, and it rested in part upon her use of equipment and techniques not generally accessible or within the knowledge of jurors. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's decision to admit the testimony. See Jackson v. State, 291 Ga.App. 287, 288(2)(b) (661 S.E.2d 665) (2008).” Cade v. State, 289 Ga. 805, 716 S.E.2d 196 (October 3, 2011). Murder and related convictions affirmed. Expert’s testimony about cause of death didn’t go to ultimate issue “because Appellant admitted strangling the victim and his sole defense was that he was justified in doing so. The ultimate issue, which the medical examiner did not address, ‘was whether [Appellant], who presented [a justification] defense ..., was culpable for the killing of the victim. [Cits.]’ Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 679(4), 681 S.E.2d 130 (2009).” Accord, Doyle v. State , 291 Ga. 729, 733 S.E.2d 290 (October 15, 2012) (no error using word “homicide” in jury charge where issue at trial was identity of assailant, not manner of death). DeLeon v. State, 289 Ga. 782, 716 S.E.2d 173 (October 3, 2011). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; witness’s testimony that they didn’t take victim’s threats against defendant seriously, didn’t violate ultimate issue rule. “The witnesses were not asked and did not testify as to whether they believed appellant acted in self-defense and so they did not express an opinion on the ultimate issue of fact.” Veasey v. State, 311 Ga.App. 762, 717 S.E.2d 284 (September 21, 2011). Robbery, reckless driving and related convictions affirmed; no improper “ultimate issue” testimony where officer testified that defendant “drove ‘in a reckless manner in reckless disregard for the safety of persons and property on the highway.’” “[T]his testimony is of no consequence given the other detailed testimony regarding the driving infractions and the overwhelming evidence of