☢ test - Í

Williams v. State, 304 Ga.App. 592, 696 S.E.2d 512 (June 25, 2010). Defendant’s rape and incest convictions affirmed; no ultimate issue violation where social worker’s testimony referred to “the perpetrator.” Quoting Brownlow v. State, 248 Ga.App. 366, 369(2)(b) (544 S.E.2d 472) (2001): “This testimony was given as part of a lengthy response to a request by the State to explain the concept of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. In its context, given the question and the testimony both before and after the language at issue, the psychologist's testimony is most fairly seen as an attempt to explain child abuse accommodation syndrome to the jury rather than an impermissible opinion on an ultimate issue.” Sanchez v. State, 285 Ga. 749, 684 S.E.2d 251 (September 28, 2009). An “objection at trial that the question called for a conclusion does not preserve for appellate review a contention that the testimony went to the ultimate issue for the jury. See Carradine v. State, 234 Ga.App. 330, 331, 506 S.E.2d 688 (1998).” Lee v. State, 300 Ga.App. 214, 684 S.E.2d 348 (September 24, 2009). Defendant, a former doctor, defended charge of aggravated sexual battery saying he was, in fact, conducting a genital exam on his prepubescent daughter. State’s expert witness testified that “she knows of no medical procedure” that would be performed in the manner used by defendant. Held, expert’s testimony did not improperly comment on either defendant’s, or victim’s, credibility, or improperly comment on the ultimate issue before the jury, or merely serve “as a conduit for the opinions of others.” “Claiborne's testimony was limited to describing how she and doctors in the medical community generally perform genital examinations of female patients.” Mayhew v. State, 299 Ga.App. 313, 682 S.E.2d 594 (June 30, 2009). At defendant’s trial for disorderly conoduct, trial court properly sustained objection to defense counsel’s question to victim, “you understand, do you not, that unless the State proves reasonable fear there can be no conviction for disorderly conduct here?” “Because [victim] Cochran's understanding of what the state was required to prove has not been shown relevant, the court did not abuse its discretion in curtailing questioning thereupon. See Cheesman v. State, 230 Ga.App. 525, 527-528(4) (497 S.E.2d 40) (1998) (in trial upon drug charges, court did not err in preventing defense from questioning agent of sheriff's office as to his own definition of ‘possession’ because that was a question of law to be addressed by the court); Taylor [ v. State, 204 Ga.App. 489-490 (419 S.E.2d 745) (1992)] (the extent of the witness's personal knowledge as to the ‘legal limit for DUI in this state’ was not a relevant factual inquiry and thus was inadmissible).” Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 681 S.E.2d 130 (June 15, 2009). Pathologist’s testimony that victim’s death was a “homicide” didn’t go to ultimate issue where defense was not as to cause of death, but alibi and other potential suspects. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 676 S.E.2d 215 (April 28, 2009 ). Detective’s testimony that no one besides defendant had motive to kill victim did not go to the ultimate issue in the case and was properly admitted. “[T]he detective's testimony concerned only the issue of motive, which was not the ultimate issue in the case. ‘Inasmuch as the [detective] was not opining on the ultimate issue of fact and the jury was free to conclude that the [detective] was incorrect, this enumeration presents no grounds for reversal. [Cit.]’ Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 380, 384(3), 467 S.E.2d 542 (1996).” Berryhill v. State, 285 Ga. 198, 674 S.E.2d 920 (March 27, 2009). Not error to admit victim’s death certificate showing cause of death as “homicide.” “‘“[T]he word ‘Homicide’ was nothing more than an indication of the immediate agency of death.” [Cit.]’ Bennett v. State , 265 Ga. 38, 40, 453 S.E.2d 458 (1995).” Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 57, 673 S.E.2d 249 (February 23, 2009). At defendant’s trial for murder of his five-year old stepdaughter, no ultimate issue violation where doctor was allowed to testify, over objection, that child’s prior injuries “were caused by ‘child abuse.’” “Because Dr. Johnson's opinion concerned a 2003 incident for which [defendant] was not on trial, Dr. Johnson was not testifying about the ultimate issue in this case, and, as such, there was no error in allowing his testimony.” Ogburn v. State, 296 Ga.App. 254, 674 S.E.2d 101 (February 20, 2009). Investigator’s testimony opining that evidence indicated that residents of home “had been cooking drugs,” and that the quantity and materials indicated “that the drugs were intended for distribution,” was not improper as going to the ultimate question. Manley v. State, 284 Ga. 840, 672 S.E.2d 654 (January 26, 2009). No mistrial required where trial court promptly sustained objection and struck testimony: investigator testified that “it was apparent to me that [defendant] was responsible for the murder of [victim].”