☢ test - Í

Axelburg v. State, 294 Ga.App. 612, 669 S.E.2d 439 (October 31, 2008). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated sexual battery reversed; trial court erred in failing to redact video recording of defendant’s non-custodial statement to police wherein interrogating officer repeatedly accused defendant of lying, based on officer’s expertise as a “certified forensic interviewer.” “[T]here are instances when a police interrogator's comments during an interview require redaction because they contain the officer's opinions and conclusions on an ultimate fact and impermissibly invade the jury's province,” citing Holland v. State , 221 Ga.App. 821, 472 S.E.2d 711 (1996) (trial court should have excluded interrogator’s comments “that the defendant's stepdaughter would not have ‘just dream[ed] ... up’ molestation allegations; that defendant's actions were an ‘abnormal’ and ‘wrong’ way of showing affection to the stepdaughter; … that the defendant was lying in the interview,” etc.). Officer here cast doubt on defendant’s primary defense (that he was sleepwalking when he molested victim) and defendant’s general credibility. Distinguishing Georgia Supreme Court decisions admitting comments that “appear[ed] to reflect only an aggressive interrogation technique designed to test the truthfulness of [the defendant's] denial of [the requisite intent],” e.g., Hames v. State , 278 Ga. 182, 598 S.E.2d 459 (2004); Rowe v. State , 276 Ga. 800, 582 S.E.2d 119 (2003). Dew v. State, 292 Ga.App. 631, 665 S.E.2d 715 (July 9, 2008). No error where trial court allowed victim and other State’s witnesses to use the word “rape” to describe the incident on trial, over defendant’s objection. Given the trial court’s jury charges on burden of proof and presumption of innocence, “the jury was properly instructed that the question of whether or not Dew raped S.D. was for their determination, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the term to be used. See Marks v. State, 237 Ga. 277(2) (227 S.E.2d 334) (1976) ; Machuca v. State, 279 Ga.App. 231, 235(2) (630 S.E.2d 828) (2006) ; McIntosh v. State, 247 Ga.App. 640, 644(4) (545 S.E.2d 61) (2001). Furthermore, since the crime of rape was a central focus of the trial, it would have been unreasonable to require all witnesses to avoid using the term. See Mullinax v. State, 172 Ga.App. 601, 602(2) (323 S.E.2d 897) (1984).” Accord, Osei-Owusu v. State , 319 Ga.App. 33, 735 S.E.2d 75 (November 29, 2012). Birkbeck v. State, 292 Ga.App. 424, 665 S.E.2d 354 (June 18, 2008). “It is well settled that a witness, even an expert witness, in a child molestation case may not express her opinion on the ultimate issue in the case – i.e., whether the child was molested. Odom v. State, 243 Ga.App. 227, 227-228(1) (531 S.E.2d 207) (2000); Putnam v. State, 231 Ga.App. 190, 191(2) (498 S.E.2d 340) (1998). Accordingly, we assume for the purpose of this appeal that defense counsel’s failure to object to [psychologist] Medlin’s testimony that she diagnosed H.L. with ‘sexual abuse as a child, as the victim alleged’ constituted deficient performance.” Trial counsel here testified at hearing on motion for new trial, that the decision was not strategic – “rather, counsel simply did not ‘see [the testimony] as commenting on the ultimate issue of fact.’” No ineffective assistance, however, as “[t]he challenged testimony represented a mere nine words in the course of Medlin’s lengthy testimony, which also included her repeated entirely proper statements that H.L.’s behavior was consistent with a history of sexual abuse.” Glover v. State, 292 Ga.App. 22, 663 S.E.2d 772 (June 18, 2008). In defendant’s trial for child abuse, “ the trial court’s admission of the DFCS case manager’s statement that ‘[this] was one of the more severe cases of marks and bruises I had seen’ was not erroneous. The state established that the case worker had been with DFCS for ten years, had investigated approximately fifteen to twenty cases each month, and had seen hundreds of physically abused children. The evidence was relevant to the issue of excessive physical pain, an essential element of the crime of cruelty to children. See OCGA § 16-5-70(b). The case manager’s statement did not express an opinion on an ultimate issue of the case. Accordingly, her comparison of the child’s injuries to those of other child abuse victims over the course of her experience was properly admitted. Cherry v. State, 174 Ga.App. 145, 147(6) (329 S.E.2d 580) (1985).” Osborne v. State, 291 Ga.App. 711, 662 S.E.2d 792 (May 29, 2008). At defendant’s trial for rape and child molestation, over defendant’s objection, trial court properly allowed State’s expert “to testify that the child’s manner of responding during the interview showed signs of spontaneity and detail that were not consistent with being coached. Because this testimony did not impermissibly address the ultimate issue before the jury or bolster the child’s credibility, we find no error.” Child here responded to questions about molestation ‘in a singsong manner;’ defense suggested this was a result of coaching. Jackson v. State, 291 Ga.App. 287, 661 S.E.2d 665 (April 24, 2008). “‘Expert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which the jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Caldwell v. State, 245 Ga.App. 630, 633(4) (538 S.E.2d 531) (2000). Under the circumstances