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here, it was permissible for the investigator to testify that based on his experience, persons who suffer from cuts or stab wounds often do not remember being stabbed – a conclusion that is beyond the ken of the average layman . [fn: Even if the investigator’s testimony was somewhat based upon hearsay, his opinion was mainly derived from his many years of professional experience. See Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871, 875(3) (655 S.E.2d 806) (2008); Brewer v. State, 280 Ga. 18, 20(2) (622 S.E.2d 348) (2005) (‘an expert may base his opinion on hearsay; the presence of the hearsay does not mandate the exclusion of the testimony, but rather goes to the weight the testimony is to be given, which is a question for the jury.’ (Citation omitted.); compare Cobb [(March 17, 2008), below ] (expert testimony inadmissible where opinion was based entirely upon hearsay). ] See Caldwell, supra. We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of this testimony.” Accord, Walton v. State , 291 Ga.App. 736, 662 S.E.2d 820 (May 30, 2008) (expert may testify to opinion on ultimate issue where matter is beyond the ken of the average layman – here, fact that defendant’s behavior was typical of a shoplifter). Karafiat v. State, 290 Ga.App. 15, 658 S.E.2d 801 (March 4, 2008). Officer’s testimony that defendant “had been DUI” “did not impermissibly invade the jury’s province. Lanning v. State, 261 Ga.App. 480, 482-483(3) (583 S.E.2d 160) (2003); Chance v. State, 193 Ga.App. 242(1) (387 S.E.2d 437) (1989).” “The officer stated the opinion after giving an extensive outline of his years of DUI training and experience and his observations of Karafiat.” Stanley v. State, 283 Ga. 36, 656 S.E.2d 806 (January 28, 2008). Eyewitness’s testimony that “I saw [Stanley] walk up to [Gates] and stick him in the chest. That’s what I really believe killed him,” was not, in context, improper. “[Witness] Byrd was certainly authorized to testify about his observations of the attack on the victim. As to Byrd’s comment about the cause of the victim’s death, it is plain that Byrd was not testifying as an expert witness on that issue or any other, and that his statement was merely gratuitous.” Berry v. State, 282 Ga. 376, 651 S.E.2d 1 (July 13, 2007). No error where “the medical examiner testified that the victim’s death was a homicide and not an accident … ‘[s]ince homicide means “the killing of any human being”....’ Griggs v. State, 17 Ga.App. 301, 302(6)(a) (86 SE 726) (1915). There was no dispute that Berry killed Rotunno, because he was operating the car which caused the death.” Brooks v. State, 286 Ga.App. 209, 648 S.E.2d 724 (June 28, 2007). At defendant’s child molestation trial, no error in admitting expert’s opinion testimony: “the expert was asked whether the victim could distinguish between certain sexual acts he had seen his mother engage in and the acts that Brooks was accused of committing. The expert answered that in his opinion the victim did not confuse his mother’s sexual acts with the acts committed by Brooks.” “[T]he expert’s testimony appears to be an attempt to explain what impact it could have on the victim to see his mother engaging in sexual intercourse, rather than an impermissible opinion on an ultimate issue.” Winfrey v. State, 286 Ga.App. 718, 650 S.E.2d 262 (June 20, 2007). Trial court erred in admitting officer’s opinion testimony that defendant shot victim. “Winfrey … contends the trial court erred in admitting over objection testimony from the investigating detective affirming that the detective was confident Winfrey was responsible for the victim’s shooting. Winfrey claims that the detective’s testimony invaded the fact-finding province of the jury. The state concedes that error occurred and we agree as well. ‘The issue in this case is whether [Winfrey shot the victim]. That is a matter for jury determination, and no part of such an inquiry can be said to be beyond the ken of the average layman.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.). Fordham v. State, 254 Ga. 59, 59-60(4) (325 S.E.2d 755) (1985). See also Shafer v. State, 285 Ga.App. 748, 647 S.E.2d 274 (May 9, 2007); Grude v. State, 189 Ga.App. 901, 903(2) (377 S.E.2d 731) (1989); Carroll v. State, 185 Ga.App. 857, 859(1) (366 S.E.2d 232) (1988).” Harmless error, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Shafer v. State, 285 Ga.App. 748, 647 S.E.2d 274 (May 9, 2007). Trial court erred in allowing prosecutor to ask deputy “do you feel that this string of phone messages amounted to an aggravated stalking in violation of the temporary protective order?” “[T]he deputy’s testimony was a comment on the ultimate issue that should not have been allowed. [Cits.]” Harmless error, however. Northern v. State, 285 Ga.App. 303, 645 S.E.2d 701 (May 8, 2007). In defendant’s statutory rape prosecution, trial court properly sustained State’s objection to defense counsel’s question to victim: “Well, what element of force was present?” “‘Whether a question calls for a legal conclusion, or principally a fact which incidentally involves a legal word or phrase, is within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Shaw v. Ruiz, 207 Ga.App. 299, 302(8), 428 S.E.2d 98 (1993).”