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Jones v. State, 281 Ga. 758, 642 S.E.2d 816 (March 26, 2007). “[T]he use of the word ‘victim’ in referring to the deceased does not amount to an improper comment on the guilt of the accused. Sedlak v. State, 275 Ga. 746, 748- 749(2)(d) (571 S.E.2d 721) (2002); Camphor v. State, 272 Ga. 408, 414(6)(c) (529 S.E.2d 121) (2000).” Collum v. State, 281 Ga. 719, 642 S.E.2d 640 (March 19, 2007). No improper expression of opinion on ultimate issue: “The State’s expert in pediatrics testified that [child murder victim] Jacob had been beaten to death and an expert in forensic pathology testified that Jacob’s then-healing broken rib was the result of an adult strength force. Collum argues that the trial court erred by denying his related motions for mistrial because this testimony went to the ultimate issue. 1. As to the former testimony, Collum’s argument has no merit because t here was no attempt to attribute Jacob’s death to anything other than being beaten; the ultimate issue was the identity of the person or persons responsible for the beating. Accord, McFolley v. State , 289 Ga. 890, 717 S.E.2d 199 (October 17, 2011) (doctor allowed to testify that death by shaken baby syndrome is inconsistent with accidental falls, as he never expressed any opinion on the ultimate issue of who was responsible therefor); Dyer v. State , 295 Ga. 173, 758 S.E.2d 301 (May 5, 2014) (testimony relating to cause of death didn’t go to ultimate issue of identity of perpetrator). 2. The argument also lacks merit as to the latter testimony because the force necessary to break a young child’s rib is an issue beyond the ken of the average layman; thus, such expert opinion is admissible even if it goes to the ultimate issue. See Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 (277 S.E.2d 678) (1981). 3. Collum also argues that certain comments made by investigators in the course of questioning Rhodes, which were included in the videotaped interviews played for the jury, improperly went to the ultimate issue and to witness credibility. [fn] We find no merit in this argument, however, as law enforcement interrogations are, by their very nature, attempts to determine the ultimate issue and the credibility of witnesses.” Appling v. State, 281 Ga. 590, 642 S.E.2d 37 (February 5, 2007). No error in trial court’s “overruling an objection to the State’s reference to [victim] Parks as the ‘murder victim’ during its direct examination of a crime scene technician, and by commenting on the use of the term in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 [fn]. We find no error in this reference because the evidence was clear that Parks was unlawfully killed. See Ruffin v. State , 243 Ga. 95 (14), 252 S.E.2d 472 (1979). As the trial court’s aside was merely an explanation of its ruling on the objection, i.e., that inappropriate use of the word had not been an issue thus far in the trial, it does not constitute the type of judicial comment prohibited by OCGA § 17-8-57.” Harris v. State, 283 Ga.App. 374, 641 S.E.2d 619 (February 1, 2007). At defendant’s rape trial, State presented “testimony from a clinical psychologist opining that it is a common misconception that people will make up rape allegations for the purpose of revenge. We agree that the testimony was improper but find that it did not constitute prejudicial error.” “‘ Georgia law forbids expert opinion testimony that ... implicitly goes to the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, when such issue ... is not beyond the ken of the average juror.’ Bruce v. State, 268 Ga.App. 677, 681(1)(b) (603 S.E.2d 33) (2004). See also Odom v. State, 243 Ga.App. 227, 228(1) (531 S.E.2d 207) (2000). Dr. Gordon’s testimony – that it is a common misconception that people make up rape allegations for the purpose of revenge – implicitly went to the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, namely, whether the victim had fabricated the rape allegation against Harris. And, it is simply not beyond the ken of the average juror to determine whether and under what circumstances a rape allegation has been fabricated. ‘[W]here (a) the path from evidence to conclusion is not shrouded in the mystery of professional skill or knowledge, and (b) the conclusion determines the ultimate issues of fact in a case, the jury must make the journey from evidence to conclusion without the aid of expert testimony.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jennette v. State, 197 Ga.App. 580, 582(3) (398 S.E.2d 734) (1990). Accordingly, Dr. Gordon’s testimony should not have been allowed. Cf. Bruce, 268 Ga.App. at 681(1)(a) (expert testimony opining ‘that children sometime have difficulty distinguishing nightmares from reality’ was inadmissible because not beyond the ken of the average juror); Jennette, 197 Ga.App. at 581-582(3) (expert testimony on ‘lying child syndrome’ was inadmissible because jury could determine whether child victim was lying without aid of an expert). [ footnote: We note that Dr. Gordon’s testimony was inadmissible on an additional ground. The testimony could be construed as implying that Harris, by suggesting that the victim accused him of rape out of revenge, fit the common profile of a rapist. As such, Dr. Gordon’s testimony was similar to testimony that a defendant fits the common profile of a spousal abuser, which we have held is not admissible, absent a situation where the defendant has put his character in issue or has raised some defense, such as accident, which the profile is relevant to rebut. See Jones v. State, 276 Ga. 253, 255(2) (577 S.E.2d 560) (2003); Parrish v. State, 237 Ga.App. 274, 277(2)(ii) (514 S.E.2d 458) (1999). ] ” Harmless error, however, given overwhelming evidence of guilt. Accord, Al-Attawy v. State , 289 Ga.App. 570, 657 S.E.2d 552 (January 25, 2008) (psychiatrist’s testimony – that he found child molesting victim’s outcry to be credible – was inadmissible). Smith v. State, 281 Ga. 237, 637 S.E.2d 400 (November 6, 2006). Trial court properly overruled objection to prosecutor’s