☢ test - Í

question to witness: based on her observations, did she believe “that Smith acted in self-defense?” “[I]t was permissible for the eyewitness to testify, based upon her own observations of the shooting, whether Smith acted in self-defense. Campbell v. State, 269 Ga. 186, 187(5) (496 S.E.2d 724) (1998).” Revells v. State, 283 Ga.App. 59, 640 S.E.2d 587 (October 25, 2006). Doctor’s testimony that his “overall impression” of child victim’s condition “was a possible child-neglect scenario” did not invade jury’s province, expressing opinion on ultimate issue. “A treating physician can testify that the examination of the child raised a ‘strong suspicion of child abuse.’ Thornton v. State, 264 Ga. 563, 571(11) (449 S.E.2d 98) (1994). See also Harris v. State, 279 Ga.App. 570, 571 (631 S.E.2d 772) (2006) (Examining pediatrician testified that his findings were consistent with a finding of molestation.)” Distinguishing Allison v. State , 256 Ga. 851, 853(6), 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987) (“the psychologist opined that in her professional opinion, the child ‘had been [sexually] abused.’”). Nguyen v. State, 279 Ga.App. 129, 630 S.E.2d 636 (April 27, 2006). “While use of the word ‘rape’ may be objectionable in some circumstances, [footnote: See Arnold v. State, 166 Ga.App. 313, 317(7) (304 S.E.2d 118) (1983) (reference to an incident as ‘rape’ states a conclusion usually to be determined by the jury).] and defense counsel may file a motion in limine to prohibit the use of the term ‘rape,’ see Glass v. State, 255 Ga.App. 390, 403(10)(e) (565 S.E.2d 500) (2002), we cannot conclude that trial counsel’s failure to file such a motion here constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. See Glass v. State, 255 Ga.App. at 403(10)(e).” Howell v. State, 278 Ga.App. 634, 629 S.E.2d 398 (February 8, 2006). Physical precedent only. Doctor/expert witness in child molestation case was properly allowed to testify that, in her experience, “it is very common” for “family members to recant their original statements.” The doctor did not “comment upon the ultimate issue for the jury to decide or the witnesses’ credibility.” Overruled on other grounds, Hatley v. State , 290 Ga. 480, 722 S.E.2d 67 (February 6, 2012). Nelson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 92, 625 S.E.2d 465 (December 6, 2005). “Nelson contends that the trial court erred by allowing [victim] Ms. Haynes to testify that Nelson ‘threatened’ her, and by allowing the State to use the words ‘threats’ and ‘threatened’ to characterize Nelson’s words and actions when questioning Ms. Haynes on direct examination. Nelson argues that characterizing Nelson’s words in this way constituted the rendering of an improper legal conclusion or legal opinion. We are unpersuaded. By describing Nelson’s words as ‘threats,’ Ms. Haynes did no more than provide a factual description of what she heard and observed as an eyewitness, and the prosecutor merely reiterated in his subsequent questioning the factual description provided by Haynes. Thus, no error was committed in allowing the testimony. See Roberts v. State, 272 Ga. 822, 826(6) (537 S.E.2d 86) (2000) (testimony in which officer ‘was merely relating what he observed by use of his senses of sight and hearing’ did not constitute impermissible opinion testimony); Bland v. State, 174 Ga.App. 584(1) (330 S.E.2d 796) (1985) (testimony reflected officer’s ‘personal observation’ of fact and thus did not constitute the rendering of an impermissible legal conclusion).” Jones v. State, 276 Ga.App. 810, 625 S.E.2d 4 (November 9, 2005). Allowing officers to refer to machines as “gambling machines” did not express opinion on ultimate issue of whether machine was illegal and whether defendant sold it, although defendant was contesting whether it was, in fact, set up for gambling. “‘As a general rule a witness is not permitted to express an opinion of ultimate fact or the fact to be decided by the jury because to do so would invade the province of the jury. [Cit.]’ (Punctuation omitted.) Nichols v. State, 177 Ga.App. 689, 692(2) (340 S.E.2d 654) (1986) (reversible error to allow doctor to testify that victim was ‘raped.’). Cf. Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 (277 S.E.2d 678) (1981) (expert’s opinion regarding ‘battered woman syndrome’ admissible at trial.)” Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 99, 619 S.E.2d 789 (August 12, 2005). “The prosecutor did not ask the victim for his opinion on the ultimate issue of whether Brown committed the indicted acts with the criminal intent required to authorize the jury to convict. Rather, the State’s question sought to elicit testimony regarding whether it appeared to this eyewitness that the movement of Brown’s arm which propelled the point of the sword he held through the victim’s body was within Brown’s control. We find no authority supporting the position that whether observed physical behavior was within the actor’s control, or whether it was involuntary, is the sort of opinion testimony which is inadmissible under OCGA § 24-9-65.” Accord, Patterson v. State , 327 Ga.App. 695, 761 S.E.2d 101 (June 24, 2014) ( victim properly allowed to testify that defendant’s act of setting her on fire was “intentional” ). Dunagan v. State, 255 Ga.App. 309, 565 S.E.2d 526 (May 9, 2002). In child molestation prosecution, “It would have been proper to allow the physician to testify that the physical injuries were consistent with sexual molestation by vaginal penetration, but it improperly invaded the province of the jury to allow the physician to testify that the physical