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injuries showed it was likely the child had been sexually molested by vaginal penetration.” Compare Amador (June 23, 2011), above. Sewell v. State, 244 Ga.App. 449, 536 S.E.2d 173 (June 13, 2000). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no mistrial where trial court instructed jury to disregard expert’s testimony that victim “had been sexually abused.” “In this case, ‘the exclusion of the testimony and the trial court's curative instructions prevented [any] error from occurring.’ Brown v. State, 262 Ga. 833, 834(1), 426 S.E.2d 559 (1993).” Atkins v. State , 243 Ga.App. 489, 533 S.E.2d 152 (March 30, 2000). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; pediatrician was properly allowed to testify to child’s description of symptoms suffered after anal intercourse as being consistent with molestation. Pediatrician didn’t personally observe any physical evidence in her exam made “several months after the alleged event.” “Dr. Wilkov made it clear that she was not giving her opinion as to [victim] D.K.'s veracity or whether or not an act of molestation had actually occurred. Moreover, she never attempted to link Atkins to any act of molestation that may have occurred. Dr. Wilkov merely gave her opinion as to whether the symptoms described by D.K. were consistent with those reported by known victims of abuse by anal penetration. The medical history is a part of a physical exam. The question is whether or not the physician may testify concerning the medical history absent objective evidence of molestation on examination. We hold that the physician can so testify.” Accord, Johnson v. State , 245 Ga.App. 690, 538 S.E.2d 766 (August 28, 2000). Porter v. State , 243 Ga.App. 498, 532 S.E.2d 407 (March 24, 2000). Convictions for child cruelty and contributing to deprivation of a minor reversed; trial court erred in excluding defendant’s expert evidence that defendant had a psychological condition that caused her to “‘to be able to block out things that she doesn't want to see’ and that ‘her whole psychological makeup is almost designed to not see things that are too painful to see.’” “Porter's counsel then argued that Porter's defense was that she had no knowledge of the abuse her husband was inflicting on her son. He argued that the psychologist's testimony and report were admissible to show that in her expert opinion Porter was not aware of the signs and symptoms of the abuse, even though a normally perceptive person would have been aware.” 1. The defense presented was not an insanity defense. Rather, the defense went to the defendant’s knowledge, not her intent or ability to form the intent to commit the offenses. 2. Witness’s observation that such conditions “usually happens when one is subjected to some type of abuse or severe emotional distress as a child,” and acknowledgment that she had no knowledge of defendant having experienced such abuse, didn’t make evidence inadmissible. Witness’s testimony that defendant exhibited the condition was based on scientific training plus testing of defendant; she “did not testify she concluded that Porter's condition was the result of childhood trauma.” 3. “ Neither was Dr. Speyer's testimony inadmissible as going to the ultimate issue of whether Porter did have knowledge of her husband's abuse. ‘ It is well settled that an expert may give an opinion or conclusion even on the ultimate issue when that conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman. [Cit.]’ Beecher v. State, 240 Ga.App. 457, 458(2), 523 S.E.2d 54 (1999). In this case, it is clear that the jury would have no way of reaching a conclusion on this issue without the testimony of the expert.” Accord, Gulley v. State , 244 Ga.App. 629, 536 S.E.2d 530 (June 26, 2000) (expert could testify to match between defendant’s DNA and DNA profile from rape kit). 4. Distinguishing cases where defendant sought to present expert testimony of his own state of mind where issue was based on a “reasonable man” standard: justification, Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198, 475 S.E.2d 892 (1996) (“justification is based upon the fears of a reasonable person, not upon the reasonable fears of the defendant”) and voluntary manslaughter, Lewandowski v. State, 267 Ga. 831, 483 S.E.2d 582 (1997) (“voluntary manslaughter required the jury to decide whether the provocation was sufficient to excite deadly passion in a reasonable person, not in this particular defendant”). “In this case, no ‘reasonable man’ standard is involved. Instead, to prove that Porter was a party to causing her son unnecessary pain and depriving him of medical treatment, it was necessary that the State show that she knew her son suffered such pain and required medical treatment.” Odom v. State , 243 Ga.App. 227, 531 S.E.2d 207 (March 15, 2000). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed. 1. Psychotherapist’s “foundation testimony that the victim was referred to her for treatment of ‘[a]lleged child sexual abuse and post traumatic stress disorder’” was not an expression of opinion that the child had been abused. “[T]here is no error in testimony that the young victim was initially referred to Smith for treatment of alleged sexual abuse.” 2. Expert’s testimony that victim’s exam was “most consistent with a history of sexual abuse … was a permissible expression of the expert's opinion based on factors beyond the ken of the average juror. State v. Butler, [256 Ga. 448, 450, 349 S.E.2d 684 (1986)]; Hawkins v. State, 236 Ga.App. 346, 512 S.E.2d 59 (1999); Randall v. State, 207 Ga.App. 637, 640, 428 S.E.2d 616 (1993). 3. Psychiatrist’s testimony that “this child, in my opinion, had been sexually abused” was improper, but cured by immediate objection and curative instruction. Also harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt.