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Beecher v. State, 240 Ga.App. 457, 523 S.E.2d 54 (September 29, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for arson affirmed; trial court properly “allowed the State to introduce expert testimony that the fire was intentionally set. … It is well settled that an expert may give an opinion or conclusion even on the ultimate issue when that conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman. Blackburn v. State, 180 Ga.App. 436, 437, 349 S.E.2d 286 (1986). And here, as in Blackburn, the cause of the fire ‘was such an issue as called for an expert's conclusion.’ Id.” Sams v. State, 239 Ga.App. 715, 521 S.E.2d 848 (August 27, 1999). At defendant’s trial for habitual violator, question asking why officer believed that defendant was the driver of the vehicle in question “invaded the jury's province as to an ultimate issue of fact in violation of the rule enunciated in Maxwell v. State, [ 262 Ga. 73, 76(5), 414 S.E.2d 470 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Wall v. State, 269 Ga. 506, 507(2), 509, 500 S.E.2d 904 (1998)].” Induced error, however, as defense counsel elicited the information. Avila-Nunez v. State, 237 Ga.App. 649, 516 S.E.2d 335 (April 13, 1999). Witness’s testimony did not invade ultimate issue on whether defendant and her husband committed acts of abuse against their child, where doctor testified that abuse is often perpetrated by family members . “Dr. Kelly did not testify that a member of the immediate family had committed the crimes. The language at issue was introduced in the context of an explanation of the Battered Child Syndrome. Dr. Kelly’s testimony addressed only the general issue of who usually commits the abuse ‘in a significant number of cases,’ not in this specific case. Nor was his expert opinion that the child undoubtedly suffered abuse improper. His scientific conclusions on the etiology of the child’s myriad injuries were not within the ken of ordinary jurors. Baise v. State, 232 Ga.App. 556, 559(2), 502 S.E.2d 492 (1998). Moreover, even if the jury accepted his opinion, such did not interfere with the jury’s duty to decide who inflicted the injuries. See id. at 560, 502 S.E.2d 492. Nor did it detract from Avila-Nunez’s own defense that a babysitter abused the victim.” 5. MEDICAL OPINION/INJURIES See also subheading LEGAL OPINIONS/ULTIMATE ISSUE, above Pulliam v. State, 309 Ga.App. 477, 711 S.E.2d 21 (April 15, 2011). Conviction for leaving scene of accident with serious injuries affirmed; victim was properly allowed to testify that he had “several rub fractures.” “Although ‘[a] lay witness is not competent to give what amounts to a medical opinion relative to his injuries or the effect thereof,’ (Citation omitted.) Jones v. State, 294 Ga.App. 564, 566(2) (669 S.E.2d 505) (2008), this Court has ruled that ‘victims are competent to testify as to the injuries they suffered during an assault,’ Watson v. State, 301 Ga.App. 824, 826 (689 S.E.2d 104) (2009) (victim of aggravated assault testified to broken fingers and injuries to head and spine resulting from attack by defendant), citing Jones, supra at 567(2) (victim testified that her right jawbone was fractured during attack), including broken bones. See Ferrell v. State, 283 Ga.App. 471, 473(2) (641 S.E.2d 658) (2007) (victim testified to injuries including eye socket broken in three places, broken cheekbone and nose, and four broken ribs); Code v. State, 255 Ga.App. 432(1) (565 S.E.2d 477) (2002) (victim testified to jaw broken in two places).” Defendant’s testimony that he also “had a pulmonary contusion which is a punctured lung,” if improper, was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Jones v. State, 294 Ga.App. 564, 669 S.E.2d 505 (November 14, 2008). Trial court properly allowed aggravated assault victim to testify that she suffered a broken jaw as a result of defendant’s assault. “A lay witness is not competent to give what amounts to a medical opinion relative to his injuries or the effect thereof. Thomason v. Willingham, 118 Ga.App. 821, 825(2) (165 S.E.2d 865) (1968). This proscription includes the diagnosis and potential continuance of a disease, which must be established by physicians as expert witnesses and not by lay persons. Hunnicutt v. Hunnicutt, 237 Ga. 497 (228 S.E.2d 881) (1976). … We can find no authority, nor does Jones present any, for the proposition that victims of crimes cannot testify as to the injuries they suffered during an assault. See Ferrell v. State, 283 Ga.App. 471, 473(2) (641 S.E.2d 658) (2007) (victim testified that cheekbone, nose and four ribs were broken during attack); Johnson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 413, 415-416(1) (579 S.E.2d 809) (2003) (victim testified that nose was broken during attack); Code v. State, 255 Ga.App. 432, 433(1) (565 S.E.2d 477) (2002) (victim testified that his jaw was broken in two places during attack).” Accord, Watson v. State , 301 Ga.App. 824, 689 S.E.2d 104 (December 30, 2009). 6. STATE OF MIND/MENTAL CONDITION OF ANOTHER Faulkner v. State, 295 Ga. 321, 758 S.E.2d 817 (May 19, 2014). Felony murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly excluded evidence proffered by defense of one witness’s opinion about another person’s motive or intent for certain actions. Faulkner’s theory of defense was that the murder was actually committed by Crew, who was incarcerated at the same time Faulkner was. Faulkner proffered “an officer's expected testimony that Crew would do anything to be placed in