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the same disciplinary ‘pod’ at the jail as Faulkner. Crew did not make any statement to this effect; the officer was merely expected to testify to his opinion based on behavioral problems with Crew. And after a proffer of that testimony, the trial court excluded it as an improper and speculative opinion about Crew's state of mind. See former OCGA § 24–9–65. … ‘While opinion evidence of state of mind or mental condition may be admissible, usually opinion evidence as to one's motives or intent is not. Intent is something which exists in the human mind and can be manifested only by external acts from which an inference of intent will arise.’ Michaels v. Gordon, 211 Ga.App. 470, 473(2)(a) (439 S.E.2d 722) (1993) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Cohen v. Hartlage, 179 Ga.App. 847, 849–850 (348 S.E.2d 331) (1986); Paul S. Milich, Ga. Rules of Evidence § 15:2 (‘lay witnesses are usually not allowed to render opinions as to the intent or motives of others’) (footnote omitted). We find no abuse of discretion in the ruling that excluded opinion testimony that the intent or motive for Crew's misbehavior in jail was to obtain placement in the same part of the jail as Faulkner.” Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428, 721 S.E.2d 892 (January 23, 2012). Malice murder convictions affirmed; no error in admitting testimony that defendant didn’t seem upset at her child’s serious injuries. “A person's state of mind or mental condition is properly the subject of opinion testimony after the facts and circumstances upon which the opinion is based are stated. Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209(2) (232 S.E.2d 47) (1977). The trial court did not err when it allowed the testimony.” Accord, Patterson v. State , 327 Ga.App. 695, 761 S.E.2d 101 (June 24, 2014) (victim properly allowed to testify that defendant’s act of setting her on fire was “intentional,” not an accident); Favors v. State , 296 Ga. 842, 770 S.E.2d 855 (March 27, 2015) (officer’s testimony that she made contact with defendant and “I know he saw me” before almost running over her was properly admitted, citing Smith ). T. OUT OF STATE WITNESSES Note: the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State has been recodified at OCGA § 24-13-90 et seq. Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 769 S.E.2d 329 (February 16, 2015). Reversing 326 Ga.App. 217, 756 S.E.2d 300. 1. Trial court erred by holding that it couldn’t consider hearsay in deciding “whether an out-of-state person is a material witness to a Georgia criminal proceeding under our State's Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, OCGA § 24–13–90 et seq. (the ‘out-of-state witness act’).” “[A] proceeding on a motion for issuance of a material witness certificate is a fact-finding proceeding to which the new evidence rules apply under OCGA § 24–1–2(b), unless an exception applies—but an exception does apply. Under § 24–1–2(c)(1), the hearsay and other rules of evidence, aside from privileges, do not apply to ‘[t]he determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under Code Section 24–1–104.’ And determining whether a particular out-of-state person can offer testimony that is material to the particular Georgia criminal proceeding involves ‘[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of [the] person to be a witness’ in the case under OCGA § 24–1–104(a). The trial court therefore erred in applying the hearsay rules to exclude appellant Jason Parker's proffered documents from the evidence the court considered in ruling on his motion for material witness certificates.” Defendant here sought to subpoena source code evidence from Intoxilyzer manufacturer in Kentucky. In support of his motion, defendant presented affidavits and transcripts of testimony from an expert witness, published articles and a National Safety Council report, but trial court sustained State’s hearsay objection “and therefore denying Parker's motion for failure to prove the materiality of the witnesses requested.” Held, this proceeding falls under “OCGA § 24–1–2(c)(1), which says that the rules of evidence, other than privileges, shall not apply to ‘[t]he determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under Code Section 24–1–104.’” “[O]btaining production of a material witness under the out-of-state witness act requires proof of various facts pertaining to the particular witness and case. The party seeking a material witness certificate must show that the person sought is a ‘material witness’ in the underlying criminal proceeding, OCGA § 24–13–94(a), meaning that the person is capable of ‘“testify[ing] about matters having some logical connection with the consequential facts”’ of the case, Davenport [ v. State , 289 Ga. 399, 404, 711 S.E.2d 699 (2011)]. And if a certificate is issued, the party must show the court in the receiving state that the witness is ‘material and necessary,’ among other things, OCGA § 24–13–92(b). These are ‘[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness’ within the meaning of OCGA § 24–1–104(a). See also OCGA § 24–6–602 (to be competent to testify to a matter, a lay witness must have ‘personal knowledge of the matter’). And OCGA §§ 24–1–2(c)(1) and 24–1– 104(a) both state clearly that in this situation, the rules of evidence, other than privileges, do not apply; the inapplicable rules include the hearsay rules. This conclusion is bolstered by the recognition that OCGA § 24–13–94 permits a court to decide a motion to issue a material witness certificate without holding an evidentiary hearing, … although the court still must find certain facts to make the decision; when no hearing is held at which live testimony can be given, the evidence the court considers in making its decision will often be hearsay.” 2. “[T]he trial court retains the prerogative as the fact-