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finder to determine the weight and credibility of the evidence submitted, and in making this determination, the court may consider the fact that evidence was presented in the form of hearsay rather than testimony subject to cross-examination or evidence bearing other indications of trustworthiness. See Milich, supra, § 1:7, at 7 (explaining that while hearsay statements should be considered by the court in determining preliminary questions under OCGA § 24–1–104(a), the court ‘must decide whether their hearsay character so reduces their reliability that the facts are not proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In other words, the hearsay character of the evidence goes to weight, not admissibility.’ ); John Bourdeau et al., 12 Fed. Proc., L.Ed. § 33:36 (2010 ed.) (explaining that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) recognizes ‘the ability of the court to receive all relevant evidence and to discount evidence that is inherently untrustworthy or suspicious,’ and that “even though the court may consider evidence which would normally be excluded at trial, the court still has a duty to weigh the evidence and discount that which is less reliable’).” 3. Rejects defendant’s alternative argument that the proceeding falls under OCGA § 24-1-2(c)(3) as a “proceeding for extradition or rendition.” Distinguishes that section from its federal counterpart, FRE 1101, which references “miscellaneous proceedings such as ” those listed; the Georgia provision includes no such language. Aburto v. State, 327 Ga.App. 424, 759 S.E.2d 276 (May 30, 2014) (physical precedent only on this point). Conviction for aggravated sodomy and related offenses affirmed; no error in denying petition to secure out-of-state witnesses. Trial court properly concluded that the two proposed witnesses were not shown to be material witnesses. Defendant sought to show that the victim, S.A., fabricated the charge against defendant after she was charged with molesting her brother, C.A. Defendant sought to secure S.A. and his doctor from Illinois. “For purposes of Aburto's theory of the defense, as presented at the petition hearing, it was consequential to his case if the allegation that S.A. molested her brother preceded the allegation that Aburto molested S.A. The state was willing to concede for purposes of the hearing that S.A. had molested her brother, but Aburto did not show that such an act, in and of itself, was a consequential fact,” because he failed to show the sequence of events, while the State showed by a police report that the charge against defendant arose a day before the brother was seen by the doctor. Cronkite v. State, 293 Ga. 476, 745 S.E.2d 591 (July 1, 2013). Affirming 317 Ga.App. 57, 730 S.E.2d 694 (2012); trial court properly denied motion for certificate of need for testimony under Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State, as defendant failed to show that the evidence was “material” to his prosecution. Court of Appeals correctly affirmed trial court, but incorrectly stated that the defendant was required to show “ evidence of an error in the source code that was material to this case.” “Rather, the ‘consequential facts’ of this case deal with whether the Intoxilyzer 5000 may have generated erroneous results from Cronkite’s breath test.” Here, Cronkite attempted to do that by showing that defendant had a dental implant and retainer that could trap mouth alcohol, resulting in an erroneous reading. “However, Cronkite presented no evidence that mouth alcohol was present during his breath test such that an error message should have been generated that was not generated. Indeed, the mere possibility that alcohol can remain present in the mouth due to the existence of a surgical implant and retainer does not amount to evidence of facts pointing to the actual existence of excess alcohol in the mouth at the time of Cronkite’s breath test that should have produced an error message from the Intoxilyzer 5000 that was not produced. Nor did Cronkite point to any other evidence of facts supporting the existence of a possible error in his specific breath test results such as discrepancies in the operation of the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine itself.” Final footnote raises a question for future cases: “the extent to which a trial court might (or might not) have some degree of discretion under former OCGA § 24-10-94(a) to issue a certificate in light of the use of the term ‘may’ in the statute (as the term could imply something other than unfettered discretion of the trial court in this context).” Spann v. State, 318 Ga.App. 740, 736 S.E.2d 749 (November 21, 2012). DUI conviction reversed and remanded for proper application of test for issuance of subpoena for out-of-state witness. “In this case, … the trial court's order establishes that the court did not apply the relatively minimal standard enunciated in Davenport [ (June 20, 2011), below, at 404], to determine whether Spann was entitled to a certificate of materiality under OCGA § 24–10–94 and thus a new trial. Instead, the trial court answered a different question: whether the Intoxilyzer 5000 was sufficiently reliable that expert testimony about its fallibility was unnecessary. The trial court found that the legislature has created procedural and testing safeguards to minimize the possibility of erroneous test results, that other safeguards were built into the trial process, such as a defendant's right to an independent test under the Implied Consent law, the admissibility of testimony that ‘would go to the weight of the evidence,’ and the fact that scientists and engineers on which expert opinions are based must be sufficiently qualified to attain publication.” This amounts to a finding that the witness was not necessary, not whether the witness was material. Davenport v. State, 289 Ga. 399, 711 S.E.2d 699 (June 20, 2011). Reversing 303 Ga.App. 401, 693 S.E.2d 510 (February