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11, 2010) and defendant’s DUI conviction; contrary to Court of Appeals ruling, the Uniform Act for Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State (OCGA § 24-10-90 et seq.) does not require the trial court to determine if a witness is “a necessary and material witness to the case” before issuing process for that witness to appear from outside the state (here, from Kentucky, to produce the source codes for the Intoxilyzer 5000); rather, the trial court in Georgia is only to determine whether the witness is material, pursuant to OCGA § 24-10-94(a); it is up to the out-of-state court (here, in Kentucky) to determine whether “the witness is material and necessary.” Disapproves a line of Court of Appeals decisions holding to the contrary, including Chesser v. State, 168 Ga.App. 195, 196 (308 S.E.2d 589) (1983), Mafnas v. State, 149 Ga. App. 286(1) (254 S.E.2d 409) (1979), and Holowiak v. State , 308 Ga.App. 887, 709 S.E.2d 887 (March 29, 2011). As used in OCGA § 24-10-94(a), a “material witness” is “‘a witness who can testify about matters having some logical connection with the consequential facts, esp. if few others, if any, know about these matters’ Black's Law Dictionary (8 th ed., 2004). Since the proper statute was not applied to this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” Nahmias concurs, suggesting that inability of defendants to obtain source codes for Intoxilyzer 5000 raises due process concerns regarding DUI – per se prosecutions. Hines writes for Carley in dissent, arguing that trial judge is in best position to determine whether witness is necessary, and that defendant here made no such showing here. Defendant here argued that her asthma may have resulted in inaccurate reading on machine, a claim Hines calls “at best, … speculative.” Yeary v. State, 289 Ga. 394, 711 S.E.2d 694 (June 20, 2011). Reversing 302 Ga.App. 535, 690 S.E.2d 901 (February 10, 2010) and defendant’s DUI conviction; contrary to Court of Appeals ruling, the Uniform Act for Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State (OCGA § 24-10-90 et seq.) “authorizes a party in a criminal proceeding to seek purportedly material evidence from an out-of-state corporate entity without naming a person within the corporation as the witness to be summoned to Georgia.” A corporation is “a person” who may be subpoenaed within the meaning of the Act. Defendant here seeks source codes for Intoxilyzer 5000 from its Kentucky manufacturer. Holowiak v. State, 308 Ga.App. 887, 709 S.E.2d 887 (March 29, 2011). Per se DUI conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in declining defendant’s request to subpoena out-of-state witness to testify about Intoxilyzer source codes. “Although Holowiak noted that there were pending allegations in other states of ‘problems with the Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test results based upon breathing patterns,’ and that the information would be used ‘as applied to [his] particular health and physical issues,’ he did not allege that he actually had a physical or health issue that might affect the results of the breath test, much less present any evidence about it. … Thus, as Holowiak did not carry his burden of showing that the subpoena was material and necessary to the case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holowiak's motion.” Disapproved, see Davenport (June 20, 2011), above. French v. State, 288 Ga.App. 775, 655 S.E.2d 224 (November 6, 2007). “Georgia’s Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State (the ‘Act’), OCGA § 24-10-90 et seq., sets forth the procedure for compelling the trial attendance of an out-of-state witness. Additionally, the Act has been construed as providing a mechanism for obtaining a subpoena duces tecum compelling the out-of-state witness to produce specified documents that are necessary and material to the case. See Wollesen v. State, 242 Ga.App. 317, 321(3) (529 S.E.2d 630) (2000). A requesting party, however, does not have an absolute right to obtain out-of-state witnesses or records under the Act. Rather, the Act requires the requesting party to make a ‘presentation of enough facts to enable both the court in the demanding state and the court in the state to which the requisition is directed to determine whether [there should be compliance with the request.]’ (Citations omitted.) Mafnas v. State, 149 Ga.App. 286, 287(1) (254 S.E.2d 409) (1979). French failed to make such a presentation in this case. A subpoena duces tecum is defined as ‘[a] subpoena ordering [a] witness to appear and to bring specified documents, records, or things.’ Black’s Law Dictionary (8 th ed., 2004). Hence, logic dictates that before a court in the demanding state can issue a certificate requesting the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum from a foreign state, and before the foreign state can issue the requested subpoena duces tecum, the courts must be informed of the specific witness to whom the subpoena is to be directed. Here, however, French’s motion failed to identify any specific person, entity, agency or records custodian who should be directed to produce the requested records. Instead, French’s motion included no more than a blanket, generalized request for all of the school, juvenile, and child welfare agency records of the two victims maintained anywhere in California, Florida, and Michigan. As such, the Georgia trial court, as well as the California, Florida, and Michigan courts, would have been made to guess who specifically should be compelled to produce the documents sought by French. In view of that fact, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying French’s motion. ” Wollesen v. State, 242 Ga.App. 317, 529 S.E.2d 630 (February 10, 2000). Trial court properly ordered Wollesen to appear as a grand jury witness in Maryland, pursuant to Maryland court’s certificate “as contemplated by the Uniform Act to