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because it was the result of inattention and not reasoned strategy).” Dissent further faults counsel for filing an affidavit with the plea petition, in which counsel “went beyond laying the foundation that she had conferred with defendant and fully informed him of his rights, the legal effect of entering a plea, and the possible penalties that could be imposed in response to his plea. In the affidavit, counsel also attested she is ‘satisfied that defendant is voluntarily entering this plea and that defendant knows and understands the rights [he] is waiving.’ In this manner, counsel improperly became a witness on the issue of Parody's competency to enter into the plea based on information gleaned from her representation of the client. See Almond v. State, 180 Ga.App. 475 (349 S.E.2d 482) (1986) (finding it repugnant to the idea of a fair trial to admit the testimony of defendant's counsel, after having been called by the state, regarding counsel's opinion regarding the issue of defendant's mental competency that was gained during his representation of defendant).” Dissent also finds that prejudice has been adequately shown. “Applying the standard set forth in Hill v. Lockhart [474 U.S. 52, 58 (106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203) (1985), the central issue presented by Parody's pro se application for writ of habeas corpus relief is not whether there is a reasonable probability that a less severe sentence would have been imposed in response to Parody's guilty plea but whether the plea would have been entered in the first place or, if entered, would have been accepted without a trial on the issue of his competency to enter the plea.” Habeas court’s finding that the outcome “might have been different” is similar to phrasing used by this court, which “has affirmed the grant of habeas relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel where the facts showed the defendant ‘might have been found incompetent to stand trial’ but for counsel's failure to present evidence relating to the defendant's mental state. Martin v. Barrett, supra, 279 Ga. at 595.” Sears v. Humphrey, 294 Ga. 117, 751 S.E.2d 365 (November 18, 2013). Habeas court properly denied relief from capitol sentence where defendant kidnapped victim in Georgia, raped her in Tennessee, and murdered her in Kentucky. Defendant’s additional proposed mitigating evidence presented at habeas hearing might just have likely been considered aggravating by a jury. No ineffective assistance where defense counsel withdrew motion for pretrial psych exam; prevailing law at the time gave the State the right to reports from experts consulted by the defense, even if the defense decided not to use the witness; see Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 18(6) (282 S.E.2d 61) (1981), overruled, Rower v. State, 264 Ga. 323, 325(5) (443 S.E.2d 839) (1994). Evidence of defendant’s impairment was weak, and counsel were afraid that defendant would say something incriminating in the evaluation. “Thus, counsel stated that, because of the law at the time, they feared that an evaluation would almost certainly benefit the prosecution. See Sabel, 248 Ga. at 18(6) (holding that the State may call the defendant's expert as a witness if the defendant does not do so, or may argue to the jury that the defendant would have called the expert had the result of the expert's testing been favorable to the defendant).” “According to counsel, they weighed the pros and cons of pursuing the motion for funds for a psychiatrist, considering Sears' choice [not to be evaluated], their concerns that Sears might make a statement during an evaluation that could be used against him at trial, their personal observations of Sears and ‘the house he grew up in,’ the middle-class environment in which he was raised, and the fact that his parents, ‘who were normal people,’ said that there was nothing wrong with him. Counsel then concluded that, all things considered, they could not have Sears examined pretrial ‘without facing an untenable risk of doing more harm than good.’ Consequently, trial counsel withdrew the motion for a pretrial psychiatric evaluation but left pending the motion for a presentencing psychiatric examination in the event of a conviction, which counsel testified was designed to mitigate the dilemma posed by Sabel in light of the fact that the State's use against Sears of any statements made by him about the crimes were not likely to be as damaging in the sentencing phase as they would be in the guilt/innocence phase. However, the trial court later denied this motion. See Sears v. State, 262 Ga. 805, 807(5) (426 S.E.2d 553) (1993) (affirming on interim review the trial court's denial), disapproved of on other grounds by Brogdon v. State, 287 Ga. 528, 530–531(2) (697 S.E.2d 211) (2010). … According to counsel, they weighed the pros and cons of pursuing the motion for funds for a psychiatrist, considering Sears' choice, their concerns that Sears might make a statement during an evaluation that could be used against him at trial, their personal observations of Sears and “the house he grew up in,” the middle-class environment in which he was raised, and the fact that his parents, “who were normal people,” said that there was nothing wrong with him. Counsel then concluded that, all things considered, they could not have Sears examined pretrial “without facing an untenable risk of doing more harm than good.” Consequently, trial counsel withdrew the motion for a pretrial psychiatric evaluation but left pending the motion for a presentencing psychiatric examination in the event of a conviction, which counsel testified was designed to mitigate the dilemma posed by Sabel in light of the fact that the State's use against Sears of any statements made by him about the crimes were not likely to be as damaging in the sentencing phase as they would be in the guilt/innocence phase. However, the trial court later denied this motion. See Sears v. State, 262 Ga. 805, 807(5) (426 S.E.2d 553) (1993) (affirming on interim review the trial court's denial), disapproved of on other grounds by Brogdon v. State, 287 Ga. 528, 530–531(2) (697 S.E.2d 211) (2010).” “We … agree with the habeas court that, ‘without any indication that [Sears] was suffering from any significant, noticeable disorder,’ trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to have him evaluated by a mental health expert under the circumstances facing counsel at the time. See Holladay v. Haley, 209 F3d 1243,