☢ test - Í

1250(III)(A)(3) (11 th Cir., 2000) (explaining that counsel are not required to seek an independent evaluation when the defendant does not display strong evidence of mental problems and that the choice not to do so is a tactical decision that is evaluated for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying deference to counsel's judgment, under Strickland ). Finally, we conclude that trial counsel developed a reasonable mitigation strategy that included showing the good character of Sears and his family and the impact that a death sentence would have on his family. See Chandler v. United States, 218 F3d 1305, 1321 n. 30 (11 th Cir., 2000) (‘Bringing the family's existence and pain to the attention of the jury is powerful in and of itself.’); Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 969(1) (11 th Cir., 1983) (‘[O]ften the best strategy in a capital case is to attempt to humanize the defendant by presenting evidence of his personal qualities.’).” Hatfield v. State, 321 Ga.App. 904, 743 S.E.2d 560 (May 23, 2013). Rape and related convictions affirmed; although counsel was deficient in failing to investigate whether he was suffering from delusional compulsion at the time of his offense, trial court properly found no showing of prejudice. Defendant’s only witness “noted that although Hatfield ‘was significantly psychiatrically impaired at the time of the alleged offenses, he is clear in his statements to me, and corroborated by the medical record, that he knew right from wrong and was not suffering from any delusional compulsion that would have forced him to commit an act that he otherwise would not have engaged in.’” Defendant’s speculation that an earlier evaluation might have revealed more is insufficient to carry his burden of proof. Brinkley v. State, 320 Ga.App. 275, 739 S.E.2d 703 (March 11, 2013). Kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to seek competency evaluation for 14-year old defendant. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the mere fact of his age didn’t require inquiry into his competency. Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 737 S.E.2d 98 (January 7, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance from trial counsel’s strategic decision not to pursue an insanity/incompetency defense. Trial counsel reviewed defendant’s limited prior records and interviewed his psychiatrist. “The lawyer also confirmed that Arnold had not received further treatment for any mental health issues since his treatment at the Charter facility. In addition, the lawyer drew upon her own extensive experience as a criminal defense lawyer and found no indications in her interactions with Arnold that suggested that further investigation or evaluation of his mental health would be worthwhile. [fn] Based on these things, the lawyer declined to request a psychological evaluation of Arnold, and she instead decided to focus her efforts on developing evidence of provocation that would warrant a conviction for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. [fn] As a part of that defense, she called the psychiatrist who had evaluated Arnold at the Charter facility to testify at trial about the relationship between Arnold and Lakeisha, and while testifying, the psychiatrist touched upon some of the mental health issues for which Arnold had been treated. … ‘Although other attorneys might have explored the mental issue further, we cannot conclude that the investigation by and tactical judgment of [Arnold]'s attorney was outside the wide range of reasonably effective assistance.’ Whitus v. State, 287 Ga. 801, 804(2), 700 S.E.2d 377 (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted).” Alexander v. State, 319 Ga.App. 199, 734 S.E.2d 432 (November 16, 2012). Convictions for battery and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on “failing to properly investigate his mental health prior to trial.” “Alexander never made this assertion to trial counsel, and he did not disclose it when asked about it in an intake interview. See Tyner v. State, 313 Ga.App. 557, 566(6)(d), 722 S.E.2d 177 (2012) (finding no ineffective assistance because defendant did not disclose alleged mental health problem to trial counsel). Further, the alleged mental health problems would not have been relevant to his stated trial strategy of self defense. … [T]here was no evidence presented at the motion for new trial hearing that Alexander was impaired by a mental health condition at the time he battered his girlfriend. See Baker v. State, 259 Ga.App. 433, 437(3)(d), 577 S.E.2d 282 (2003), disapproved of on other grounds by Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 812, n. 1, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).” Nor has defendant “established that a reasonable probability existed that his sentence would have been more lenient if his mental health history had been offered at sentencing. See Hernandez v. State, 303 Ga.App. 103, 106(2), 692 S.E.2d 712 (2010) (‘Mere speculation will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’); Whited v. State, 258 Ga.App. 195, 200(7), 573 S.E.2d 449 (2002), overruled on other grounds by Schofield, 281 Ga. at 812, n. 1, 642 S.E.2d 56.” Defendant here had history of clinical depression and “counseling for behavior problems.” Woods v. State, 291 Ga. 804, 733 S.E.2d 730 (October 29, 2012). Murder conviction reversed on other grounds; trial court properly declined to suppress defendant’s statement to police on grounds that his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to make the statement. Trial could find that counsel wasn’t ineffective. “[Attorney] Tomlinson was faced with a client who had decided to turn himself in and had already revealed to a law enforcement officer that he had killed [victim] Sauls, claiming self defense, and that he had attempted to conceal the body. Viewing Tomlinson's conduct in