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absence of some showing that the witness who testified inconsistently at trial either had personal knowledge or had received information directly from one of the defendants themselves .’ Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 686(3) (531 S.E.2d 84) (2000), citing Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. 17, 19(4) (389 S.E.2d 238) (1990); see also Campbell v. State, 263 Ga. 824, 826(4) (440 S.E.2d 5) (1994). ‘The record in this case does not show how [Gaines] acquired his information; he could merely have been repeating rumors, or he might have acquired information second or third hand. It would have been error to allow [Gaines] personally to testify over objection about a crime of which he had neither personal knowledge nor information directly from ... the defendant [ ] [himself]. The testimony of [the resident of the trailer] was no more admissible than [Gaines's] would have been, and the trial court erred by admitting it in evidence over [Hart's hearsay] objections.’ Johnson, 260 Ga. at 19. Cf., e.g., Sharpe, supra (trial court correctly admitted witness's prior inconsistent statements, where the witness had identified the appellant in her previous statements to the police as the source of her information); Campbell, supra (trial court correctly admitted witness's prior inconsistent statement, where witness claimed in his prior statement to police that he was an eyewitness to the crime).” State v. Canup, 300 Ga.App. 678, 686 S.E.2d 275 (October 16, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for failure to register as a sex offender was supported by defendant’s father’s statement to investigator that defendant no longer lived with him, despite father’s testimony to the contrary. “‘[E]ven though a witness may recant on the stand, [his] prior inconsistent statements constitute substantive evidence on which the factfinder may rely.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Meeks v. State, 281 Ga.App. 334, 336 (636 S.E.2d 77) (2006). The testimony of the investigator as to the prior statement of Canup's father therefore was admissible as substantive evidence of Canup's guilt. [Cits.]” Thorpe v. State, 285 Ga. 604, 678 S.E.2d 913 (June 29, 2009). Murder and related convictions affirmed. Witness’s prior statement (relating conspirators’ prior statements about the murder) was properly admitted as a prior inconsistent statement where witness testified “that his recorded statement was ‘all … lies.’” Green v. State, 298 Ga.App. 17, 679 S.E.2d 348 (May 18, 2009). Green and three co-defendants were charged with attempting to purchase 100 pounds of marijuana from an undercover officer. “The state … called co-defendant Robinson, who had elected to testify at his own trial the day before. [fn] When asked whether he had testified in his own trial concerning ‘these acts that involved you and ... Green,’ Robinson responded, ‘I don't know.’ Robinson then denied that he had been represented by counsel ‘yesterday before a jury on these same charges.’ In a subsequent series of questions concerning Green's role in the drug transaction, Robinson responded variously with ‘I don't know that either,’ ‘I don't want to answer the question,’ ‘No answer,’ and ‘I don't wish to testify. Hold me in contempt. I take the contempt.’ Finally, Robinson denied that he was afraid of Green or that he had ever said that he was afraid of Green. Following Robinson's direct examination by the state, defense counsel expressly declined to cross-examine him. Over objection, the state then recalled the case agent, who read to the jury certain portions of the certified transcript of Robinson's testimony from his own trial the previous day and a statement Robinson had made to the police,” which implicated Green and repeatedly expressed that Robinson was afraid of Green. Held, “ Robinson's testimony at his own trial and his statement to the police were admissible as prior inconsistent statements and constituted substantive evidence of Green's participation in the attempted drug trafficking. Gibbons [ v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 862 (286 S.E.2d 717) (1982)].” Accord, Gober v. State , 300 Ga.App. 202, 684 S.E.2d 675 (September 23, 2009) ( quoting Green: “‘If a reluctant witness testifies that he does not remember whether or not he made a prior statement, the [S]tate is then entitled to introduce the prior statement as inconsistent with the in-court testimony of the witness.’”); Palencia-Barron v. State , 318 Ga.App. 301, 733 S.E.2d 824 (October 31, 2012) (same quote as Gober ); Riddick v. State , 320 Ga.App. 500, 740 S.E.2d 244 (March 19, 2013) (same quote). Eller v. State, 294 Ga.App. 77, 668 S.E.2d 755 (October 16, 2008). Witness who made 911 call denied at trial that he had reported rape in progress, but was properly impeached by “officer’s notes showing that he had made the report. Prior inconsistent statements used to impeach are substantive evidence of the matter asserted. Gassett v. State, 289 Ga.App. 792, 658 S.E.2d 366 (2008).” Simmons v. State, 285 Ga.App. 129, 645 S.E.2d 622 (April 17, 2007). “Simmons contends that there was insufficient evidence of the crime as alleged in the indictment because the victim contradicted herself on cross-examination, stating that she did not remember Simmons hitting her in the head with his fist. This contention is without merit. ‘The fact that at trial the victim disavowed her prior statements went to the weight and credibility that the jury wished to assign to the [s]tate’s otherwise sufficient evidence and presents no basis for reversal.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Griffin [ v. State, 262 Ga.App. 87, 88(1) (585 S.E.2d 145) (2003)]. ‘[T]hat some evidence offered by a witness seems contradictory to his own or to some other’s, or incomplete or uncertain, does not automatically discredit the evidence given by that