☢ test - Í

witness, or others, for it is the function of the triers of fact to determine to what evidence it gives credence. It is not for us to determine or question how the jury resolved any apparent conflicts or uncertainties in the evidence. Rather, on appeal, we indulge every contingency in favor of the verdict.’ (Citation omitted.) Anderson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 595, 596(3) (516 S.E.2d 315) (1999). See also Shorter v. State, 271 Ga.App. 528, 529(1) (610 S.E.2d 162) (2005).” Thomas v. State, 284 Ga.App. 222, 644 S.E.2d 160 (March 14, 2007). Trial court properly charged jury that a witness’s prior material inconsistent statement may be considered “not only for purposes of impeachment, but also as substantive evidence in the case,” citing Cummings v. State , 280 Ga. 831, 833(3), 632 S.E.2d 152 (2006). LeBlanc v. State, 283 Ga.App. 434, 641 S.E.2d 646 (February 5, 2007). Trial court properly admitted the statement given by defendant’s friend to a police officer as a prior inconsistent statement, where the friend claimed to be unable to remember the statement due to memory loss from an accident. “LeBlanc quotes from dicta in Johnson v. State, 255 Ga. 552, 556(4)(a) (341 S.E.2d 220) (1986), that ‘where a witness merely states that he does not remember, he cannot be impeached by the showing of former statements with respect to the facts which he claims not to remember.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Distinguishing Johnson, Spann v. State, 248 Ga.App. 419, 421(1) (546 S.E.2d 368) (2001), some years later noted that there was no evidence in Johnson that the defendant even made the prior statement. Citing to the more recent Supreme Court case of Brown v. State, 266 Ga. 723, 724-725(2) (470 S.E.2d 652) (1996), Spann held that the prior inconsistent statement of a witness suffering from memory loss is admissible where Sixth Amendment concerns are met by the defendant’s having the opportunity to cross-examine a forgetful witness about his bias, lack of care and attentiveness, and even the fact he has a bad memory. Spann, supra, 248 Ga.App. at 421(1). Spann further pointed out that the witnesses experiencing memory loss there were reluctant to testify against the defendant. Under these circumstances, where the reluctant witnesses each took the stand, Spann concluded that ‘it was proper to allow the State to introduce prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 422(1). Accord Meeks v. State, 281 Ga.App. 334, 336-337 (636 S.E.2d 77) (2006). Here, the friend who claimed the memory loss took the stand. His closeness to LeBlanc as a friend, his refusal to speak to the prosecutor before trial, and his responses to the prosecutor’s questioning made it clear that he was very reluctant to testify against LeBlanc. Indeed, the court quite properly ruled he was a hostile witness and allowed the State to ask leading questions. Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the officer to testify as to the conversation with this forgetful witness.” Buchanan v. State, 282 Ga.App. 298, 638 S.E.2d 436 (November 7, 2006). “The proper foundation is laid for a prior inconsistent statement when a witness denies that a statement was made. Hawkins v. State, 195 Ga.App. 739, 740(4) (395 S.E.2d 251) (1990). Where ‘the witness provides relevant testimony that tends to contradict the prior statement, such prior inconsistent statement is properly admitted as substantive evidence.’ Claritt v. State , 280 Ga.App. 384, 634 S.E.2d 81 (June 16, 2006).” Accord, Gassett v. State , 289 Ga.App. 792, 658 S.E.2d 366 (January 31, 2008) (witness’s prior statement was properly admitted where defendant denied making the statements and denied that they were true). Compare Cannon (September 20, 2010), above (no foundation for prior inconsistent statement where witness wasn’t asked about statement). Wells v. State, 281 Ga. 253, 637 S.E.2d 8 (October 16, 2006). “The mother of Wells’ three children, Shanta Turner, told police that he confessed to shooting someone and was planning to flee, although she later recanted at trial, claiming that her prior statement was given under duress. ‘In discharging its duty to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, however, the jury was authorized to believe [her] inculpatory pre-trial statements and to reject her exculpatory testimony at trial. [Cit.]’ Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 685(1) (531 S.E.2d 84) (2000). See also Walker v. State, 264 Ga. 676, 677(1)(b) (449 S.E.2d 845) (1994).” Lynch v. State, 280 Ga. 887, 635 S.E.2d 140 (September 18, 2006). Trial court erred in admitting witness’s prior statement at trial, where witness refused to answer questions at trial. Prior statement was not “inconsistent” with witness’s trial testimony, inasmuch as there was no trial testimony. Error was harmless, however, as statement was cumulative of other properly-admitted evidence. Claritt v. State, 280 Ga.App. 384, 634 S.E.2d 81 (June 16, 2006). Trial court properly admitted witness’s prior statement to police. Witness at first testified that he remembered speaking to the investigator, but didn’t remember what he said; later, he “testified he ‘doubt[ed]’ he had made such statement to police. Under these circumstances, Lipscomb essentially disavowed his earlier statement, and the trial court did not err in admitting it as substantive evidence,” citing Robinson (February 10, 2005), below . “In certain instances in which a witness claims not to recall a