☢ test - Í

Ga.App. 450, 452(1) (477 S.E.2d 849) (1996) (holding that the trial court erred in ‘permitting the State, on cross- examination, to have the defense psychologist refresh his recollection (thereby effectively impeaching defendant) by use of a privileged and confidential communication to the attorney's investigator’). However, the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications ‘which occur before perpetration of a fraud or commission of a crime and which relate thereto.’ In re Fulton County Grand Jury Proceedings, 244 Ga.App. at 382. This is known as the crime- fraud exception to the privilege. See id.; see also Rose v. Commercial Factors of Atlanta, Inc., 262 Ga.App. 528, 529 (586 S.E.2d 41) (2003) (noting that the applicability of the crime-fraud exception does not require proof of the existence of a crime or fraud to overcome the claim that a communication is privileged, but rather ‘depends upon whether a prima facie case has been made that the communication was made in furtherance of an illegal or fraudulent activity’). In this regard, the privileged communication may be ‘a shield of defense as to crimes already committed, but it can not be used as a sword or weapon of offense to enable persons to carry out contemplated crimes against society, frauds or perjuries.’ In re Hall County Grand Jury Proceedings, 175 Ga.App. 349, 350(2) (333 S.E.2d 389) (1985) (punctuation omitted); accord Atlanta Coca–Cola Bottling Co. v. Goss, 50 Ga.App. 637, 639(1) (179 SE 420) (1935). Here, the trial court did not err in determining that the relevant conversations fell within the ambit of the crime-fraud exception. The record reflects that Sullivan communicated with the investigator throughout the course of the weekend during which Roberts made repeated contact with the victim at Sullivan's behest (which included offers of a monetary payout to the victim in exchange for dropping the charges), and the complained-of statements related to continuation of the plan Sullivan willingly undertook with Roberts. In re Hall County Grand Jury Proceedings, 175 Ga.App. at 350(1) (‘[C]ommunications occurring after a fraud or a crime has been completed are privileged, but those which occur before the perpetration of a fraud or commission of a crime and which relate thereto are not protected by the privilege.’ ); see United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048–49(VI) (5 th Cir., 1994) (holding that crime-fraud exception applied to communications in which attorney advised that he believed a scheme was illegal and that he wanted no part in it); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 745 F.3d 681, 692(III)(B) (3 rd Cir., 2014) (holding that district court did not err in finding crime-fraud exception applicable when evidence suggested that ‘c]lient had already considered the advisability of [the proposed conduct], and determined that it was in his best interest to do so’ before seeking ‘advice about the scheme's legality’).” 2. To the extent that the conversations between defendant and the investigator occurred in someone else’s presence, they weren’t privileged. “‘The privilege does not extend to those situations in which third parties are present for attorney-client discussions.’ Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 20–21(2) (717 S.E.2d 629) (2011).” Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 18, 717 S.E.2d 629 (November 7, 2011). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted jailhouse recordings of three-way phone calls between defendant, his girlfriend, and his attorney. Calls were not protected by attorney-client privilege, both because the matters discussed were not confidential, and due to participation by girlfriend. 1. Matter discussed not confidential. See Bryant (October 9, 2007), below . 2. Girlfriend’s participation. “The telephone call was only initiated as three-way calls, with Green's participation, and remained such throughout it duration; there was no evidence that Green ceased to listen to the conversations, and her comments after the connection with the attorney was closed indicated that she had heard the conversation. The privilege does not extend to those situations in which third parties are present for attorney-client discussions. This Court's decision in Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 694 (177 S.E. 582) (1934), recognized that there is a ‘rule that communications between an attorney and client in the presence of third persons or of the adverse party are not within the prohibition [against testimony regarding the communication]. The rule is well recognized; and it has even been held that ignorance of the presence of the third person does not prevent the exception from operating. Thus it has been decided that an eavesdropper or a wiretapper is not incompetent to testify to the communications he overhears. [Cit.]’ See also Cocroft v. Cocroft, 158 Ga. 714, 719 (124 S.E. 346) (1924) (Discussing the marital privilege, and noting that if a couple is unsuccessful in keeping secret that which they intend to be confidential, the fact that they intended confidentiality will not prevent the testimony of one who hears the confidence.). Rogers did not inform the jail custodians that he wished to converse with an attorney so that he could do so on a telephone without a recording device being used. See OCGA § 16–11–62(2)(A). The only evidence before the court was that notification that the calls were recorded appeared in a handbook given to each inmate, there were signs placed on each telephone warning that calls were recorded, a message was played over the telephone before each call stating that calls could be recorded, and that such a message appears on the recording here. In such circumstances, Rogers had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone calls he placed to [girlfriend], see Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 213–14(4) (647 S.E.2d 260) (2007), and it cannot be concluded that the communications at issue fall within the privilege Rogers asserts. Bryant, supra. ” Accord, Sullivan (July 1, 2014), above. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 676 S.E.2d 215 (April 28, 2009). No error in admitting letters from an investigator, working for defense counsel, to defendant’s attorneys. “In the instant case, the three letters did not involve any communications between Davis and his attorneys. Rather, they were all communications between the private investigator and the attorneys.