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Moreover, the letters did not contain confidential information, and instead concerned only the fact of the investigator's employment and the attorneys' claims that the investigator's services in the divorce case fell under the attorney-client privilege. Because the letters do not contain confidential communications between Davis and his attorneys, they are not protected by the narrowly construed attorney-client privilege. See Weakley v. State, 259 Ga. 205(2), 378 S.E.2d 688 (1989).” Citing Bryant (October 9, 2007), below. Sears concurs specially to point out that “that the attorney-client privilege ‘includes, by necessity, the network of agents and employees of both the attorney and client, acting under the direction of their respective principals, to facilitate the legal representation.’” Pihlman v. State, 292 Ga.App. 612, 664 S.E.2d 904 (July 9, 2008). Believing that State’s witness Kautz lied when she testified that she had no plea deal, defendant called Kautz’s attorney to testify at motion for new trial hearing. “Pihlman … argues that the trial court erred by allowing Kautz's attorney to invoke the attorney-client privilege at the motion for new trial hearing concerning whether she had discussed ‘substantial assistance’ with Kautz. Pihlman argues that the attorney-client privilege cannot be used to assist Kautz in committing perjury. ‘Under the common law of Georgia, as codified in [OCGA] §§ 24-9-21(2), 24-9-24, and 24-9-25, the attorney-client privilege bars revelation, discovery, and testimony of a lawyer except when waived by the client or in very limited circumstances.’ Avery v. State, 244 Ga.App. 177, 182(4) (534 S.E.2d 897) (2000). ‘The attorney-client privilege, however, does not cover communications with respect to proposed or ongoing infractions of the law in the commission of a crime, or the perpetration of a fraud.’ (Citations omitted) Both v. Frantz, 278 Ga.App. 556, 563(5) (629 S.E.2d 427) (2006). ‘Communications occurring after a fraud or a crime has been completed are privileged, but those which occur before the perpetration of a fraud or commission of a crime and which relate thereto are not protected by the privilege.’ Id. See McKie v. State, 165 Ga. 210(3) (140 SE 625) (1927) (defendant in a homicide prosecution wrote letters to an attorney requesting his employment in another matter; the Supreme Court held, ‘Communications between client and attorney are excluded from public policy, and are incompetent as evidence against the client upon her trial for the homicide of her husband; and this is so whether such letters were voluntarily produced by the attorney to be used against the client, or were surreptitiously or otherwise taken from the possession of the attorney.’) Here, the testimony that Pihlman sought from Kautz's lawyer clearly falls within the attorney-client privilege because there was no evidence of any fraud or crime. Although Pihlman insists that Kautz committed perjury when she testified that her attorney did not discuss ‘substantial assistance’ with her, Pihlman's arguments are merely speculative.” Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 651 S.E.2d 718 (October 9, 2007). Correspondence between defendant and his attorney was properly admitted, as it did not violate attorney/client privilege. “ The attorney-client privilege protects communications between the client and the attorney that are intended to be confidential; the protection does not extend to communications which are not of a confidential nature. Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 693 (177 SE 582) (1934); Southern Guar. Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Ash, 192 Ga.App. 24, 28 (383 S.E.2d 579) (1989). It does not extend to client communications to an attorney for the purpose of being conveyed by the attorney to a third party. Howard v. State, 279 Ga. 166, 169-170(3) (611 S.E.2d 3) (2005). Nor does the privilege cover the mere fact of employment. Jones v. State, 263 Ga. 904, 904-905(2) (440 S.E.2d 161) (1994); Smith v. Smith, 222 Ga. 694, 699(5) (152 S.E.2d 560) (1966); Cranford v. Cranford, 120 Ga.App. 470, 473(2) (170 S.E.2d 844) (1969). Indeed, the statutes outlining the attorney- client privilege are not broadly construed; the attorney-client privilege embodied in OCGA § 24-9-24 has been confined ‘to its narrowest permissible limits.’ Tenet Healthcare Corporation v. Louisiana Forum, 273 Ga. 206, 207- 208(1) (538 S.E.2d 441) (2000). ‘Inasmuch as the exercise of the privilege results in the exclusion of evidence, a narrow construction of the privilege comports with the view that the ascertainment of as many facts as possible leads to the truth, the discovery of which is the object of all legal investigation.’ Id. (Internal quotation marks omitted). Exhibit 27 is a letter, dated approximately three months after [victim] Haynes’s death and prior to Bryant’s being charged and arrested, from an attorney asking Bryant to contact him to schedule an appointment to meet regarding a matter referred to at the top of the document as, ‘RE: State vs. Michael Wayne Bryant, Jr.’ The fact that Bryant may have employed the attorney is not privileged. Jones v. State, supra at 904-905(2); Smith v. Smith, supra at 699(5); Cranford v. Cranford, supra at 473(2). But, Bryant additionally argues that the letter constituted improper character evidence because of comments in opening statements, [fn] the well-known reputation of the attorney in the community as handling criminal defense, and the style on the document, all indicating that he was ‘doing something illegal’ or anticipating criminal charges. However, even assuming the jury’s awareness that the document referenced a potential criminal matter, the State sought admission of the letter to rebut the defense’s assertion that Bryant sought counsel merely in regard to a real estate transaction. Evidence that is relevant and material to an issue in a case is not rendered inadmissible on the basis that it incidentally places the defendant’s character in issue. Wood v. State, 279 Ga. 667, 670(2) (620 S.E.2d 348) (2005).” Other letters admitted likewise contained no confidential information. Quoted in Davis (April 28, 2009), above. Accord, Rogers (November 7, 2011), above .