☢ test - Í

Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. Louisiana Forum Corp., 273 Ga. 206, 538 S.E.2d 441 (November 13, 2000). Attorney could not claim attorney-client privilege to refuse to disclose his client’s identity as tipster/corporate whistleblower . “Inasmuch as the exercise of the [attorney-client] privilege results in the exclusion of evidence, a narrow construction of the privilege comports with the view that the ascertainment of as many facts as possible leads to the truth , the discovery of which is ‘the object of all legal investigation.’ OCGA § 24-1-2.” Identifies two possible exceptions, not yet adopted in Georgia: “Other jurisdictions have recognized as exceptions to the ‘client identity rule situations where identifying the client may expose the client to prosecution for criminal acts previously committed and for which the client had consulted the attorney (see, e.g., Ex parte Enzor, 270 Ala. 254, 117 So.2d 361 (1960); Dean v. Dean, 607 So.2d 494 (Fla.App., 1992)), or where disclosure of the client’s identity would reveal the substance of confidential attorney-client communications. See, e.g., In re: Grand Jury Subpoena (Alexiou), 39 F.3d 973 (9 th Cir., 1994).” Waldrip v. Head, 272 Ga. 572, 532 S.E.2d 380 (June 12, 2000). Case of first impression: where convicted defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, habeas court erred by granting “the warden's motion to compel access to the complete files of Waldrip's trial and appellate counsel.” 1. Filing of habeas petition raising ineffective assistance waived attorney-client privilege. “[A]ny waiver of the attorney-client privilege is not limited solely to the attorney's testimony, but extends also to documents in trial counsel's files. The purpose of the habeas corpus hearing is to determine the truth of the allegations that constitutional rights were violated. ‘A petitioner for habeas corpus relief cannot allege that he was deprived of his constitutional rights and then invoke the shield of the attorney-client privilege to prevent an accurate determination of the merit of his claim.’ Roberts [ v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 477, 211 S.E.2d 764 (1975)]. Given the passage of time and the difficulty that counsel may have in remembering the reasons for a particular strategy at trial or on appeal, the state should have the right to review the attorney's files to refresh counsel's memory concerning disputed matters.[fn]” 2. Waiver not absolute; process to resolve disputes. However, “we reject the state's contention that the filing of an ineffectiveness claim is an absolute waiver that entitles it to the complete file of former trial and appellate counsel. Instead, we hold that a habeas petitioner who asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel makes a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and the state is entitled only to counsel's documents and files relevant to the specific allegations of ineffectiveness. To implement this holding, we suggest that parties follow the procedure used in resolving similar discovery disputes in both civil and criminal cases. Initially, petitioner's current counsel determines the documents waived by the privilege. When the state disagrees, the parties should attempt to resolve their dispute; if they are unable to reach an agreement, the state may move for an in-camera inspection of the disputed parts of the files. At that point, the habeas court needs to review the files and order the disclosure of the parts that are relevant to the issues raised. See McKinnon v. Smock, 264 Ga. 375, 378, 445 S.E.2d 526 (1994) (providing for in-camera review when dispute arises concerning whether document contains protected work product material); Hall v. Madison, 263 Ga. 73, 74, 428 S.E.2d 345 (1993) (trial court in habeas proceeding may examine prosecutor's voir dire notes in camera to determine whether disclosure is warranted); Tribble v. State, 248 Ga. 274, 275- 276, 280 S.E.2d 352 (1981) (providing for in-camera inspection of state's file for exculpatory material based on request by defense).” In re: Fulton County Grand Jury Proceedings , 244 Ga.App. 380, 535 S.E.2d 340 (June 8, 2000). Superior court properly denied motion to quash grand jury subpoena served on private investigator (PI). S.D. claimed the PI he hired was covered by attorney-client privilege. In a divorce, S.D. hired PI to investigate a suspected affair between S.D.’s wife and another man; that man was later murdered and his house destroyed by arson. After hearing evidence on S.D.’s motion to quash, superior court could find that PI’s testimony either wasn’t covered by attorney-client privilege, or else fell within the “crime-fraud exception.” “Courts in other states have recognized that where a private investigator is employed by counsel to collect and assemble facts necessary for representation in pending or anticipated litigation, the protection of the attorney-client privilege extends to confidential communications between the client and investigator. [fn] But the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications which occur before perpetration of a fraud or commission of a crime and which relate thereto. [fn] This is referred to as the crime-fraud exception to the privilege.” During in camera examination, “the investigator proceeded to testify to the substance of certain communications to him by S.D. after [PI] had conducted his investigation and informed counsel of the results thereof. Under these circumstances, there was no violation of S.D.'s procedural rights. Because the investigator's testimony authorized the court to find that the subject communications from S.D. were made after the investigator ceased acting as an agent or employee of the attorney and that they fall within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, there are no substantive grounds for a reversal either.” Accord, Sullivan (July 1, 2014), above. Avery v. State , 244 Ga.App. 177, 534 S.E.2d 897 (May 24, 2000). Aggravated assault, armed robbery, and related