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convictions affirmed. Defendant wasn’t entitled to present testifying co-defendant’s former attorney to testify about State’s offer (which co-defendant rejected). “[T]he testimony that Avery sought to elicit is barred because it comes within the attorney-client privilege. ‘Under the common law of Georgia, as codified in OCGA §§ 24–9–21(2), 24–9–24, and 24–9–25, the attorney-client privilege bars revelation, discovery, and testimony of a lawyer except when waived by the client or in very limited circumstances.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) NationsBank, N.A. v. SouthTrust Bank &c. 226 Ga.App. 888, 896, 487 S.E.2d 701 (1997). Here, the testimony that Avery seeks to put into evidence, i.e., that Compton's first lawyer communicated the State's offer to Compton and that Compton refused such offer, clearly falls within the attorney-client privilege. ‘It is axiomatic that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, not the attorney.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Osborn v. State, 233 Ga.App. 257, 260, 504 S.E.2d 74 (1998). ‘Therefore, the attorney-client privilege can be waived [only] by the client. [Cit.]’ Id. There is no evidence that Compton waived this privilege. Further, while the attorney-client privilege can be waived when communications are made to an attorney with the intention of having this communication imparted to the opposite party, there is no evidence that Compton intended for his attorney to communicate to the State his refusal of the State's offer. Moclaire v. State, 215 Ga.App. 360, 363, 451 S.E.2d 68 (1994). ‘The mere fact that the attorney discussed the communications with others, without evidence that [Compton] authorized those discussions, does not prove that [Compton] waived the attorney-client privilege.’ Id.” 2. CLERGY PRIVILEGE See new OCGA § 24-5-502 Crosdale v. State, 297 Ga. 244, 774 S.E.2d 87 (June 1, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant waived any clergy privilege by failing to raise it at trial. “As to Crosdale's contention that the privilege set forth in former OCGA § 24–9–22 [now 24-5-502] can never be waived, this Court has recognized that it can. Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 706(2) (699 S.E.2d 1) (2010).” Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 699 S.E.2d 1 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; no violation of clergy-parishioner privilege. “The record shows that Willis, while in jail, initially told the prison chaplain that he wished to confess. The chaplain testified that he instructed Willis that ‘[i]f you want to do a confession, you don't do it to the chaplains. You do it to the proper authorities.... And I asked [Willis], I go, is this what you want to do? And he said, yes.’ The chaplain further testified that he never told Willis that he had to give any confession to police against his wishes. To the contrary, the chaplain testified that a law enforcement officer was brought to the room to take a confession at Willis' request. After the police officer entered the room, he asked Willis if he wanted to confess, and Willis confirmed that he did. The law enforcement officer then informed Willis that, if he did confess, the confession would be forwarded to the detective who was handling his case. With all of this information, Willis made his confession, knowing that it would be handed over to law enforcement in the case against him. Under these circumstances, the clergy- parishioner privilege is simply not applicable because Willis knowingly gave the confession to law enforcement, not privately to the chaplain. The chaplain did not disclose the confession to police. To the contrary, Willis did so himself. Moreover, even if there were any clergy privilege at play in this case, it was repeatedly waived. The chaplain testified that he sought out law enforcement at Willis' request, and both the chaplain and the officer who took the confession first made certain that Willis understood what he was doing and that he wanted to do it.” Benham, writing for Hunstein and Hines, dissents, noting the religious references contained in the written statement and the fact that defendant handed it to the chaplain, who gave it to the police officer. Morris v. State, 275 Ga. 601, 571 S.E.2d 358 (October 15, 2002). “‘Every communication made by any person professing religious faith, seeking spiritual comfort, or seeking counseling’ to a clergy person shall be deemed privileged. However, if such communications are not made to profess religious faith, or to seek spiritual comfort or guidance, ‘but rather are conversational statements to … a friend and frequent companion … the ministerial privilege is not applicable.’” The fact that defendant’s statements were made to his lifetime family friend who “had become a minister shortly before the night of the murder is not, standing alone, sufficient to render [defendant]’s communications privileged,” especially since nothing about the statements “indicates that [defendant] was professing his faith, or seeking spiritual comfort or guidance.” Accord, Parnell v. State , 260 Ga.App. 213, 581 S.E.2d 263 (February 20, 2003) (statements to defendant’s minister/father not protected). 3. MARITAL PRIVILEGE – MARITAL CONFIDENCES (OCGA § 24-9-21) Nichols v. State, 288 Ga.App. 118, 653 S.E.2d 300 (September 17, 2007). Defendant was charged with molestation of his minor stepdaughter. At trial, defendant’s ex-wife testified that during their marriage, he confessed to her that he had

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