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gotten drunk and molested the same child four years earlier. Defendant contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to assert the marital confidence privilege as to this testimony under OCGA § 24-9- 21. Held, counsel was not ineffective; the marital privilege didn’t apply, according to OCGA § 24-9-23(b): the marital privilege “shall not apply in proceedings in which the husband or wife is charged with a crime against the person of a minor child, but such person shall be compellable to give evidence only on the specific act for which the defendant is charged.” Further, “‘the privilege of refusing to testify belongs to the witness, not to the defendant.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Biswas v. State, 255 Ga.App. 339, 342(1) (565 S.E.2d 531) (2002), citing Brown v. State, 261 Ga. 66, 70(5)(b) (401 S.E.2d 492) (1991). See also Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 437(12) (349 S.E.2d 717) (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (107 S.Ct. 1954, 95 L.Ed.2d 527) (1987); Duncan v. State, 232 Ga.App. 157, 159(1), n. 2 (500 S.E.2d 603) (1998).” Note, this analysis appears faulty for two reasons: first, 24-9-23(b), by its own terms, applies only to testimony about “the specific act for which the defendant is charged,” not prior difficulties or similar transactions. Second, the marital confidence privilege under OCGA § 24-9-21 belongs to the declarant, not the witness (unlike the spousal witness privilege under OCGA § 24-9-23(a). See Milich, Courtroom Handbook on Georgia Evidence, “Marital Privileges” (West, 2002). 4. MARITAL PRIVILEGE – SPOUSAL WITNESS PRIVILEGE (OCGA § 24-9-23(a)) O’Neal v. State, 304 Ga.App. 548, 696 S.E.2d 490 (June 22, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation affirmed; trial court properly ruled that “the State could compel O'Neal's wife to testify although she was not a witness to the specific act charged. … O'Neal argues that his wife was never a witness to the ‘specific acts’ for which he was charged, and thus should been advised of her marital privilege and should not have been compelled to testify. … [T]he statute does not provide that the spouse can be compelled to testify only if she observed the specific act charged. It provides that the spouse can be compelled to present evidence ‘ on the specific act’ charged. … In this case, the wife testified that she did not know O'Neal had been applying ointment to the victim. This evidence is sufficiently relevant to the molestation acts charged against O'Neal so that the wife's testimony was compellable under OCGA § 24-9-23(b).” Sherman v. State, 302 Ga.App. 312, 690 S.E.2d 915 (February 11, 2010). Trial court properly ruled that defendant’s wife couldn’t invoke marital privilege to avoid testifying against defendant charged with third degree child cruelty. Court of Appeals rejects defendant’s contention that third degree child cruelty isn’t a “crime against the person of a minor child,” because it involves no physical injury to the child. Defendant here convicted of simple battery against wife and criminal trespass, acquitted of child cruelty. Peck v. State, 300 Ga.App. 375, 685 S.E.2d 367 (October 7, 2009). In defendant’s prosecution for sexual exploitation of a child and distributing obscene material, trial court properly ruled that “sexual exploitation of a child” is a “crime against the person of a minor child,” but “distributing obscene material” is not. “[T]he definition of obscene material makes no reference to minor. As a result, we cannot construe it as a crime ‘against the person of a minor child’ within the plain meaning of OCGA § 24-9-23(b).” Geter v. State, 300 Ga.App. 396, 685 S.E.2d 342 (October 7, 2009). Interprets Webb (July 7, 2008), below, as holding “that a spouse could not have waived her marital privilege under OCGA § 24-9-23 because she had not been informed of its existence.” No such defect here, however: “This court has previously held that a trial court has no obligation to inform a defendant's spouse of the existence of the marital privilege. Ingram v. State , 262 Ga.App. 304, 307(4)(a) (585 S.E.2d 211) (2003) (‘where a spouse takes the stand and testifies voluntarily, it is presumed that she has waived the marital privilege.’) However, the Supreme Court of Georgia recently found that a spouse could not have waived her marital privilege under OCGA § 24-9-23 because she had not been informed of its existence. Webb v. State , 284 Ga. 122, 127(5) (663 S.E.2d 690) (2008). Here, unlike in Webb , the evidence indicated that Geter's wife was informed by defense counsel of her rights under the marital privilege, and that she did not assert the privilege even after defense counsel voiced her objections to the testimony in her presence. Because Geter's wife was aware of the privilege but never asserted it to the trial court, we must assume that she waived her right not to testify as a result of her marriage to Geter.” Defendant’s probation revocation based upon wife’s testimony thus affirmed. Pike v. State, 299 Ga.App. 285, 682 S.E.2d 373 (July 20, 2009). At defendant’s child molestation trial for, among other things, taking nude photographs of his daughter, trial court properly admitted into evidence “numerous pictures that depicted his wife in various stages of undress and showed her tattoos.” Photos weren’t subject to marital privilege: “Pike's wife did not testify against Pike, and the photographs do not divulge any privileged communication between Pike and his wife. In fact, many of the pictures also include Pike's daughter. In addition, the marital privilege does not apply ‘in proceedings in which the husband or wife is charged with a crime against the person of a minor child, but such person shall be compellable to give evidence only on the specific act for which the defendant is charged.’ OCGA § 24-9-23(b).”