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Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 236, 664 S.E.2d 207 (July 11, 2008). Defendant wife’s email to her co-defendant husband is admissible, based on OCGA §§ 24-9-23(b), providing an exception to the general rule on spousal privilege where the defendant is charged with a crime against the person of a child. “In effect, § 24-9-23(b) initially nullifies in cases in which a husband or wife is charged with a crime against the person of a minor both the inter-spousal communication privilege and the spousal privilege to refrain from giving evidence for or against a spouse, and it then reinstates a portion of the privilege of a spouse to refuse to give evidence for or against the defendant spouse in such cases, but it does not reinstate the privilege afforded to inter-spousal communications in such cases.” Webb v. State, 284 Ga. 122, 663 S.E.2d 690 (July 7, 2008). When State subpoenaed defendant’s wife to testify in his murder trial, trial court advised her of her marital communications privilege under OCGA § 24-9-21, which she chose to invoke, but not her spousal witness privilege under OCGA § 24-9-23(a). “As the trial court concedes in its order on Webb's motion for new trial, Webb's wife did not waive her marital privilege under OCGA § 24-9-23, because she had not been informed of its existence. Moreover, Webb's wife indicated at trial that she wanted to assert her marital privilege, and she further submitted an affidavit for use at the motion for new trial hearing that she would not have testified at all had she not been compelled to do so by the State. Thus, upon the retrial of this case, besides being informed of her marital privilege under OCGA § 24-9-21, Webb's wife should also be fully informed of her marital privilege under OCGA § 24-9-23 so that she can make an informed decision as to whether she would like to waive or assert her marital privilege.” Phillips v. State, 278 Ga.App. 439, 629 S.E.2d 130 (March 24, 2006). “‘[A spouse’s] privilege not to testify may be invoked by the witness spouse even if he or she has testified for or against the defendant spouse in a previous hearing,’ Brown v. State, 261 Ga. 66, 70(5)(c) (401 S.E.2d 492) (1991); OCGA § 24-9-23(a) (spouses shall not be compellable to give evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against each other).” Carter v. State, 275 Ga.App. 483, 621 S.E.2d 503 (September 13, 2005). Kidnapping conviction affirmed; no error in manner of addressing invocation of marital privilege. Mere mention in jury’s presence that State intended to call defendant’s wife as a witness didn’t raise a negative inference. Based on Colson v. State, 138 Ga.App. 366, 226 S.E.2d 154 (1976), which “forbids ‘requiring the wife to make an election as to whether she will testify against her husband in the presence of the jury.’ Colson, supra at 370(16), 226 S.E.2d 154. also Westbrook v. State, 162 Ga.App. 130(1), 290 S.E.2d 333 (1982) (‘the election of one spouse to testify against the other should be made outside the presence of the jury under normal circumstances.’). While Carter contends that merely announcing the victim's name in the jury's presence constitutes reversible error, the decisions do not so hold. Price v. State, 175 Ga.App. 780, 334 S.E.2d 711 (1985), relied on by Carter, forbids the creation by the State of ‘an unwarranted negative inference against the defendant.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 781, 334 S.E.2d 711. In Price, we reversed on the basis of the prosecutor's ‘totally gratuitous’ reference in closing argument to the State's inability to call the appellant's spouse. Id. at 782(1), 334 S.E.2d 711. Here in contrast, Carter seeks to draw an inference merely from the identification of the victim as a witness. Many other reasons exist, however, for a witness to be identified but never take the stand; the witness could be unavailable due to an invalid subpoena, a scheduling conflict, or illness. A better practice would be for the State simply to announce to the trial court that it had an unspecified matter to take up outside the presence of the jury. But the mere announcement of a witness's name, without more, does not constitute the creation by the State of an ‘unwarranted negative inference’ as forbidden by Price. ” Beck v. State, 263 Ga.App. 256, 587 S.E.2d 316 (September 17, 2003). “OCGA § 24-9-23(b) provides that the spousal privilege ‘shall not apply in proceedings in which the husband or wife is charged with a crime against the person of a minor child’ with respect to testimony regarding the specific acts charged against the defendant.” Ingram v. State, 262 Ga.App. 304, 585 S.E.2d 211 (July 14, 2003). Trial court had no duty to tell wife that she could assert marital privilege and decline to testify against her husband. “[W]here a spouse takes the stand and testifies voluntarily, it is presumed that she has waived the marital privilege.” Smith v. State, 254 Ga.App. 107, 561 S.E.2d 232 (March 4, 2002). Trial court did not err in allowing victim to testify without conducting a hearing to determine whether she was Defendant’s common-law wife because the marital privilege belongs to the witness and the victim testified voluntarily, thereby presumably waiving any privilege she may have had as a result of her relationship with Defendant.