☢ test - Í

Respres v. State, 244 Ga.App. 689, 536 S.E.2d 586 (June 29, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in declining to allow victim to testify for defendant after she invoked marital privilege in refusing to testify for State. “Once the State rested, … defense counsel informed the court that the victim was under a defense subpoena and that he intended to call her. Counsel expected the victim to deny that she was detained or dragged anywhere and to state that she possessed two knives and had tried to kill herself. The trial court deemed it coercive and in derogation of the privilege to ask the victim/witness herself whether she would reassert her marital privilege and ruled that the defense could not call the victim to the stand. This was, in our view, procedural error. The fact that the victim asserted her privilege during the State's case is not conclusive. The privilege not to incriminate one's spouse at the behest of the State is different from the privilege not to testify for one's spouse. It follows that the victim should have been summoned to state her intentions before the presiding judge, see Price v. State, 175 Ga.App. 780(1), 334 S.E.2d 711 (1985) (defendant is entitled to have spouse make election outside the presence of the jury), whether she would testify at the behest of her husband or reassert her privilege. But this error does not require reversal and a new trial, because defendant failed to show harm. Nowhere does the record (including the transcript of the hearing on the motion for new trial) indicate that the victim would have testified if called by her defendant husband. In the absence of proof that the victim would have waived her privilege if called, defendant has failed to meet his burden to show harm as well as error. Compare Gay v. State, 220 Ga.App. 78, 79, 467 S.E.2d 383 (1996).” 5. PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE Sherman v. State, 302 Ga.App. 312, 690 S.E.2d 915 (February 11, 2010). “Sherman contends the court erred by compelling his son to testify over his, Sherman's, objection. He argues that OCGA § 24-9-27(a) applies. That Code section provides: ‘ No party or witness shall be required to testify as to any matter which may criminate or tend to criminate himself or which shall tend to bring infamy, disgrace, or public contempt upon himself or any member of his family.’ But the Supreme Court has made clear that the rule does not apply ‘if the proposed evidence is material to the issues in the case’ as opposed to ‘where the proposed answer has no effect on the case except to impair the witness' credibility.’ Brown v. State, 242 Ga. 536, 538-539(3) (250 S.E.2d 438) (1978). Here the son's testimony was material to the issues in that he knew his father had broken the window, and he gave a statement to the police that he had overheard his parents fighting. Again, we find no abuse of discretion.” Dickerson v. State, 292 Ga.App. 775, 666 S.E.2d 43 (June 25, 2008). Physical precedent only. Trial court properly admitted recording of sixteen-year old defendant’s conversation with his mother, made without their knowledge in interview room of jail after his arrest for armed robbery. Based on Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in jails, including visitor rooms) and Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (rejects Lanza “protected areas” analysis, focuses on expectations of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”). “Even though Katz thus called into question the continued viability of Lanza, post- Katz decisions have consistently followed Lanza and held that federal law permits the admission in evidence of monitored conversations in places such as jails, police cars, and police stations. [Cits.]” Also based on Meyer v. State , 150 Ga.App. 613 (258 S.E.2d 217) (1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy on public phone at jail “with police personnel within her immediate vicinity”) and Burgeson v. State , 267 Ga. 102 (475 S.E.2d 580) (1996) (no reasonable expectation of privacy where “a hidden tape recording device captured a conversation between arrestees placed in the back of a patrol car”). Questionable here whether defendant had any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, but tape shows that defendant and mother exhibited no subjective expectation, either, carrying on conversation without lowering voices even when police came in room, and making no request for privacy. Barnes concurs in judgment only, would hold that a minor has a right to confidential consultation with a parent, on a par with attorney-client privilege. “Although I recognize that the majority has correctly analyzed the general precedents involving jail house interrogations, conversations on public telephones, and the like, I do not find these precedents controlling in this case because the parent’s involvement is mandated by OCGA § 15-11-47(c). Indeed, one of the criteria which must be considered before a juvenile's statement is admissible in this State is ‘whether the accused is held incommunicado or allowed to consult with relatives, friends or an attorney.’ Marshall v. State, 248 Ga. 227, 230(3) (282 S.E.2d 301) (1981); Riley v. State, 237 Ga. 124, 128 (226 S.E.2d 922) (1976). Consultation with a parent is meaningless if the police may surreptitiously record the conversation between the parent and child and the prosecutor may then play the recording to the jury. Therefore, just as we would not countenance the recording of a conversation between a defendant and his attorney, we should not permit the recording of a conversation between a juvenile defendant and his parent in this context.” 6. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE Neuman v. State, 297 Ga. 501, 773 S.E.2d 716 (June 15, 2015). In murder prosecution, finding of guilty but mentally ill reversed; trial court erred by giving State access to notes and records of psych experts retained only to advise defense