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concerning an incarcerated individual. Id. at 265, 517 S.E.2d 61. Here, the facts show appellant did not initiate any treatment from Dr. Brickhouse and his staff for mental illness. Rather, upon his arrest appellant was initially subject to a mental health screen in accordance with jail protocol and soon thereafter was placed on the jail's psychiatric ward and put on a suicide watch because he was ‘behaving bizarrely.’ After appellant was placed in the general prison population, Dr. Brickhouse and his staff continued to monitor and meet with appellant because appellant would state that he had urges to hurt himself and/or others.[fn] For example, during his pretrial incarceration appellant cut himself superficially with a razor and attempted to rush a prison guard. The primary purpose of Dr. Brickhouse's actions, and the actions of his staff, was to control appellant's behavior for the safety of the prison as opposed to caring for appellant's mental health.[fn] As such, appellant had a diminished expectation of privacy with regard to his jailhouse mental health records. Id. When appellant announced his intent to assert an insanity defense, he waived what little expectation of privacy he had with regard to his communications with Dr. Brickhouse and his staff. As such, appellant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the State subpoenaed his jail mental health records and the trial court did not err in denying the motion in limine or in denying the motion for new trial.” Perkinson v. State, 279 Ga. 232, 610 S.E.2d 533 (March 14, 2005). “The trial court did not err by permitting pretrial discovery by the State of Perkinson’s school records. Perkinson asserts that these records were privileged under OCGA § 24-9-21(7) because they included testing and evaluation by school counselors. Even if we assume that school records are covered by this claim of privilege, which we need not decide here, in a criminal case where the defendant raises a claim of mental retardation, putting the defendant’s mental capacity at issue, ‘such affirmative defense waives the privilege under OCGA § 24-9-21(5) through (8). ’ Trammel v. Bradberry, 256 Ga.App. 412, 424(6), 568 S.E.2d 715 (2002). In addition, Perkinson opted-in to reciprocal discovery. OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. OCGA § 17-16-4(b)(2) provides that the prosecuting attorney be permitted to inspect and copy any mental examination, including a summary of the basis for the expert opinion rendered in the report, if the defendant intends to introduce in evidence in the defense’s case-in- chief the results of the mental examination. Perkinson disclosed to the trial court and the State before trial that the school records formed the basis of much of his mental retardation claim. At trial, Perkinson presented the school counselor who testified about the intellectual testing and psychoeducational assessments administered to Perkinson at school and three of Perkinson’s four psychoeducational reports were tendered into evidence. Both psychologists called to testify by Perkinson testified extensively about the school records and their contribution to the psychologists’ opinions that Perkinson was mildly mentally retarded.” Accord, Rogers v. State , 282 Ga. 659, 653 S.E.2d 31 (November 5, 2007) (defendant waived privilege by raising issue of mental retardation). Hunt v. State, 268 Ga.App. 568, 602 S.E.2d 312 (July 16, 2004). Defendant contends that notes of counseling with child victim were not privileged because counselor “did not become a licensed clinical social worker until after these sessions were conducted.” Counselor’s “session notes were, however, requested by the defense motion for release of medical or psychological records. Hunt thus identified [counselor’s] session notes as privileged. Consequently, he cannot complain that in ruling on his motion for release of these notes, the trial court erred in treating them as privileged.” Herendeen v. State, 268 Ga.App. 113, 601 S.E.2d 372 (June 9, 2004). Psychologist-patient privilege (or psychiatrist- patient privilege – rules are the same for both) may apply even though relationship began through court appointment, “to the extent that treatment was given or contemplated,” as opposed to mere evaluation. Based on Lucas v. State , 274 Ga. 640, 555 S.E.2d 440 (2001). “ Lucas makes clear that voluntariness is not relevant to a consideration of the privilege; the only question is whether the records were prepared in the course of treatment, whether voluntary or not. The decision does not declare absolutely privileged, however, records that were not prepared in the course of treatment or do not involve patient communications. Id. For these reasons, an in camera examination of the records is appropriate.” Opinion expresses concern about the extent to which this may cause difficulty in juvenile court deprivation or parental rights termination proceedings, and suggests review by Supreme Court or legislature. Affirmed , State v. Herendeen , 279 Ga. 323, 613 S.E.2d 647 (May 23, 2005): Distinguishes situations “when the mental health provider is appointed by the court to conduct a preliminary examination to evaluate a person’s mental state because, in such a situation, mental health treatment is not given or contemplated. Kimble v. Kimble, 240 Ga. 100(1), 239 S.E.2d 676 (1977). See also Wiles v. Wiles, 264 Ga. at 596, 448 S.E.2d 681 (1994); Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 704-705, 177 S.E.2d 79 (1970). Similarly, no professional relationship is formed because no mental health treatment is given or contemplated when a court, acting pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-35, orders a plaintiff in a tort action to undergo a psychiatric examination ( Roberts v. Forte Hotels, 227 Ga.App. 471(7), 489 S.E.2d 540 (1997)), or, invoking OCGA § 15-11-100, orders persons involved in a parental rights’ termination action to undergo a mental evaluation. See In re: M.N.H., 237 Ga.App. 471(4), 517 S.E.2d 344 (1999); In re: L.H., 236 Ga.App. 132(3), 511 S.E.2d 253 (1999); In re: R.M., 194 Ga.App. 888(1), 392 S.E.2d 13 (1990). … In light of the above, we disapprove language in M.N.H., L.H., R.H., and