☢ test - Í

Johnson v. State, 255 Ga.App. 544, 546, 566 S.E.2d 353 (2002), which states the privilege exists only when the patient voluntarily seeks treatment, and thereby supports the idea that court-ordered (i.e., involuntary) interaction with a mental health provider can never be privileged. In each of these cases, no privilege existed because the mental health provider was appointed by the court to evaluate the mental state of an individual involved in a termination of parental rights or a defendant in a criminal prosecution who had announced his intent to raise as issues his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the incident. There was no privilege because there was no treatment, not because the interaction was involuntary.” Accord, Rogers v. State , 282 Ga. 659, 653 S.E.2d 31 (November 5, 2007) (certain records of psychologist were privileged despite court appointment, as some counseling was involved in the relationship; later records pertained to evaluation only and were not privileged). King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). “The trial court did not err by denying King’s blanket motion for the disclosure of any psychiatric histories of the State’s witnesses that might exist. King failed to show that the hypothetical records were ‘critical to his defense and that substantially similar evidence [was] otherwise unavailable to him’ so as to penetrate the psychiatrist-patient privilege. Bobo v. State, 256 Ga. 357, 360(4), 349 S.E.2d 690 (1986); OCGA § 24-9-21(5). There is also no evidence in the record that any exculpatory psychiatric evidence was withheld that was not privileged. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).” Daker v. State , 243 Ga.App. 848, 533 S.E.2d 393 (April 11, 2000). Aggravated stalking convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted “compositions written [defendant] and found by police in a trash can in his bedroom. … In them, he admitted that he despised [victim] because of what she had done to him and wanted to destroy her without actually killing her. Daker argues that the compositions were written at the direction of his psychiatrist and were, therefore, inadmissible under OCGA § 24–9–21(5), which creates an evidentiary privilege for ‘[c]ommunications between psychiatrist and patient.’ Because the compositions were found in a trash can with no showing by Daker that they were ever given to his psychiatrist, the court was authorized to find that they had not been and were not intended to be communications between psychiatrist and patient.” Atkins v. State , 243 Ga.App. 489, 533 S.E.2d 152 (March 30, 2000). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly granted State’s motion in limine prohibiting defense from cross-examining victim “J.B.'s therapist about the substance of her meetings with J.B.” “‘The privilege established by OCGA § 24-9-21(5) prohibits the defendant from engaging in a ‘fishing expedition’ regarding a witness' consultations with a [psychologist]. Therefore, a defendant may not explore such evidence unless he makes allegations sufficient to establish a prima facie need for its discovery by a proper motion for a pretrial hearing. At the ensuing inquiry, the [psychologist] would be available to the defendant for discovery of his findings and any statements made by the patient-witness to him material to the issues on trial. The trial court must, consistent with the demands of due process, then delineate those communications available to the defense for use at trial. Conversely, any communications not central to the defense must remain privileged and inadmissible at trial.’ Bobo v. State, 256 Ga. 357, 360(4), 349 S.E.2d 690 (1986). … Thus, due to the complete absence of any evidence from Atkins that it would be necessary to violate J.B.'s psychologist-patient privilege, the trial court did not err by limiting Atkins' cross-examination of J.B.'s therapist and thereby preventing him from engaging in a fishing expedition to dredge up evidence of domestic problems totally unrelated to the act of molestation.” Accord, Easter v. State , 322 Ga.App. 183, 744 S.E.2d 374 (June 12, 2013) (trial court properly denied defense motion for access to victim’s psychiatric records despite claim that “the case against [defendant] rested upon the victim’s credibility.”). 8. REPORTERS In re: Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 513 S.E.2d 219 (March 8, 1999). 1. Trial court erred in ordering reporter to reveal his sources and confidential information based on his interviews with murder suspect; the information was protected by the reporter’s qualified privilege under OCGA § 24-9-30. “In 1990, the Georgia General Assembly enacted OCGA § 24-9-30 granting a qualified privilege against compelled disclosure of information to persons who gather and disseminate news. [Cit.] The rationale for the privilege is that ‘compelling disclosure of unpublished material or confidential sources chills the free flow of information to the public.’ See Susan A. Dewberry, Witnesses: A Qualified Reporters' Privilege, 7 Ga. St. Univ. L.Rev. 286, 288 (1990).” This privilege “protects against the ‘disclosure of any information, document, or item obtained or prepared in the gathering or dissemination of news,’ [Id.] Thus, the statutory language does not distinguish between the source’s identity and information received from that source or between non-confidential and confidential information. See id. at 293-294. The privilege applies in both civil and criminal proceedings, but only where the journalist is not a party. To overcome the privilege, the party seeking the information must show that the privilege is either waived or that the information meets a three-part test. Under that test, the party must show that the