☢ test - Í

information ‘(1) Is material and relevant; (2) Cannot be reasonably obtained by alternative means; and (3) Is necessary to the proper preparation or presentation of the case of a party seeking the information, document, or item. ” OCGA § 24-9-30. This test is similar to the qualified reporter’s privilege found in many states. [Cit.] In our only previous case, we held that the ‘information already publicly disclosed’ in the news article was waived, but that the reporter properly invoked the privilege when she declined to reveal the identity of her confidential sources. See Stripling [ v. State, 261 Ga. 1, 9, 401 S.E.2d 500 (1991)].” “[T]his this case does not involve a conflict between the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the public’s right to a free press. Rather, the appeal presents a conflict between the public’s right to evidence at a criminal trial and its competing right to the unencumbered flow of information through the news media.” Publication of some information does not waive privilege as to other information. State here failed to show that the information was relevant, necessary or unobtainable by other means. 2. “[N]on-parties engaged in news gathering may file a direct appeal of an order denying them the statutory reporter’s privilege under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. Cf. R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 578, 292 S.E.2d 815 (1982) (providing for a direct appeal of order closing pretrial hearings and trial in criminal case as most effective means for protecting the right of the public and news media to be present).” 9. SELF-INCRIMINATION See CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – SILENCE/TESTIMONY BY DEFENDANT, above W. PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION Fox v. State, 266 Ga.App. 307, 596 S.E.2d 773 (March 17, 2004). “‘[I]t is within the trial court’s discretion to grant or deny a request for psychiatric examination of a witness.’ [cit.]” Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for psychiatric evaluation of rape victim. X. REBUTTAL Harris v. State, 333 Ga.App. 118, 775 S.E.2d 602 (July 13, 2015). Convictions for child molestation and enticing a child affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly allowed rebuttal testimony from another molestation victim. When State presented similar transaction evidence of defendant’s prior guilty plea to child molestation, defendant testified that it “had been an isolated incident and that he had never done anything like that before. On rebuttal, the state introduced testimony from the aunt of that nine-year-old victim. She testified that on several occasions when she was 14 years old, Harris had taken her to a hotel room and had sex with her.” Held, defendant opened the door to this rebuttal testimony. “‘A witness may be impeached by disproving the facts testified to by the witness.’ OCGA § 24–6–621. Here, the state was properly allowed to impeach Harris by calling the rebuttal witness to give testimony disproving Harris' testimony by showing that he had in fact engaged in improper sexual contact with another minor girl prior to the child molestation incident to which he pled guilty.” Galvan v. State, 330 Ga.App. 589, 768 S.E.2d 773 (February 4, 2015). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in scope of rebuttal evidence allowed to State. “A trial court's rulings concerning the scope of rebuttal testimony are subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. See Smith v. State, 260 Ga. 746, 748(1), 399 S.E.2d 66 (1991). … [E]ven if the attorney's testimony at times went beyond rebuttal of the victim and her mother and sister's testimony, it is well-established that a trial court may exercise its discretion to permit the State to introduce ‘'vidence after the defendant has closed his testimony, even if it was not strictly in rebuttal’ and could have been introduced during the State's case-in-chief. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith, 260 Ga. at 748(1), 399 S.E.2d 66. See Thompson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 91, 93(2), 514 S.E.2d 870 (1999); Braddock v. State, 208 Ga.App. 843, 844(1), 432 S.E.2d 264 (1993). As we have explained, ‘[a] trial court has discretion to allow relevant evidence even if such evidence tends to bolster the State's case more than to directly impeach defense evidence.’ Evans v. State, 225 Ga.App. 589, 591(3), 484 S.E.2d 320 (1997).” Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 620, 740 S.E.2d 158 (March 18, 2013). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing State to present an expert in rebuttal of defendant’s firearms expert. “The defense expert testified that he had examined the gun used in the shooting and concluded that it had defects that could have caused it to discharge accidentally. The State's rebuttal expert testified that his examination of the gun had uncovered no defects and that other forensic evidence suggested that the gun had been fired while being pressed into the pillow. Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to permit the State to introduce testimony after the defendant has closed his evidence. Smith v. State, 260 Ga. 746(1), 399 S.E.2d 66 (1991). Absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not reverse a decision to allow such testimony, even if it was not strictly in rebuttal. Id. at 748, 399 S.E.2d 66. We find no abuse of discretion here.”