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Ford v. State, 285 Ga.App. 106, 645 S.E.2d 590 (April 13, 2007). No error in allowing detective to refresh his recollection as to which defendant was which by reviewing their booking photos with names attached; the photos were not in evidence. “The detective testified not to what the photograph showed, but as to his personal recollection as refreshed by the photograph. ‘OCGA § 24-9-69 permits a witness to refresh and assist his memory by the use of any written instrument or memorandum, and does not require the written document so used to have been prepared by the witness, so long as the witness testifies from personal recollection.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Woods v. State, 269 Ga. 60, 62(3) (495 S.E.2d 282) (1998). ‘As long as the witness is willing to swear from his memory as refreshed, his memory may be refreshed by any kind of stimulus, a song, or a face, or a newspaper item.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Croy v. State, 168 Ga.App. 562, 564(3) (309 S.E.2d 841) (1983).” Accord, Wilson v. State , 291 Ga.App. 69, 661 S.E.2d 221 (April 11, 2008). Becker v. State, 280 Ga.App. 97, 633 S.E.2d 436 (June 23, 2006). No error where trial court allowed proof of similar transaction based on certified copy of conviction plus officer’s testimony, which had to be refreshed from his written incident report. “To the extent Becker argues that it was error for the officer in the 1997 offense to use the police report of the incident during his testimony, pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-69, ‘[a] witness may refresh and assist his memory by the use of any written instrument or memorandum, provided he shall finally speak from his recollection thus refreshed.’” Hall v. State, 272 Ga.App. 204, 612 S.E.2d 44 (March 15, 2005). “OCGA § 24-9-69 provides that ‘[a] witness may refresh and assist his memory by the use of any written instrument or memorandum, provided he shall finally speak from his recollection thus refreshed or shall be willing to swear positively from the paper.’ Once a witness states that his recollection is not refreshed by the writing, it is improper to subject the witness to further questioning about the writing. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 247 Ga.App. 741, 743(1) (545 S.E.2d 114) (2001).” Trial court erred in allowing cross- examination of defendant based on documents she claimed never to have seen before and which did not refresh her recollection, but harmless error. Penland v. State, 258 Ga.App. 659, 574 S.E.2d 880 (December 3, 2002). “OCGA § 24-9-6, which ‘permits a witness to refresh and assist his memory by the use of any written instrument or memorandum…, does not require the written document so used to have been prepared by the witness, so long as the witness testifies from personal recollection.’” Miller v. State, 275 Ga. 32, 561 S.E.2d 810 (March 28, 2002). Prosecutor properly used copy of police summary of witness’s statements to police on day of murder to refresh witness’s recollection during her testimony, especially where witness did not merely repeat on the stand what she had told police. Any document may be used to refresh the recollection of a witness, and the witness need not have prepared the document. Sewell v. State, 244 Ga.App. 449, 536 S.E.2d 173 (June 13, 2000). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in denying defense counsel the opportunity to review document referred to by State’s expert on direct. On direct, psychologist referred to, and read from, questionnaire filled out by victim’s mother, but trial court refused defense request to see the document during cross. “Pretermitting whether the questionnaire was discoverable or privileged before trial, see, e.g., Horne v. State, 192 Ga.App. 528, 530–531(4)(a), 385 S.E.2d 704 (1989) (whole court), it is apparent that the witness either read from the document or testified from it after the inception of the trial. Consequently, the trial court erred in failing to permit the cross-examiner to examine the document. But we find the error harmless” in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Z. SCOPE OF CROSS/ RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga.App. 197, 739 S.E.2d 682 (March 8, 2013). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; no error in limiting defense cross-examination of investigator as to matters explored at length on direct. “The record reflects that in response to the prosecutor's direct examination questions, the investigator testified at length regarding the informant's prior criminal history, including his numerous arrests and convictions. When Littlejohn's trial counsel began to cross- examine the investigator as to the same issues that had already been explored in his earlier testimony, the trial court interrupted his questioning and conducted a bench conference. During the bench conference, the trial court directed counsel not to elicit cumulative testimony. The trial court nevertheless ruled that trial counsel was allowed to question the investigator as to the informant's reliability pertaining to the instant case. Contrary to Littlejohn's contention, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in controlling the scope of cross-examination. The trial court was authorized to exclude cumulative questioning on matters that had already been covered. See Osborne v. State, 291 Ga.App. 711, 714(4) (662 S.E.2d 792) (2008); Hopson v. State, 281 Ga.App. 520, 522(1)(b) (636 S.E.2d 702) (2006).” Accord, Hammill