☢ test - Í

v. State , 327 Ga.App. 588, 758 S.E.2d 336 (May 30, 2014) (court could limit re-cross as to issues already explored on cross, though also covered on re-direct). Watson v. State, 304 Ga.App. 128, 695 S.E.2d 416 (May 19, 2010). Defendant’s rape conviction affirmed; no error in allowing State to recall witness and ask questions outside the scope of cross . “‘Trial courts generally have discretion regarding the reexamination of witnesses. They may order a witness recalled for further cross-examination and permit a party to introduce additional evidence after that party has rested. They also may permit a questioner to inquire into matters on redirect or recross that should have been inquired into earlier but had been overlooked, even though redirect and recross are usually not for introducing new topics.’ (Citations omitted.) Thomas v. State, 275 Ga. 882, 883(2) (572 S.E.2d 537) (2002).” AA. SEQUESTRATION/RECALL See new OCGA § 24-6-615 New case! Davis v. State, S16A0103, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3145125 (June 6, 2016). Felony murder conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to invoke rule of sequestration. Because the rule hadn’t been invoked, State’s rebuttal expert was allowed to review deposition of defense expert prior to testifying. Under 2013 Evidence Code, sequestration rule is found in OCGA § 24-6-615, which “differs significantly from the text of the sequestration provision of the old Evidence Code,” OCGA § 24-9-61, instead tracking the Federal Rule. “As relevant here, both OCGA § 24-6-615(3) and Federal Rule of Evidence 615(c) preclude trial courts from excluding a witness whose presence a party shows is “essential” to presenting that party’s case. The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether a witness comes within this exception. [Cits.] The federal circuits agree that expert witnesses are not automatically excepted from sequestration as ‘essential’; that determination remains in the trial court’s discretion. [Cits.] But the drafters of the federal rule recognized that the ‘essential’ witness category would include ‘an expert needed to advise counsel in the management of the litigation.’ [Cit.] In addition, federal courts have explained that the concerns underlying sequestration are generally overcome where an expert witness will give only or primarily opinion rather than factual testimony and may appropriately base that opinion on the testimony of other witnesses. [Cits.] This view rests in part on the recognition that OCGA § 24-7-703, like Federal Rule of Evidence 703, allows expert witnesses to base their opinions on facts or data ‘perceived by ... the expert at ... the hearing.’ … Indeed, having the expert attend the relevant parts of the trial may render unnecessary the lengthy, convoluted, and typically argumentative hypothetical questions that lawyers would otherwise utilize. [Cits.] The reasons for sequestration may be even less applicable to rebuttal testimony by experts. While not excepted per se from sequestration, ‘the very function of a rebuttal witness is directed toward challenging the prior testimony of opposing witnesses, thereby enhancing the fact finder’s ultimate determination of an objective “truth.” While not all rebuttal witnesses need be apprised of prior testimony – impeachment witnesses called to demonstrate bias, for example, – a rebuttal witness presented to refute the medical findings of an opposing expert can contribute most completely to a jury’s truth finding capacity only by fully understanding and addressing all of the relevant prior evidence. … Moreover, trial by ambush and confoundment of rebuttal witnesses hardly advances the purported goals of reliability and trustworthiness.’ United States v. Bramlet , 820 F.2d 851, 855 (7 th Cir., 1987).” Viewed against this legal backdrop, under the circumstances of this case the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in allowing Dr. Downs to testify in rebuttal of Dr. Ophoven based in part on his review of her recorded testimony. Dr. Downs was entitled to know of her opinions and the bases for them, and where the defense had not provided an expert report and the court could find that the defense had rebuffed the State’s efforts to contact her before trial, that information was reasonably conveyed to Dr. Downs by means of the recording rather than through a summary by someone who had viewed the recording or through hypothetical questions. Accordingly, even if Appellant’s counsel had invoked the rule of sequestration earlier in the trial, the court would not have abused its discretion in excepting Dr. Downs from the rule to the limited extent that he was excepted.” Jackson v. State, 334 Ga.App. 469, 779 S.E.2d 700 (November 13, 2015). Rape and false imprisonment convictions affirmed; allowing investigator to remain in courtroom over defendant’s objection was error, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. Error because State gave no rationale or explanation for why the investigator was needed other than stating, “[w]e would just request that you allow our prosecutor to sit at the table.” Moore v. State, 297 Ga. 773, 778 S.E.2d 210 (October 5, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing primary police investigator to be excepted from the rule of sequestration. “Here, the prosecutor specifically explained to the trial court that Agent Walsingham was needed to assist in the orderly presentation of this