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case, which involved over thirty witnesses and a significant amount of paperwork and CDs.” Freeman v. State, 333 Ga.App. 6, 775 S.E.2d 258 (July 9, 2015). Convictions for cruelty to children affirmed; under 2013 Evidence Code, no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed severely-injured child to be displayed to the jury. “At trial, E.F.'s foster mother testified regarding his condition, including the fact that he was not able to talk, walk, feed, or toilet himself at four years old. The State asked her to step down and bring E.F. into the courtroom. Over the defendants' objections, the trial court allowed her to do so.[fn] After she wheeled E.F. into the courtroom in a stroller, the State asked her one final question regarding her care of E.F. The record reveals that during this brief questioning, E.F. ‘groaned several times out loud.’ Freeman asserts that the State presented E.F. to the jury not as evidence but to inflame the jury and prejudice it against Freeman.” Trial court properly determined that the jury view of the victim was not substantially more prejudicial than probative. “[W]e … agree with the State that pursuant to OCGA § 17–17–9, referred to as the ‘Crime Victims' Bill of Rights,’ E.F. had the right to be present at the trial. The Crime Victims' Bill of Rights provides in part that ‘[a] victim has the right to be present at all criminal proceedings in which the accused has the right to be present.’[fn] OCGA § 17–17–9(a). See also Nicely [October 29, 2012, below] , at 795(2) (‘the Crime Victims' Bill of Rights promotes legitimate state interests, namely the interest of the State in according to crime victims the same right to be present as the Constitution accords to the accused’).” Mitchell v. State, 326 Ga.App. 899, 755 S.E.2d 308 (March 17, 2014). Armed robbery conviction reversed; trial court erred by excluding two defense witnesses, unquestionably discovered after start of trial. “The victim and sole eyewitness, Haywood, was the first witness to testify at trial. On direct examination, Haywood recounted his version of the events and specifically testified that he had neither seen nor met Mitchell (Naro's cousin) prior to the robbery. During a brief recess, Mitchell's trial counsel was approached by two individuals who had been sitting in the courtroom observing the trial. They informed counsel that they recognized Haywood when he came into the courtroom, that Haywood was known by a different name in the community, and that Haywood had known Mitchell for several years.[fn] Thus, the existence of these witnesses and the relevance of the information they possessed did not become apparent until Haywood appeared on the witness stand and testified.” 1. Trial court excluded the witnesses based on failure to disclose them in discovery , but such an exclusion can only be made “upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith,” OCGA § 17-16-6, and “the record clearly shows that there was no bad faith on the part of Mitchell in failing to disclose the newly-discovered witnesses.” 2. Trial court excluded the witnesses based on violation of the rule of sequestration, but a) the two weren’t potential witnesses at the time the rule was invoked, and b) the remedy for a violation of sequestration is not exclusion, but a jury charge on credibility. Robinson v. State, 246 Ga.App. 576, 583(7), 541 S.E.2d 660 (2000). Smith v. State, 324 Ga.App. 100, 749 S.E.2d 395 (October 3, 2013). DUI conviction reversed; trial court erred by failing to sequester witnesses at motion to suppress hearing, in the mistaken belief that the rule only applies at trial. “Smith points out that [former OCGA § 24-9-61, now 24-6-615] applies to ‘all cases,’ which would include evidentiary hearings as well as trials.” “Under the law's mandate that a party has the right to examine the opposing party's witnesses out of the hearing of each other, ‘the parties are entitled to the benefit of this rule at all stages of the proceedings in the trial of a case, regardless of the purpose of the testimony, and the error in depriving the plaintiff in this case of this substantial right rendered all subsequent proceedings nugatory, requiring the grant of a new trial.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hall v. Hobbs, 107 Ga.App. 46, 47-48 (129 S.E.2d 209) (1962) (rule applicable and mandatory during pre-trial proffer of witness testimony). Further, our Supreme Court's holding in Blankenship v. State, 258 Ga. 43, 49(9) (365 S.E.2d 265) (1988), that ‘[t]he trial court is not required to enforce the rule of sequestration until the presentation of evidence has begun,’ does not support the proposition that the rule only applies during trials and not motions hearings. Rather, the court in Blankenship held that the rule applies when witnesses are testifying and not during opening statements and thus did not address the issue of sequestration in the context of pretrial hearings in which witnesses testify.” Puckett v. State, 321 Ga.App. 743, 743 S.E.2d 466 (May 17, 2013). DUI and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in “the trial court's decision to sequester defendant’s expert witness during the presentation of the State's case.” Defendant here wanted its expert on field sobriety evaluations to observe the officer’s testimony, including demonstration of how he conducts field sobriety evaluations. Actual conduct of the evaluations on defendant wasn’t recorded on video, but defense was able to prepare its witness with the officer’s testimony at prior hearing on motion to suppress. “Ultimately, Puckett's counsel had Officer Ferguson demonstrate to the jury how he administered the HGN test without [expert witness] Corroto present in the courtroom, and counsel later elicited testimony from Corroto on the proper method of administering the HGN test and the factors that could affect its reliability.” “‘Even when an expert witness would be assisted by hearing the testimony of preceding witnesses instead of answering a hypothetical question and could