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assist counsel in conducting the cross-examination, the grant or denial of such exemption [from the rule of sequestration] lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion,’” quoting Gray v. State, 222 Ga.App. 626, 631(2) (476 S.E.2d 12) (1996). Nicely v. State, 291 Ga. 788, 733 S.E.2d 715 (October 29, 2012). Murder conviction affirmed; 1. no equal protection violation in exempting victim’s mother, but not defendant’s father, from rule of sequestration , though both were witnesses. Child victim’s mother was exempted from rule pursuant to OCGA § 17-17-9(b). Assuming without deciding that the two were similarly situated, and that defendant had standing to raise the issue of his father’s alleged equal protection violation, the different treatment of the witnesses “is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. … The rule of sequestration itself undoubtedly promotes legitimate state interests in, among other things, restraining witnesses from ‘tailoring their testimony to that of earlier witnesses’ and ‘aid[ing] in detecting testimony that is less than candid.’ Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592) (1976) (citations and punctuation omitted). Likewise, the statutory exemption to the rule contained in the Crime Victims' Bill of Rights promotes legitimate state interests, namely the interest of the State in according to crime victims the same right to be present as the Constitution accords to the accused. See OCGA § 17–17–1. Nicely does not even contend that the differential treatment of his father and Rogers bears no rational relationship to legitimate state interests, and we conclude that it certainly does. For these reasons, the differential treatment of these two witnesses did not work a denial of equal protection.” Cited with approval, Freeman (July 9, 2015), above. 2. No violation of right to public trial in excluding defendant’s father from courtroom pursuant to rule of sequestration. “Nicely does not point us to a single case in which the sequestration of a witness was held to violate the right to a public trial, and we have found none. To the contrary, we have found case upon case in which courts have held that the rule of sequestration ordinarily does not even implicate the right to public trial, much less infringe upon it. [Citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions.] At least in the circumstances of this case, we see no infringement of the constitutional right to a public trial by the exclusion of a single witness pursuant to a routine application of the rule of sequestration.” Farley v. State, 314 Ga.App. 660, 725 S.E.2d 794 (March 9, 2012). Convictions for terroristic act and aggravated stalking affirmed; no abuse of discretion in prohibiting defense from recalling State’s witnesses. “Farley contends that the trial court therefore deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. We disagree. Farley was afforded the opportunity to extensively cross-examine, and therefore confront, these witnesses. See generally State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 638(1) (571 S.E.2d 752) (2002) (‘[t]he main and essential purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination’) (citation and punctuation omitted). Furthermore, ‘the trial court has the power to deny the recall of a witness who testified previously where the testimony to be given by the recalled witness would be repetitious of the witness'[s] earlier testimony.’ McMichael v. State, 252 Ga. 305, 307 (313 S.E.2d 693) (1984). Farley's counsel proffered the topics he intended to explore with the three witnesses on recall, but counsel had already thoroughly cross-examined the witnesses on these issues. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Farley's request to recall the witnesses. See Smith v. State, 261 Ga.App. 871, 875(3) (583 S.E.2d 914) (2003).” Pennington v. State, 313 Ga.App. 764, 723 S.E.2d 13 (January 27, 2012). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown in failure to invoke rule of sequestration. Only person shown to have been in courtroom who later testified was not at that time identified as a witness or expected to testify, and thus wouldn’t have been sequestered even if rule had been invoked. And even if rule had been invoked and violated, “such a violation ‘generally does not affect the admissibility of the testimony, but may impact the offending witness' credibility.’ (Citations omitted.) Rakestrau v. State, 278 Ga. 872, 876(4) (608 S.E.2d 216) (2005). Here, the jury was informed of the father's earlier presence in the courtroom, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined him, and the court properly instructed the jurors on their role in resolving conflicts in the evidence and in determining the credibility of witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and whether a witness was impeached. Thus, the jury was able to gauge the victim's father's credibility and make a determination as to the weight, if any, it should give to his testimony. Id.; Glass v. State, [289 Ga. 542, 548(6)(c) (712 S.E.2d 851) (2011)]; Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 87(3) (526 S.E.2d 347) (2000).” Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012). Hit and run and related convictions affirmed; no error in allowing State’s witness to be present in courtroom “during pre-trial argument on her motion in limine, in which she attempted to exclude a statement made by the investigating officer in the companion case. … Sevostiyanova has cited no authority in support of this enumeration, however, nor has she directed us to any evidence in the record which would indicate that the witnesses were not truthful on the stand or that their testimony was in any way influenced by their presence in the courtroom at this time.”