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Glass v. State, 289 Ga. 542, 712 S.E.2d 851 (July 11, 2011). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; remedy for violation of rule of sequestration, if any, was curative instruction, not mistrial, citing Johnson v. State, 258 Ga. 856, 857–858(4), 376 S.E.2d 356 (1989). In re: F.F., 304 Ga.App. 232, 695 S.E.2d 723 (May 27, 2010). Juvenile’s delinquency finding reversed; juvenile court erred by sequestering juvenile’s parents . “Despite the state's claims to the contrary, ‘a parent is a party to a juvenile proceeding and may not be sequestered, even if the parent is also a witness in the case.’ Appling v. State, 221 Ga.App. 162(1) (470 S.E.2d 761) (1996); D.C.A. v. State, 135 Ga.App. 234, 235-236(1) (217 S.E.2d 470) (1975). This is true whether the juvenile proceeding is a deprivation hearing or a delinquency proceeding. See Livingston v. State, 266 Ga. 501, 505(3) (467 S.E.2d 886) (1996) (the juvenile code requirements are applicable when a child is taken into custody or temporarily detained, regardless of whether it is for alleged deprivation, delinquency, or unruliness); In re: J.L.B., 280 Ga.App. 556, 557(2) (634 S.E.2d 514) (2006) (parents are necessary parties to a delinquency action involving their child). And, ‘there must be scrupulous adherence to due process requirements in juvenile court proceedings.’ FN12 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In re: B.A.H., 198 Ga.App. 713, 714(1) (402 S.E.2d 791) (1991). We find it is a manifest abuse of discretion to exclude a juvenile's parents from a delinquency trial. See Land v. State, 101 Ga.App. 448, 449(1) (114 S.E.2d 165) (1960). F.F. is entitled to a new trial where his parents are present.” Watson v. State, 304 Ga.App. 128, 695 S.E.2d 416 (May 19, 2010). Defendant’s rape conviction affirmed; no error in allowing State to recall witness, despite defense claims that the witness had been coached in the interim. “‘[A] judge has broad discretion to allow the recall of a witness, even one that has been excused.’ Watkins v. State,. 253 Ga.App. 382, 384(1) (559 S.E.2d 133) (2002). A review of the transcript reveals no indication that the State improperly coached the witness, and under these circumstances, we find no abuse of the court's discretion.” “‘Trial courts generally have discretion regarding the reexamination of witnesses. They may order a witness recalled for further cross-examination and permit a party to introduce additional evidence after that party has rested. They also may permit a questioner to inquire into matters on redirect or recross that should have been inquired into earlier but had been overlooked, even though redirect and recross are usually not for introducing new topics.’ (Citations omitted.) Thomas v. State, 275 Ga. 882, 883(2) (572 S.E.2d 537) (2002).” Driggers v. State, 295 Ga.App. 711, 673 S.E.2d 95 (January 27, 2009). No abuse of discretion in allowing child molestation victim’s psychologist to remain in courtroom during child’s testimony. Psychologist did not testify at trial. “Driggers maintains that by allowing the psychologist to stay in the courtroom, the trial court violated OCGA 17-8- 54, which provides: ‘In the trial of any criminal case, when any person under the age of 16 is testifying concerning any sex offense, the court shall clear the courtroom of all persons except parties to the cause and their immediate families or guardians, attorneys and their secretaries, officers of the court, jurors, newspaper reporters or broadcasters, and court reporters.’ According to Driggers, the trial court's failure to comply with the statute constitutes reversible error. We are unpersuaded. ‘[T]he purpose of [OCGA § 17-8-54] is to protect the interest of the child witness, not the defendant, and failure to follow the statute does not violate the defendant's rights.’ Turner v. State, 245 Ga.App. 294, 297-298(4)(e) (536 S.E.2d 814) (2000). See also Donaldson v. State, 255 Ga.App. 451, 452(3) (565 S.E.2d 486) (2002). Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that the psychologist improperly influenced the testimony of the victim. Consequently, Driggers has failed to assert a valid basis for reversal. See id; Martin v. State, 205 Ga.App. 591, 593(5) (422 S.E.2d 876) (1992).” Kelley v. State, 295 Ga.App. 663, 673 S.E.2d 63 (January 26, 2009). No violation of rule of sequestration where victim’s sister, who had been in the courtroom, was called as a rebuttal witness as to claims arising in defendant’s testimony. Axelburg v. State, 294 Ga.App. 612, 669 S.E.2d 439 (October 31, 2008). No abuse of discretion where trial court prohibited each side’s expert witness from hearing the other’s testimony. “The trial court had the discretion to apply the rule of sequestration to prohibit witnesses from being present during the testimony of any other witnesses. See OCGA § 24-9-61 (‘in all cases either party shall have the right to have the witnesses of the other party examined out of the hearing of each other’); Gray v. State, 222 Ga.App. 626, 631(2) (476 S.E.2d 12) (‘the court in the exercise of its sound discretion as an inherent power to administer justice may apply the rule to all witnesses of all parties’) (citations omitted). And although the court, in its discretion, could exempt a witness from the rule of sequestration to assist a party in presenting the case, the court also could decline to grant such an exemption, even when an expert witness's presence could assist counsel at trial. See Pittman v. State, 274 Ga. 260, 262-263(3) (553 S.E.2d 616) (2001); McNeil v. State, 229 Ga.App. 149, 150 (493 S.E.2d 570) (1997); Heath v. State, 223 Ga.App. 680, 681-682(2) (478 S.E.2d 462) (1996).” Accord, Puckett (May 17, 2013), above.