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investigating officer from the rule of sequestration or in failing to require the officer to testify first.” Carter v. State, 271 Ga.App. 588, 610 S.E.2d 181 (February 10, 2005). Dicta: two judges (Ruffin, Adams) criticize practice of automatically granting prosecution’s request to allow prosecuting police officer to remain in courtroom as exception to rule of sequestration, while acknowledging trial court’s broad discretion to allow it. See Warner (March 26, 2007), above. Rakestrau v. State, 278 Ga. 872, 608 S.E.2d 216 (January 24, 2005). “The rule of sequestration is meant to ensure that the testimony of a witness who has yet to testify is not influenced by the testimony of another witness; its violation generally does not affect the admissibility of the testimony, but may impact the offending witness’ credibility. Quijano v. State, 271 Ga. 181, 183 (516 S.E.2d 81) (1999); Childress v. State, 266 Ga. 425, 431 (467 S.E.2d 865) (1996). The decision of whether to allow a witness to testify in violation of the rule of sequestration is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless such discretion is abused. Pearley v. State, 235 Ga. 276, 277 (219 S.E.2d 404) (1975); Kelly v. State, 118 Ga. 329, 330 (45 SE 413) (1903).” No indication that witness’s testimony here, which was limited to identifying a piece of evidence, was influenced by hearing other witnesses. No abuse of discretion in allowing the testimony. Accord, Raszeja v. State , 298 Ga.App. 713, 680 S.E.2d 690 (July 2, 2009) (violation of rule of sequestration goes to weight, not admissibility, of evidence). Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 853, 596 S.E.2d 597 (May 24, 2004). 1. “Williams contends the trial court erred in permitting an investigator to remain in the courtroom after invocation of the rule of sequestration and in failing to require the witness to testify first. Where, as here, ‘[t]he prosecutor stated that he needed him for presentation of the case and that to require him to testify first would interfere with the orderly presentation of the case[,] ... we have found the exception of a witness from the rule of sequestration is within the discretion of the trial judge. [Cit.] We find no abuse of discretion and there is no merit to this enumeration of error.’ Blalock v. State, 250 Ga. 441(1), 298 S.E.2d 477 (1983).” Accord, Warner (March 26, 2007), above, and cases collected thereunder; Epps v. State , 296 Ga.App. 92, 673 S.E.2d 608 (February 13, 2009). 2. No error where trial judge instructed three similar transaction witnesses together “on the limitation to be placed on their testimony.” Their testimony, however, was taken outside each other’s presence. “‘The trial judge is vested with broad discretionary powers in administering the rule of sequestration, which will not be controlled unless manifestly abused.’ Watts v. State, 239 Ga. 725, 731, 238 S.E.2d 894 (1977).” Hancock v. State, 277 Ga. 835, 596 S.E.2d 127 (April 27, 2004). Murder conviction affirmed. “The rule of sequestration was not violated by conversations between the State’s expert and one of the defense expert witnesses that occurred prior to trial. See Blankenship v. State, 258 Ga. 43(9) (365 S.E.2d 265) (1988) (rule not enforceable until presentation of evidence has begun). We find no reversible error to the extent [defendant] raises a claim of violation of the rule based on conversation during the trial between the State’s expert witness and other persons (who did not testify at trial), during which they assessed the performance of a defense expert who did testify. The purpose of the rule of sequestration is to ensure that the testimony of a witness who has not yet testified is not influenced by that of another witness. OCGA § 24- 9-61; Childress v. State, 266 Ga. 425, 431(2) (467 S.E.2d 865) (1996). The evidence supports the trial court's holding that the alleged conversation did not influence the testimony of the State’s expert, which was based on her own report made months before trial.” Shepherd v. State, 245 Ga.App. 386, 537 S.E.2d 777 (July 27, 2000). Aggravated battery and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in exempting victim from rule of sequestration. “OCGA § 24–9–61, the rule of sequestration, provides that a party has the right to have the witnesses of the other party examined out of the hearing of each other, except as otherwise provided in OCGA § 24–9–61.1. Under OCGA § 24–9–61.1(a), a trial judge has the discretion to allow a crime victim to be present in court and the discretion to determine the order in which the victim's testimony will be given. Lewis v. State, 215 Ga.App. 161, 162(1), 450 S.E.2d 448 (1994). In this case, the trial judge allowed the victim Roseberry to remain in the courtroom while the detective and the polygraph examiner testified and then let him give his own testimony. Under OCGA §§ 24–9–61 and 24–9–61.1(a), such a procedure was fully within the trial court's discretion and does not constitute reversible error. See Hayes v. State, 182 Ga.App. 26, 28–29(2), 354 S.E.2d 655 (1987).” Jack v. State, 245 Ga.App. 216, 536 S.E.2d 235 (June 22, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing detective to remain in courtroom to assist prosecutor. “‘This court previously has held that in similar circumstances, the exception of a witness from the rule of sequestration does not constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion.’ Sweat v. State, 203 Ga.App. 290(1), 416 S.E.2d 845 (1992). We find no legal basis for Jack's