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contention that the above exception to the Rule applies only to the police department's officially designated ‘lead investigator’ of the incident. The exception has been applied to expert witnesses, material witnesses, and others needed to assist the prosecution (or defense) at trial. See, e.g., Ridley v. State, 235 Ga.App. 591, 596(2), 510 S.E.2d 113 (1998); Allen v. State, 208 Ga.App. 854(2), 432 S.E.2d 600 (1993); Greenway v. State, 207 Ga.App. 511, 514(4), 428 S.E.2d 415 (1993). Further, a violation of the sequestration rule affects only the weight and credibility of the witness' testimony, not its admissibility. Staley v. State, 224 Ga.App. 806, 809(3), 482 S.E.2d 459 (1997).” Chastain v. State , 244 Ga.App. 84, 535 S.E.2d 25 (May 18, 2000). Theft by taking conviction affirmed; no violation of rule of sequestration occurred. “The discussion at issue transpired before trial between the prosecutor and the victim, who was the State's only witness. Chastain claims that because two other potential witnesses were present in the courtroom and could possibly have overheard the conversation, this conduct violated the rule. The purpose of the rule of sequestration, codified at OCGA § 24-9-61, is to ensure that the testimony of a witness who has not yet testified is not influenced by that of another witness. Childress v. State, 266 Ga. 425, 431(2), 467 S.E.2d 865 (1996). But this rule does not prohibit conversations between an attorney involved in a case and a prospective witness, provided that the attorney speaks with the witness separately and does not inform the witness about previous testimony. Ross v. State, 254 Ga. 22, 28(4)(a), 326 S.E.2d 194 (1985). Further, a trial court is not required to enforce the rule of sequestration until the presentation of evidence has begun. Blankenship v. State, 258 Ga. 43, 46(9), 365 S.E.2d 265 (1988). Since no person had yet testified, no violation of the rule could have occurred. See id.” Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 526 S.E.2d 347 (February 14, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in allowing State’s witnesses to testify despite violation of rule of sequestration. “At trial, a police officer violated the rule of sequestration by talking with three witnesses outside the courtroom about the date that they last saw Rackley at church. A violation of the rule of sequestration goes to the credibility of the witness's testimony rather than its admissibility. Johnson v. State, 258 Ga. 856, 857, 376 S.E.2d 356 (1989). The remedy is for the court to admit the evidence of the violation and then charge the jury that it should consider the violation in determining the weight and credit to be given the witness's testimony . Id. at 857–858, 376 S.E.2d 356. During his testimony, the officer admitted that he discussed the evidence with defense witnesses prior to their testimony. Defense counsel cross-examined the officer thoroughly about his violation, questioned the three church members about the conversation and its effect on their testimony, and argued to the jury that the officer had tainted the witnesses. Because the jury was fully informed about the officer's violation of the rule of sequestration and was able to consider it in assessing his credibility and the defendant never requested a jury charge on the violation, the trial court's failure to give a specific charge on the officer's credibility is not grounds for a reversal.” Accord, Holmes v. State, 272 Ga. 517, 529 S.E.2d 879 (May 8, 2000); Hawkins v. State , 316 Ga.App. 415, 729 S.E.2d 549 (June 26, 2012). Jones v. State, 271 Ga. 516, 520 S.E.2d 454 (September 13, 1999). Trial court erred in ruling that defense counsel had violated rule of sequestration by talking with State’s witness during trial, and so charging jury. “‘The rule does not prohibit discussions between an attorney to the case and a prospective witness, at least so long as the attorney talks to him separately from the other witnesses and does not inform him of previous testimony.’ Ross v. State, 254 Ga. 22, 326 S.E.2d 194 (1985). Since there is no indication that any other witness was involved in the conversation or that the attorney told Bell what any other witness said, it is clear that no violation of the rule occurred. The trial court erred in ruling that there was and in instructing the jury concerning the alleged violation of the statutory rule of sequestration. … We are aware of no authority pursuant to which a trial court can order a witness for the State not to speak to defense counsel. In fact, it is clear that the defense cannot be denied access to a material witness. Howard v. State, 262 Ga. 784(3), 426 S.E.2d 365 (1993). That, however, is exactly the effect the trial court meant its order to have. To that extent, the trial exceeded its authority and erred.” Harmless error, however, given that “Bell was a witness for the State, so any harm to his credibility would benefit the defense; and the evidence, though circumstantial, was substantial and pointed only toward the guilt of these [defendants].” BB. TESTIMONY Gonzalez v. State, 310 Ga.App. 348, 714 S.E.2d 13 (June 30, 2011). Convictions for rape, child molestation, and related offenses affirmed. No abuse of discretion in “allowing a victim-witness advocate employed by the district attorney's office to sit with the victim during her testimony to provide support.” Before allowing it, judge ascertained that the 14-year old victim “was very shy due to the difficult situation involving her step-father,” and instructed the advocate “that it was very important that the advocate not convey by gesture, body language or otherwise any approval of the child's answers, nor was she to prompt the child in any way.” “See Bell v. State, 294 Ga.App. 779, 780–781(3) (670 S.E.2d 476) (2008) (no abuse of discretion in allowing prosecutor to use leading questions to examine 14–year–old victim who demonstrated