☢ test - Í

Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304, 612 S.E.2d 789 (May 9, 2005). “Harris … urges that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate Harris’s mental health history and failed to raise the issue of his mental health at trial. However, Harris does not contend that he was insane at the time of the crimes, incompetent to stand trial, or otherwise was suffering from delusional compulsion. Nor is there any evidence to support the possibility of verdicts of guilty but mentally ill. See Boswell v. State, 275 Ga. 689, 572 S.E.2d 565 (2002).” Evidence of counseling was presented during sentencing. Accord, Radford v. State , 281 Ga. 303, 637 S.E.2d 712 (November 20, 2006). Horne v. State, 273 Ga.App. 132, 614 S.E.2d 243 (May 2, 2005). “Stipulating to a polygraph examination is a valid trial strategy, [Cit.] and trial counsel testified that he explained the pros and cons of this strategy to Horne, as well as the law regarding the admissibility of polygraph test results. Additionally, Horne cannot show how he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to inquire about his use of medications and mental health history, as there was no testimony from either examiner that these conditions affected the results of Horne’s polygraph examinations.” Cormier v. State, 277 Ga. 607, 592 S.E.2d 841 (February 16, 2004). “Cormier claims that due to the ‘bizarre’ nature of the crime, trial counsel should have been alerted to a mental illness defense, and that counsel was deficient in failing to conduct a mental evaluation. … When asked why he did not have Cormier evaluated by a psychologist or psychiatrist, counsel replied that no mental health issues were triggered, that Cormier was able to assist in his defense, and that family members did not raise any mental health concerns. Counsel testified that he certainly would have requested a mental evaluation had there been any reason to pursue such a defense. We deem this response as a reasonable tactical decision a competent attorney would have made under the circumstances. [cit.]” Defendant can’t prevail on this issue without showing that an evaluation would, in fact, have shown that insanity or competency issues existed; mere speculation is not enough to show prejudice. Accord, Hughes v. State , 323 Ga.App. 4, 746 S.E.2d 648 (July 15, 2013). Morton v. State, 265 Ga.App. 421, 594 S.E.2d 664 (February 4, 2004). Trial counsel not ineffective for failing to seek a second psychiatric opinion on defendant’s competency to stand trial where the first opinion, that she was competent and merely malingering, was supported by the evidence. Barber v. State, 236 Ga.App. 294, 512 S.E.2d 48 (February 8, 1999). No ineffective assistance where counsel failed to seek a psychiatric evaluation of defendant: “Although Barber contends that counsel should have undertaken a more thorough inquiry into his mental state, Barber failed to present any evidence at the hearing indicating that such an evaluation was appropriate or would have benefited him at trial. The only relevant facts testified to by Barber at the hearing were that (1) he was knocked unconscious in a car accident in 1995, (2) he has had ‘seizures’ since he was 12 years old, twice causing him to ‘black out’ while driving, and (3) when he was incarcerated previously, he was sent to Augusta Hospital ‘to get my head examined because they wanted to know what was wrong. ’ Barber did not testify that he had ever been hospitalized for any type of mental disorder, nor did he introduce any hospital records relating to his alleged admission to Augusta Hospital. … Although Barber’s testimony shows that he may have occasionally had seizures of some sort, been injured in a car accident a year or two before the robbery, and been sent to a hospital at some point for an unexplained reason, there is nothing to suggest that he has any history of mental disorders that would have been relevant to the trial of this case.” 57. INTERPRETERS Cisneros v. State, 334 Ga.App. 659, 780 S.E.2d 360 (November 18, 2015). Physical precedent only. Convictions for burglary and related home-invasion offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to move for hearing on interpreter’s accuracy. One interpreter was employed to interpret for defendant; a courtroom interpreter worked with witnesses. A Spanish-speaking alternate juror repeatedly criticized or corrected the courtroom interpreter, but neither defendant (who, according to counsel, spoke English) nor his interpreter expressed any concerns about the courtroom interpreter’s accuracy beyond a single instance where defendant’s interpreter corrected the courtroom interpreter. The courtroom interpreter was court certified, with a master’s degree in Bilingual Legal Interpreting. The juror was from Colombia, but her Spanish fluency was unknown, “and nothing indicated to [counsel] what her … interpreting skills were.” “[W]e cannot discern any basis for a valid objection to the interpretation provided by the court certified interpreter on the ground that [juror] M.B. was in apparent disagreement with portions of that interpretation. Nor can we conclude that trial counsel acted unreasonably in failing to insist on a hearing under the Supreme Court of Georgia’s Rules for the Use of Interpreters (the ‘Rules’). The Rules provide for such a procedure ‘[w]here a challenge is made to the accuracy of a translation[.]’ [Cit.] Cisneros maintains that M.B. had challenged the accuracy of the courtroom translation during the trial and then during the hearing on her misconduct, and that trial counsel ‘merely needed to insist that the trial court follow’ the Rules. Although the Rules do not specify how the accuracy of a translation may be challenged, or who