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may make such a challenge, the Rules do not reasonably contemplate that a hearing must be held where a juror is making comments from the jury stand and complaining to other jurors about the translation, as occurred here. Further, under the Rules the trial court ‘shall resolve the issue of the contested translation,’ so long as the trial court has ‘first determine[d] whether the interpreter is able to communicate accurately with and translate information to and from the non-English speaking person.’ Nothing put trial counsel on notice that Epps was not able to perform her duties as an interpreter, and his failure to insist on a hearing on that issue was reasonable. And Cisneros does not point to any specific portion of the courtroom translation that was brought to either trial counsel’s or the court’s attention as then being in dispute and therefore resolvable by the trial court. In view of the foregoing, Cisneros does not show that his trial counsel’s performance was professionally deficient in failing to object to [interpreter]’s interpretation or to insist on a hearing under the Rules, and the trial court did not err in rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance.” Cert. granted on this issue, case no. S16G0443, February 8, 2016. Weldon v. State, 328 Ga.App. 163, 761 S.E.2d 566 (July 10, 2014). Armed robbery and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; no prejudice shown in counsel’s failure to object to alleged deficiencies in interpretation. “Weldon has made an insufficient showing on the prejudice prong. He speculates that parts of the interpretations were incorrect, but has not provided a correct interpretation of that testimony. He also criticizes the professionalism of an interpreter who interpreted a statement made by a similar transaction witness as the witness was leaving the stand, leading to the state recalling the witness and obtaining additional testimony about the similar transaction that was favorable to the state. But the witnesses requiring interpreters were only a part of the state's case against Weldon. The state also presented testimony from victims and similar transaction witnesses who did not require interpreters, and it presented testimony from police officers and Weldon's accomplice tying him to the crimes. Under these circumstances, Weldon has not shown that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, absent any unprofessional errors on counsel's part, the result of his trial would have been different.’ Pineda [February 28, 2011, below] (citation omitted). See also Holliday v. State, 263 Ga.App. 664, 669 (588 S.E.2d 833) (2003) (finding no merit in claim of ineffective assistance for failure to obtain independent interpreter to translate victims' trial testimony where evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming and evidence did not affirmatively show that any translation problems harmed defendant).” Gonzalez v. State, 310 Ga.App. 348, 714 S.E.2d 13 (June 30, 2011). Convictions for rape, child molestation, and related offenses affirmed. No ineffective assistance for failure to seek mistrial “after a juror, who spoke fluent Spanish, told the bailiff that portions of the victim's videotaped statements had not been properly translated.” “Gonzalez provided no record support for his assertion that Juror Wellborn spoke with the bailiff about this issue in front of the other jurors; there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the other jurors were even aware of her concern. And Juror Wellborn stated that she ‘absolutely’ could rely on the official interpretation. Accordingly, Gonzalez has not established a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for his counsel's alleged deficiency.” Pineda v. State, 288 Ga. 612, 706 S.E.2d 407 (February 28, 2011). Malice murder and firearms convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to secure adequate interpreters. “Unlike defense counsel in Ling v. State, 288 Ga. 299, 302(1) (n. 1) (702 S.E.2d 881) (2010), Pineda's counsel recognized the need for interpreters and secured them. [fn] And, as the trial court noted in its order denying the motion for new trial, Pineda had ample opportunity to inform counsel or the court of any problems with the interpreters, and the fact that he did not do so during the trial hampers him in meeting his burden to show that counsel's performance in securing interpreters to assist him was inadequate. See Scott v. State, 275 Ga. 305, 308(6) (565 S.E.2d 810) (2002); Holmes v. State, 272 Ga. 517, 520(7) (529 S.E.2d 879) (2000); Maldonado v. State, 284 Ga.App. 26, 33-34(10)(b) (643 S.E.2d 316) (2007); Fennell v. State, 271 Ga.App. 797, 803(6)(j) (611 S.E.2d 96) (2005).” Accord, Cruz v. State , 315 Ga.App. 843, 729 S.E.2d 9 (May 10, 2012). Ling v. State, 288 Ga. 299, 702 S.E.2d 881 (November 22, 2010). Reversing 300 Ga.App. 726 (686 S.E.2d 356) (2009). In child cruelty prosecution, trial court’s ruling on motion for new trial vacated and remanded for written findings regarding defendant’s need for an interpreter. “[W]e hold that one who cannot communicate effectively in English may be effectively incompetent to proceed in a criminal matter and rendered effectively absent at trial if no interpreter is provided. We also now hold that trial courts must state and explain their findings when an issue concerning the need for an interpreter that implicates foundational due process rights is raised and decided at the motion for new trial stage.” Defendant here primarily spoke Mandarin Chinese; trial counsel testified that he was able to communicate with her effectively, but that in any event he didn’t ask for interpreter in part so as not to bias the jury against her, “given the media attention on immigration laws at the time. It is not professionally reasonable to decide to forego obtaining an interpreter for an otherwise incompetent criminal defendant based on speculative fears of juror bias, especially where, as here, there is no evidence that the defendant participated in or consented to the decision.” Carley,