☢ test - Í

length of deliberations following the Allen charge as proof of the charge's coerciveness, the fact that the verdict was apparently returned less than an hour later does not render it coercive. See Scott, supra, 290 Ga. at 888(6), 725 S.E.2d 305 (length of deliberations alone cannot make a charge coercive).” Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 773 S.E.2d 254 (June 1, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to request jury charge on limited use of defendant’s prior felony conviction [offered here to prove defendant’s status as a convicted felon in possession of firearm], where the trial court gave such an instruction sua sponte . “‘Thus, trial counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction had no effect on the outcome of the trial.’ Lee v. State, 280 Ga. 521, 522(2)(b) (630 S.E.2d 380) (2006).” Daughtry v. State, 296 Ga. 849, 770 S.E.2d 862 (March 27, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failure to request jury charge “on impeachment of a witness by a prior conviction. Here, however, [State’s witness] Oliver appeared in court in a prison jumpsuit, admitted that he was in prison for a probation violation on an aggravated assault conviction, and admitted that he sold cocaine. Because of these facts and the overwhelming evidence of Appellant's guilt, we conclude that, even if counsel had objected to the court's failure to charge on impeachment by a prior conviction, there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713, 770 S.E.2d 585 (March 16, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to request jury charge on voluntary manslaughter “absent ‘slight evidence’ that the killing was ‘solely’ the result of a ‘sudden, violent, and irresistible passion.’” “See McNeal v. State, 289 Ga. 711 (715 S.E.2d 95) (2011) (counsel not ineffective for failing to request voluntary manslaughter instruction where there was no evidence to support such a charge); Ros v. State, 279 Ga. 604(6) (619 S.E.2d 644) (2005) (same).” Sallee v. State, 329 Ga.App. 612, 765 S.E.2d 758 (November 13, 2014). Conviction for insurance fraud affirmed. No ineffective assistance in failing to request a jury charge stating an inaccurate proposition (here, that proof of insurance fraud requires a showing that the insurer relied on the defendant’s fraudulent statement). Davis v. State, 296 Ga. 126, 765 S.E.2d 336 (November 3, 2014). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to trial court’s response to deliberating jury’s question. Jury’s question: “When the charge reads that the assault was performed with a handgun, does it mean that the defendant Tremain Stuart Davis had to be the actual person wielding the gun? In other words, could we render a guilty verdict on the assault charges for the defendant if we believe he himself was unarmed?” In response, “the trial court simply instructed the jury to consider as a whole all of the charges previously given, an approach to which defense counsel agreed. Later, at the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense counsel explained his reasons for not asking for a recharge. A concise, direct, and accurate answer to the question posed by the jury—that, yes, Davis could be convicted as a party to the crime even if he were unarmed—would amount to an improper comment on the evidence, counsel concluded, and in any event would not be helpful to Davis. Similarly, a recharge only on parties to a crime would only emphasize the several ways in which Davis could be held responsible for the crimes with which he was charged, and in the experience of counsel, such a charge usually is harmful to the accused. … Here, we cannot say that the worries of counsel were unreasonable ones, and we likewise cannot say that the strategy employed by counsel—to agree to the trial court simply referring the jury to the whole of the charges previously given—was unreasonable. Moreover, since the jury had a written copy of the jury instructions, we fail to see how Davis could have been prejudiced in this case by the failure of the trial court to read one or more of these charges again.” Chavez v. State, 329 Ga.App. 207, 764 S.E.2d 447 (October 3, 2014). Physical precedent only on this point. Aggravated child molestation, rape and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to object to jury charge. Trial court charged jury that convictions for these offenses and others, including some for which the defendant was not charged (incest and aggravated sodomy) don’t require corroboration of the victim’s testimony. But viewed as a whole, the charge (which including reading the indictment and instructions on the burden of proof and definitions of the offenses charged) “properly limited the jury's consideration to the offenses contained within the indictment.” Thus, any objection to the charge would have been meritless. Bragg v. State, 295 Ga. 676, 763 S.E.2d 476 (September 22, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant “failed to show how requesting a charge on circumstantial evidence would have changed the outcome of the case.” Evidence against defendant was both direct and circumstantial.