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Byrd v. State, 325 Ga.App. 24, 752 S.E.2d 84 (November 20, 2013). Aggravated assault conviction reversed; jury charge that “[a] firearm, when used as such, is a deadly weapon as a matter of law,” wasn’t applicable when the firearm was “used as a bludgeon or club.” Further, the State failed to present any evidence “to show the circumstances surrounding the use of the handgun to strike Lo on his lip, such as the degree of force used, the likelihood of serious injury, or the nature of the injuries actually received. See generally Williams v. State, 127 Ga.App. 386, 389(2), 193 S.E.2d 633 (1972). Compare Green v. State, 221 Ga.App. 694, 695(2)–696(3), 472 S.E.2d 457 (1996) (affirming a conviction for aggravated assault where witness testified that defendant hit the victim in the head with the pistol so violently that it sounded like a shot and resulted in bleeding); Ortiz v. State, 292 Ga.App. 378, 381(2), 665 S.E.2d 333 (2008) (aggravated assault established where the evidence showed, without conflict, that defendant struck the victim with a handgun so violently that it caused the victim to bleed, and victim testified that, during the attack, he was afraid because he thought he was going to be killed). Here, the evidence produced by the State failed to show any details about the use of the handgun as alleged in Count 3 of the indictment that would render the handgun a ‘deadly weapon’ as a matter of law. [fn] Under these particular circumstances, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's instruction that ‘[a] firearm, when used as such, is a deadly weapon as a matter of law.’ The trial court's instruction seemly removes from the jury's province the question of whether the State had established an essential element of aggravated assault in Count 3, i.e. the use of the handgun as a deadly weapon. Additionally, the facts as proven cannot support a conclusion that the firearm was used as a deadly weapon as it must have been so used due to the language of the indictment. Thus, the requisite prejudice for trial counsel's ineffective assistance has been shown.” Dodd v. State, 324 Ga.App. 827, 752 S.E.2d 29 (November 19, 2013). Physical precedent only. Conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute reversed; counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to trial court’s jury charge on similar transactions, which improperly expanded the purposes for which the jury could consider the evidence. Charge here allowed jury to consider similar transactions for “the state of mind, bent of mind, course of conduct, and motive of the individual and the knowledge and the intent of the defendant and the crimes charged in the case now on trial. ” “Dodd's defense counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he did not object because he did not see any error as the instruction was given, and not a matter of trial strategy.” Bester v. State, 294 Ga. 195, 751 S.E.2d 360 (November 18, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance from failure to request jury charges. “Bester failed to point to any deficiency in the trial court's charge or to any charge that trial counsel should have requested that was not covered by the trial court's jury charge. Bester's merits brief suffers from the same shortcoming. Bester therefore has offered nothing ‘“more than mere speculation that, absent the counsel's alleged error [ ], a different result probably would have occurred at trial.”’ Baker v. State, 293 Ga. 811(3), 750 S.E.2d 137 (October 21, 2013) (citation omitted). Accord Valentine v. State, 293 Ga. 533(3), 748 S.E.2d 437 (2013).” Janasik v. State, 323 Ga.App. 545, 746 S.E.2d 208 (July 9, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel didn’t ask for contemporaneous limiting instruction on similar transaction evidence. Trial court did give a limiting instruction in closing charge. In absence of evidence on the subject, counsel’s decision is deemed strategic. “See Smith v. State, 270 Ga. 68, 70(3), 508 S.E.2d 145 (1998) (counsel not ineffective in failing to request limiting instruction contemporaneously with similar transaction testimony where he requested such instruction as part of court's general charge); Sims v. State, 317 Ga.App. 420, 422–423(1), 731 S.E.2d 105 (2012); Copeland v. State, 276 Ga.App. 834, 838(2)(b), 625 S.E.2d 100 (2005) (no prejudice shown where counsel failed to request contemporaneous limiting instruction).” Lake v. State, 293 Ga. 56, 743 S.E.2d 414 (May 20, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel “did not object to the trial court's failure to recharge the jury after it requested written definitions of the charges. … At the motion for new trial hearing, Lake's counsel testified that he ultimately made a strategic decision to allow the trial court to remind the jury of the court's previous instruction, rather than provide them with a recharge that included the defenses, because, in his experience, such a recharge may have made the jury more inclined to convict Lake rather than acquit him. This strategy was reasonable under the circumstances.” Simon v. State, 321 Ga.App. 1, 740 S.E.2d 819 (March 28, 2013). Verdict of guilty but mentally ill on aggravated assault and related charges affirmed; no ineffective assistance. “Where, as here, ‘the jury was properly instructed on the law of insanity , counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to seek alternative instructions.’ Rodriguez [ v. State, 271 Ga. 40, 45(5)(a), 518 S.E.2d 131 (1999)].”