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Riley v. State, 319 Ga.App. 823, 738 S.E.2d 659 (February 20, 2013). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failing to seek jury charge on alibi. “Because ‘[t]he absence of a charge on alibi did not change the fact that no juror who believed [Riley's] testimony could find that the [S]tate had carried its burden of proof,’ the trial court correctly determined at the motion for new trial that Riley failed to carry his burden of proof under the second prong of Strickland by establishing that there was a reasonable probability the outcome of his trial would have been different had trial counsel requested and received a jury charge on alibi. Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 300(8), 298 S.E.2d 10 (1982). See also Davis [ v. State, 267 Ga.App. 668, 670(2), 600 S.E.2d 742(a) (2004).” Moore v. State, 319 Ga.App. 766, 738 S.E.2d 348 (February 14, 2013). Child cruelty convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to verdict form where the single charge against defendant wife was “sandwiched between” two charges against her husband. Counsel testified that the charges against the separate defendants were clearly delineated, and the jury was charged to consider the charges against each defendant separately. The decision not to object was therefore strategic and does not provide a basis for a claim of ineffectiveness. See, e.g., Robison v. State, 277 Ga.App. 133, 138(3), 625 S.E.2d 533 (2006).” Gunter v. State, 316 Ga.App. 485, 729 S.E.2d 597 (June 28, 2012). Convictions for aggravated assault and terroristic threats affirmed; no ineffective assistance where defendant, over counsel’s advice, chose to forego jury charge on lesser-included offense of simple assault. Here, defense counsel requested the charge, but trial court insisted that counsel ask defendant if she wanted it. Over counsel’s objection, he did so, and defendant said she didn’t want it. Defendant now contends that counsel should have preserved an objection to the court’s failure to give the lesser-included charge, but “a defendant ‘cannot blame trial counsel for a decision he himself made over counsel's objection.’ Alvarado v. State, 271 Ga.App. 714, 719(3), 610 S.E.2d 675 (2005). In Alvarado, the defendant waived a trial by jury over his attorney's advice that to do so would be unwise. Here, Gunter waived the charge of a lesser included offense over her attorney's advice. See also Rose v. State, 258 Ga.App. 232, 235(2)(a), 573 S.E.2d 465 (2002) (not ineffective assistance where defendant decided to introduce prior drug conviction). Cf. Gabler v. State, 177 Ga.App. 3, 7(2), 338 S.E.2d 469 (1985) (failure to object to bad character evidence not ineffective assistance where testimony was duplicative of testimony given by a witness who defendant insisted upon calling over his trial counsel's advice).” McFadden dissents , arguing that decision on what jury charges to request lies with counsel, not defendant. “Here, it is apparent from the record, as well as appellant's brief, that the error sought to be asserted was the trial court's refusal to recognize trial counsel's authority to insist on the charge and his interference with the attorney/client relationship. Once the trial court had so ruled, and through that ruling had elicited from Gunter a decision not to seek the charge, trial counsel was prevented from requesting the charge or objecting to the failure to give it. … Because the trial court—over vigorous objection—prevented trial counsel from doing her job, we should reverse and remand for a new trial.” Bynum v. State, 315 Ga.App. 392, 726 S.E.2d 428 (March 7, 2012). Conviction for child molestation affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failure to request jury charge on defendant’s decision not to testify. “‘The decision whether to request a particular jury charge falls within the realm of trial tactics and strategy.’ Duvall v. State, 273 Ga.App. 143, 147(3)(h) (614 S.E.2d 234) (2005).” Accord, Pennie v. State , 292 Ga. 249, 736 S.E.2d 433 (January 7, 2013) (in murder trial, decision not to request charge on proximate cause of death was strategic, “no grounds for reversal unless such tactical decisions are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.”). Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428, 721 S.E.2d 892 (January 23, 2012). Malice murder convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failure to request jury charge on voluntary manslaughter “because it would have required an admission that Smith had committed an unlawful act, and her client was adamant that he had done nothing wrong and did not want to present that alternative to the jury.” Accord, Jessie v. State , 294 Ga. 375, 754 S.E.2d 46 (January 21, 2014) (No ineffective assistance in declining to seek charge on voluntary manslaughter as lesser-included charge to malice murder; “Jessie's trial counsel testified at the new trial hearing that, after consultation with Jessie, he had opted to pursue an ‘all or nothing’ strategy, believing that the jury ‘would have to really reach’ to convict her of malice murder.”); Pepe-Frazier v. State , 331 Ga.App. 263, 770 S.E.2d 654 (March 18, 2015) (counsel not ineffective for failing to request charge on child molestation, lesser offense to aggravated child molestation, when defendant contended that the allegations were entirely fabricated). Hickson v. State, 308 Ga.App. 50, 706 S.E.2d 670 (February 2, 2011). Convictions for voluntary manslaughter and related offenses affirmed. At first trial, defendant was acquitted of malice murder and lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, but jury hung on felony murder. At re-trial, counsel requested charge on voluntary manslaughter as lesser-