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included offense to felony murder. Held, no ineffective assistance based on strategic waiver of defendant’s double jeopardy rights: “Given that the record clearly shows that trial counsel made a strategic decision to request a charge on voluntary manslaughter, and because we cannot say that this decision was patently unreasonable, we affirm the trial court's finding that Hickson failed to prove deficient performance. See Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 487(3)(b) (690 S.E.2d 177) (2010) (decision over whether to request charge on voluntary manslaughter was strategic one that provided no basis for reversal).” Dockery v. State, 287 Ga. 275, 695 S.E.2d 599 (June 7, 2010). Defendant’s murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance for “failure to request a jury charge on immunity granted to a witness, in light of the grant of testimonial immunity to witness Seals. See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 1.31.80 (4 th ed). Though trial counsel did not request such a charge, the transcript reveals that Seals was questioned regarding the grant of immunity and was thoroughly cross-examined regarding his motives for testifying. This questioning and the general jury instructions on witness credibility that were given were sufficient to apprise the jury of any negative inferences it might draw from the immunity arrangement involving this witness. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 298 Ga.App. 376(4)(b) (680 S.E.2d 482) (2009) (counsel not ineffective for failing to request charge on immunity or leniency where potential bias brought out on cross-examination). Accordingly, appellant can show no prejudice from counsel's failure to request the more specific instruction. See Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438(3) (435 S.E.2d 600) (1993) (no prejudice from failure to request instruction on immunity).” Newton v. State, 303 Ga.App. 852, 695 S.E.2d 79 (April 14, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and firearm possession affirmed; no ineffective assistance for putting charge requests in incorrect format in violation of USCR 10.3, where requested charge was not adjusted to facts, anyway. Dixon v. State, 303 Ga.App. 517, 693 S.E.2d 900 (April 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping with injury, rape and aggravated assault affirmed; failure to object to jury charge on slight movement being sufficient to establish asportation, when that was still the law, was not deficient. See Garza v. State , 284 Ga. 696, 701(1), 670 S.E.2d 73 (2008). Angus v. State, 301 Ga.App. 92, 687 S.E.2d 142 (November 17, 2009). No ineffective assistance from charge requests, though one of them was objectively unreasonable. 1. Not objectively unreasonable to request charge that “all witnesses are presumed to speak the truth.” “Angus correctly states that such charges are discouraged in criminal trials. Noggle v. State, 256 Ga. 383, 385-386(4) (349 S.E.2d 175) (1986) (charge ‘can be misleading and is of little positive value’ even though not unconstitutional). However, counsel gave a rational explanation for requesting the charge. The victim admitted that she ‘lies a lot.’ And counsel wanted to emphasize that the jury should presume she was telling the truth when she made this statement and therefore conclude she was unreliable. Counsel was aware of Noggle but read it primarily to mean that the charge should be used with caution. This reading may not have been wise, but it cannot be considered as objectively unreasonable.” 2. Same charge on credibility went on to state: “you should not attribute a false statement to any of [witness]. If you find that this cannot be done, then you should believe the evidence that is most reasonable and believable to you and decide the case by the preponderance of the evidence as you find it to be.” “Angus contends use of the preponderance standard unconstitutionally lowered the burden of proof for the prosecution and was therefore objectively unreasonable. Reading the charge as a whole, however, we conclude that this language referred only to this section of the jury charge, and therefore there was no reversible error.” “[T]his court has found repeatedly that where the incorrect language appears in the section of the charge dealing with witness credibility, and the court has otherwise repeatedly charged the correct burden of proof, there is no reversible error. See, e.g., Alexander v. State, 203 Ga.App. 375(1) (416 S.E.2d 762) (1992) (no error where ‘preponderance of the evidence’ language was ‘limited to the charge on evaluating the credibility of witnesses’ and jury was instructed multiple times on correct burden of proof); Terrell v. State, 201 Ga.App. 628, 629(1) (411 S.E.2d 779) (1991) (same).” “The charge as a whole instructed the jury on the correct burden of proof more than ten times.” 3. Requesting this charge was objectively unreasonable , but no harm shown: “I charge you that where a party has evidence by which the party may repel a claim or charge against him/her, and omits to produce it, or having more certain and satisfactory evidence, relies on that which is of a weaker and inferior nature, a presumption arises that the charge or claim is well founded; but this presumption may be rebutted.” No harm because “the prosecution was the only party that failed to offer evidence of which the jury was aware,” and defendant’s own right not to testify was specifically addressed elsewhere in the charge. Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 687 S.E.2d 427 (November 9, 2009). Failure to request charge on defense of habitation was deficient, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. “[Co-defendant] Jackson testified that he drove the Jeep Cherokee to the fueling station and removed the keys from the ignition. While sitting in the vehicle, Jackson saw