☢ test - Í

Sparks v. State, 277 Ga. 72, 586 S.E.2d 645 (September 15, 2003). Not ineffective assistance of counsel where attorney did not seek jury charge on lesser-included offense because defendant insisted he was not even present at the scene and committed no offense. “[C]ounsel is entitled to base the defense on the veracity of the client’s assertions.” Accord, Leonard (May 4, 2006), above; Savior v. State , 284 Ga. 488, 668 S.E.2d 695 (October 27, 2008); Williams v. State , 292 Ga. 844, 742 S.E.2d 445 (April 29, 2013); Merritt v. State , 296 Ga. 98, 765 S.E.2d 316 (November 3, 2014). Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga.App. 690, 586 S.E.2d 386 (August 12, 2003). “‘Decisions as to which [jury] charges will be requested and when they will be requested fall within the realm of trial tactics and strategy. They provide no grounds for reversal unless such tactical decisions are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.’” Accord, Moreland v. State , 263 Ga.App. 585, 588 S.E.2d 785 (October 8, 2003); Conaway v. State , 277 Ga. 422, 589 S.E.2d 108 (November 26, 2003) (not ineffective assistance of counsel to forego charge on a defense different from that pursued at trial; counsel could make strategic decision that this might “confuse the jury”); Williams v. State , 309 Ga.App. 688, 710 S.E.2d 884 (May 26, 2011); Chandler v. State , 320 Ga.App. 516, 740 S.E.2d 256 (March 19, 2013) (not ineffective to forego charge on fingerprint evidence). Wakefield v. State, 261 Ga.App. 474, 583 S.E.2d 155 (June 4, 2003). Forgery and related convictions reversed. Trial court failed to charge the jury on impeachment by conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude. Counsel’s failure to object to this failure constituted ineffective assistance: the failure was not a tactical decision; by his admission, it resulted from counsel’s preoccupation doing something else during the charge. And because the impeached witness’s testimony was critical to the state’s case, “we cannot say there is no reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict would have been different absent the trial court’s erroneous failure to instruct on witness impeachment.” Stanford v. Stewart, 274 Ga. 468, 554 S.E.2d 480 (November 5, 2001). Habeas court erred in denying relief from arson conviction; trial counsel was deficient for failing to challenge an erroneous jury charge and move for a mistrial. Upon such challenge, defendant would have received a new trial. As that deficiency deprived defendant of the substantial right to be tried only on the charges for which he was indicted, defendant was denied effective assistance counsel. Moon v. State, 244 Ga.App. 443, 535 S.E.2d 771 (June 12, 2000). Theft by taking conviction affirmed; failure to preserve objections to the jury charge isn’t ineffective assistance absent a showing that the charge was erroneous. “Even assuming that failure to reserve objections could be equated with a deficiency in performance, appellate counsel for Moon has totally failed to point out any errors in the trial court's charge that would illustrate the necessary prejudice. No error has been shown. Williams v. State, 214 Ga.App. 106, 446 S.E.2d 789 (1994); Concepcion v. State, 205 Ga.App. 138, 139, 421 S.E.2d 554 (1992); see Bell v. State, 226 Ga.App. 271, 275(7)(f), 486 S.E.2d 422 (1997).” Guertin v. State , 243 Ga.App. 322, 533 S.E.2d 159 (March 30, 2000). Convictions for statutory rape, incest, and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to seek jury charge on good character where “defense counsel developed good character evidence at trial and such was before the jury. The trial court charged the jury on the credibility of witnesses. Guertin has not alleged how the result of the trial would have been different if an independent charge on good character had been given.” Lowe v. State, 241 Ga.App. 335, 526 S.E.2d 634 (December 7, 1999). Defendant’s burglary conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to request jury charge on mere presence, although “[t]he presumption of innocence, codified at OCGA § 16-1-5, is in the nature of evidence. Dennard v. State, 216 Ga.App. 446, 447(1), 454 S.E.2d 629. See also Foster v. State, 240 Ga. 858, 860(4), 242 S.E.2d 600. In our view, this evidentiary presumption is sufficient to support a proper written request for a jury instruction on mere presence at the scene.” Assuming but not holding this to be deficient performance, no harm shown as no reasonable probability of different outcome. Buice v. State, 239 Ga.App. 52, 520 S.E.2d 258 (June 29, 1999), affirmed on other grounds , 272 Ga. 323, 528 S.E.2d 788 (May 1, 2000). 1. No ineffective assistance where counsel failed to request jury charge on similar transaction evidence. “Buice's trial counsel explained that she opted not to request such an instruction because she ‘did not want to characterize [the prior allegations of molestation] as similar transactions or crimes or as anything that had been proven to have occurred.’ Since counsel's decision may be considered trial strategy, reversal is not required. Johnson v. State, 268 Ga. 416, 419(4), 490 S.E.2d 91 (1997).’” Evidence here was admitted to impeach defendant’s witnesses, who denied that either they, or victim, had been molested by defendant. Accord, Connelly v. State , 295 Ga.App. 765, 673 S.E.2d 274 (January 28, 2009); Sims v. State , 317 Ga.App. 420, 731 S.E.2d 105 (August 14, 2012) (decision not to seek limiting