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instruction on similar child molestation, so as not to draw attention to it, was strategic). 2. No ineffective assistance where counsel failed to request jury charge use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. “As the Supreme Court held, ‘[t]he failure to give a charge on prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence is not error as absent instructions to the contrary, the jury surely regarded substantively all the evidence presented to it.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Caldwell v. State, 263 Ga. 560, 564(11), 436 S.E.2d 488 (1993).” Bush v. State, 271 Ga. 156, 517 S.E.2d 509 (June 1, 1999). On motion for new trial following defendant’s conviction for felony murder, trial court erred in using wrong standard to rule on defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance. Defendant contends that counsel at his murder trial should have requested charges on accident and involuntary manslaughter; trial court ruled that there was no ineffective assistance because these were not defendant’s sole defenses, although noting that they “were warranted by the evidence; that Bush's trial counsel should have requested the charges; and that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the charges had been given.” “[I]f a defendant bases his ineffectiveness claim on trial counsel's failure to request a charge on a certain defense, it is irrelevant whether the trial court would have been required to give such a charge absent a request. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether trial counsel provided deficient representation in failing to request the charge, and if so, whether the defendant can meet the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington. In making the latter determination, the relevant inquiry is whether the charge, if it had been requested, was warranted by the evidence, and if it had been given, whether there is a reasonable probability that it would have changed the outcome of the trial. See Lucas v. State, 265 Ga. 514, 516-517(3), 458 S.E.2d 103 (1995).” Reversed and remanded with direction. Accord, Hung v. State , 284 Ga. 796, 671 S.E.2d 811 (January 12, 2009) (no reasonable probability of different outcome shown); Lewis v. State , 302 Ga.App. 506, 691 S.E.2d 336 (February 25, 2010). Champion v. State, 238 Ga.App. 48, 517 S.E.2d 595 (May 11, 1999) (disapproved on other grounds, Miller v. State , 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009)). No ineffective assistance where counsel failed to request contemporaneous limiting charge on similar transaction evidence, but trial court gave the instruction in its closing charge. “This limiting instruction was nearly contemporaneous because the similar transaction testimony was the last testimony elicited at trial. Based on the circumstances of this case, … Champion has failed to establish that, but for his trial counsel’s failure to request a contemporaneous limiting instruction, the outcome of the trial would have been different. The trial court did not err in denying Champion’s motion for a new trial on this ground. We feel compelled to note, however, that due to the very nature of similar transaction evidence and the great risk that this evidence can be misused by the jury, the better practice regarding instructions to the jury limiting their consideration of similar transaction evidence is to give the limiting instruction both immediately prior to the similar transaction testimony and during the trial court’s final instructions.” Accord, Bolick v. State , 244 Ga.App. 567, 536 S.E.2d 242 (June 22, 2000). Turner v. State, 237 Ga.App. 642, 516 S.E.2d 345 (April 13, 1999). “[T]he decision of Turner’s counsel not to request a charge on the lesser included offense of robbery by intimidation and, instead, to pursue an all-or-nothing defense was a matter of trial strategy. Milliken v. State, 230 Ga.App. 810, 812-813(2)(b), 498 S.E.2d 127 (1998); Harshaw v. State, 222 Ga.App. 385, 387(2), 474 S.E.2d 226 (1996).” Accord, Villegas v. State , 334 Ga.App. 108, 778 S.E.2d 363 (October 7, 2015) (counsel properly declined to seek jury instruction on criminal trespass as lesser-included offense to burglary, based on defendant’s insistence that he wasn’t at scene, and refusal to consider plea to trespass). Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga.App. 14, 512 S.E.2d 640 (January 8, 1999). “‘Failure to object to a court’s charge … is not ineffective assistance where the [defendant] does not show how this prejudiced his case,’” quoting Jones v. State , 263 Ga. 835, 838, 439 S.E.2d 645 (1994). 61. JURY DELIBERATIONS – RE-HEARING EVIDENCE Traylor v. State, 332 Ga.App. 441, 773 S.E.2d 403 (June 9, 2015). Rape and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in counsel’s handling of question from jury during deliberations. “During its deliberations, the jury requested (1) to view the trial transcript of M. B.'s testimony related to her having seen Traylor at the corner store, (2) to read the police report from the day of the crime, and (3) to view a calendar from August and September 2008. The judge, the prosecutor, and Traylor's counsel were all in agreement that each request should be denied, and that the jury should be instructed to use their collective memories and notes to remember the evidence.” Defendant now contends that counsel should have asked the trial court to “direct the jury's attention to the stipulated exhibits tendered during the trial,” despite the trial court’s express statement at the motion for new trial hearing that “‘[t]here is nothing [counsel] could have said to me to get me to do anything else in response to [the jury's] questions.’ And ‘[i]t has long been the law in Georgia that a judgment will not be reversed because the trial court declines to aid the jury in recalling the evidence[.]’ Young v.