☢ test - Í

State, 246 Ga.App. 651, 653(2), 541 S.E.2d 670 (2000). See Byrd v. State, 237 Ga. 781, 783(1), 229 S.E.2d 631 (1976) (A trial court may, in its discretion, refuse a jury's request to rehear certain parts of the evidence.). It follows that counsel's failure request that the judge direct the jury as suggested by Traylor does not constitute ineffective assistance, because it affirmatively appears from the record that the trial court in its discretion would have denied such a request.” Williams v. State, 282 Ga. 561, 651 S.E.2d 674 (September 24, 2007). “[Defendant] claims trial counsel performed deficiently when he acquiesced in the trial court’s refusal to permit the deliberating jury to re-hear the testimony of Jimmy Lee White. … Trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that he agreed with the trial court’s decision not to permit the jury to rehear the testimony because he had been satisfied with the testimony as given and the inconsistencies he had brought out on cross-examination; he did not know why the jury wanted to review the testimony; and he was concerned that re-reading the testimony would place undue emphasis on it. In light of trial counsel’s reasonable strategy and the trial court’s discretion whether to grant a jury’s request to rehear portions of the evidence ( Smith v. State, [280 Ga. 161(2) (625 S.E.2d 766) (2006)]), the trial court did not err in concluding that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient.” 62. JURY MISCONDUCT, FAILURE TO OBJECT McNair v. State, 296 Ga. 181, 766 S.E.2d 45 (November 17, 2014). Murder conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to move for mistrial “after five members [of the jury] indicated they had been exposed to media coverage of the crime and pending trial after they had been chosen to serve. The record reveals that on the night before the trial was to begin, a local news station broadcast a story about the case and posted the story on the station's website. Concerned that jurors might have been exposed to this media coverage, appellant's trial counsel raised this issue with the trial court the next morning prior to the jury being sworn. Trial counsel requested that the jurors be polled in order to discover whether any jurors had seen the media coverage and, if they had, whether their ability to remain impartial had been compromised. Upon questioning by the trial court, several jurors admitted to seeing the coverage, but all those who had been exposed indicated upon further questioning by the court that they could remain impartial and would base their verdict entirely upon the evidence presented at trial. Trial counsel testified on motion for new trial that, based on the jurors' responses, he made a conscious, strategic decision not to move to excuse any of the jurors or to request a mistrial. The decision whether to replace a juror who has been exposed to inadmissible material or to grant a mistrial is within the trial court's discretion. See Washington v. State, 279 Ga. 722, 723, 620 S.E.2d 809 (2005); Guess v. State, 264 Ga. 335, 338(6), 443 S.E.2d 477 (exposure to media coverage does not automatically disqualify jurors). Similar measures to those taken by the trial court in this case have been deemed adequate by this Court in determining whether any prejudice inured to a defendant as the result of jurors' exposure to media coverage. See Guess, supra; Langston v. State, 162 Ga.App. 795, 796, 293 S.E.2d 54 (1982).” Jones v. State, 289 Ga. 111, 709 S.E.2d 773 (April 18, 2011). Felony murder and firearms convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on failure to seek removal of juror seen talking to witness. In one-minute conversation, juror asked witness about health of his stepfather, who had recently had surgery; conversation was not case-related. “A defendant is entitled to trial by a jury untainted by improper influence, and communication between a juror and a witness while a trial is on-going is improper. Clark v. State, 153 Ga.App. 829(1) (266 S.E.2d 577) (1980). ‘When irregular juror conduct is shown, there is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant, and the prosecution carries the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred.... “[W]hen the substance of the communication is established without contradiction, the facts themselves may establish the lack of prejudice or harm to the defendant.”’ Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100(2) (485 S.E.2d 192) (1997). Inasmuch as the hearing established the uncontradicted substance of the conversation and that it was not an attempt to discuss the merits of the case or influence the juror, appellant was not harmed by the improper communication and trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to seek the juror's removal. The trial court did not err when it determined appellant had not established ineffective assistance of counsel. See Peterson v. State, 284 Ga. 275, 278 (663 S.E.2d 164) (2008).” Cruz v. State, 305 Ga.App. 805, 700 S.E.2d 631 (August 20, 2010). Defendants’ conviction for armed robbery affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to object to sleeping juror. “‘[W]hen irregular juror conduct is shown, prejudice to the defendant is presumed. Significantly, however, the presumption applies only where the issue was properly preserved at trial and raised as error on direct appeal; it does not apply in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In the ineffective assistance context, the burden is upon the defendant to prove actual prejudice affirmatively from the record.’ (Citation omitted.) Sullivan v. State, 295 Ga.App. 145, 154(7)(a) (671 S.E.2d 180) (2008).” Scott v. State, 242 Ga.App. 553, 530 S.E.2d 257 (March 1, 2000). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; no