☢ test - Í

Haynes v. State, 302 Ga.App. 296, 690 S.E.2d 925 (February 11, 2010). Defendant failed to show ineffective assistance from counsel’s failure “to raise a Batson challenge after the prosecution used all of its peremptory strikes to exclude six black females from the jury panel.” “Here, even assuming that the State's six peremptory strikes of black females established a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent, Haynes has made no attempt to demonstrate that the State could not have offered permissible race-or gender-neutral justifications for those strikes. Although the State would have borne the burden at trial of justifying its strikes, “in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it was [Haynes'] burden, not the State's, to ensure that the trial court had sufficient information to determine the merit of a Batson challenge.” (Citation omitted.) Pierce v. State, [286 Ga. 194(4), 686 S.E.2d 656 (November 23, 2009)]. See also Rakestrau v. State, [278 Ga. 872, 874 (608 S.E.2d 216) (2005)] (‘ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.)) Haynes relied solely upon the fact of the State's peremptory strikes to support his claim of inadequate representation. He made no attempt to obtain testimony from prosecutors or to present any other evidence regarding the basis for the State's peremptory strikes. Absent such evidence, ‘the trial court had no way of knowing whether the State could produce race- neutral explanations for whatever strikes it made and, if so, of evaluating their credibility so that it could decide, at step three of the Batson analysis, whether there was purposeful racial [or gender] discrimination’ in selecting the jury. Pierce, 286 Ga. 194(4).” Reversed on other grounds, Watson v. State , 297 Ga. 718, 777 S.E.2d 677 (September 14, 2015). Accord, Stokes v. State , 289 Ga. 702, 715 S.E.2d 81 (September 12, 2011); Downey v. State , 298 Ga. 568, 783 S.E.2d 622 (March 7, 2016). Culpepper v. State, 302 Ga.App. 370, 690 S.E.2d 864 (February 1, 2010). At defendant’s trial for selling and possessing cocaine, no ineffective assistance where counsel allegedly failed to strike a juror defendant wanted struck. Defendant claimed he knew the juror, but “the potential juror did not state that she knew Culpepper, and Culpepper has not shown that striking her would have produced a different result in his trial.” Matiatos v. State, 301 Ga.App. 573, 688 S.E.2d 385 (December 11, 2009). Defendant’s convictions for sexual exploitation of children affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to seek excusal for cause of four jurors who “expressed discomfort at viewing sexually graphic photographs of children.” “[U]pon being further queried, no such juror expressed an inability to decide the case based on the evidence alone.” Pyburn v. State, 301 Ga.App. 372, 687 S.E.2d 909 (December 1, 2009). Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at defendant’s trial for incest with “certain” voir dire questions. Among those quoted: “is that something, so gross, so demented, that you can’t be fair?” “Do we really presume people to be innocent? I mean, I don’t.” And “suggesting that if Pyburn did not testify, ‘you might think ... he should have gotten on the stand if he [is an] innocent man.’ Pyburn contends that through these comments and others, his counsel made unnecessary concessions and gave the jury license to ignore the presumption of innocence and to assume Pyburn's guilt. Pyburn's trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he had undergone training in voir dire which involved being candid with the jury in the hope of receiving candid responses. He was of the opinion that it was in Pyburn's interest for him to identify those jurors who were so sensitive to the charges of incest that they could not give Pyburn a fair trial, who would be unwilling to presume Pyburn's innocence, or who would be prejudiced against Pyburn if he chose not to testify. Although trial counsel's attempt to obtain candid responses from the prospective jurors constituted a reasonable strategy, we conclude that certain of trial counsel's questions were not a reasonable execution of this strategy and constituted deficient performance.” No prejudice, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Phipps dissents: “I believe that the law requires that we presume Pyburn was prejudiced when his counsel told the jury that he did not believe the presumption that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty.” Hardnett v. State, 285 Ga. 470, 678 S.E.2d 323 (May 18, 2009). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. No ineffective assistance where counsel failed to use peremptory strikes to remove jurors who expressed doubt about their impartiality. “Although the potential jurors expressed concern that certain factors would impact their ability to be fair and impartial, they both stated they would try to decide the case based upon the evidence and the court's instructions.” “The use of peremptory strikes is a matter of trial strategy, and Hardnett has failed to carry his burden to show that counsel's use of his strikes was not reasonable. Hammond v. State, 264 Ga. 879, 885 (452 S.E.2d 745) (1995); Solomon v. State, 247 Ga. 27, 30 (277 S.E.2d 1) (1980).” Accord, Bates v. State , 322 Ga.App. 319, 744 S.E.2d 841 (June 17, 2013). Crawford v. State, 294 Ga.App. 711, 670 S.E.2d 185 (November 19, 2008). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. Circumstances didn’t demand Batson challenge where prosecutor struck one juror who knew defendant, and another who knew a witness.