☢ test - Í

Peterson v. State, 284 Ga. 275, 663 S.E.2d 164 (June 30, 2008). During defendant’s murder trial, a juror awoke one morning to find a friend of his adult son sleeping on the couch. “The juror had said ‘good morning’ to the [guest who turned out to be a witness for the State], but that was the sum total of all the communication he had ever had with him. When the juror realized that the man who had been on his couch that morning was involved in the case, he promptly brought the issue to the trial court’s attention.” After examination, the trial court allowed the juror to remain on the case. Held, no ineffective assistance where defense counsel agreed “to allow the juror to remain on the panel. Trial counsel explained at the hearing on the new trial motion that he believed – in light of the juror’s decision to come forward, his explanation, and his overall behavior – that the juror was trustworthy and being straightforward, that he did not know the witness aside from that one brief encounter, that he had not discussed the case with him outside of court, and that the juror would be fair and impartial if allowed to continue serving. … The trial court held, and we agree, that under these circumstances, counsel’s decision to allow the juror to remain on the panel was a perfectly reasonable tactical decision.” Burnette v. State, 291 Ga.App. 504, 662 S.E.2d 272 (May 13, 2008) (physical precedent only). No ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to object to trial court’s failure “to ask the qualifying voir dire questions that are required by OCGA § 15-12-164(a). “Counsel testified at the new trial hearing that he was unaware that the trial court was required to ask the statutory questions. … Assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, Burnette cannot show that the outcome of her trial would have been different had the court asked the statutory questions. The prosecutor asked the potential jurors whether they were acquainted with the defendant or the victim, and if so, whether they could remain impartial. The potential jurors indicated that they had no bias. Further, there is no evidence, and defendant does not contend, that any of the jurors were, in fact, biased or prejudiced against her. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 221 Ga.App. 374-375(1) (471 S.E.2d 318) (1996).” Warner v State, 287 Ga.App. 892, 652 S.E.2d 898 (October 22, 2007). Counsel’s decision not to strike “juror who indicated that she might have had Warner as a student,” made in consultation with defendant after considering juror’s voir dire responses, was strategic. “The juror testified that the fact that she might know Warner would not affect her ability to listen to the evidence and the charge of the court, nor would it affect her ability to be fair and impartial.” Griffith v. State, 286 Ga.App. 859, 650 S.E.2d 413 (July 30, 2007). In defendant’s burglary trial, no ineffective assistance where counsel elected not to strike juror with first-offender theft conviction. “[A]t the hearing on the motion for new trial, Griffith’s trial attorney testified that he ‘felt that [the juror] may not be a bad juror for us, that his having been convicted of theft by receiving stolen property ... at the time I did not believe that that would render him a ... bad ... juror for us.’ Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to object to the juror was a reasonable strategic decision, and not the result of deficient performance. [Cit.]” Vega v. State, 285 Ga.App. 405, 646 S.E.2d 501 (May 16, 2007). Counsel’s decisions about which jurors to strike peremptorily were a matter of trial strategy. “Here, where the jurors at issue all expressed certain reservations about the subject matter of the case but upon further questioning stated that they could be fair and impartial, we cannot conclude that trial counsel’s decision to use the available strikes as she did was so patently unreasonable that no competent lawyer would have done the same.” No contention here that jurors should have been excused for cause. Accord, Ware v. State , 321 Ga.App. 640, 742 S.E.2d 156 (April 25, 2013) (not ineffective for failure to strike where “[t]he juror did not display a definite and fixed opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of defendant, nor did she indicate an inability or unwillingness to listen to the evidence, apply the law, or deliberate with fellow jurors to reach a verdict.”). Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga.App. 335, 612 S.E.2d 521 (March 21, 2005). “Stevenson contends that his trial counsel failed to strike jurors during voir dire according to his directions. The decision on which jurors to accept and which jurors to strike is one of trial strategy, and ‘[t]rial counsel’s strategic decisions made after thorough investigation are virtually unchallengeable.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Oliver v. State, 270 Ga.App. 429, 430(2)(b) (606 S.E.2d 874) (2004).” Accord, Port v. State , 295 Ga.App. 109, 671 S.E.2d 200 (November 14, 2008); Allen v. State , 299 Ga.App. 201, 683 S.E.2d 343 (July 15, 2009). Domingues v. State, 277 Ga. 373, 589 S.E.2d 102 (November 17, 2003). “It cannot be said that counsel were ineffective for failing to have voir dire transcribed because Domingues does not assert that anything harmful or prejudicial transpired during voir dire.” Accord, Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 853, 596 S.E.2d 597 (May 24, 2004); Davis v. State , 275 Ga.App. 714, 621 S.E.2d 818 (October 4, 2005); Robbins v. State , 290 Ga.App. 323, 659 S.E.2d 628 (February 20, 2008) (no