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ineffectiveness for failure to voir dire about pre-trial publicity, absent showing that pre-trial publicity had any impact, or was “incorrect or inflammatory.”) ; Daugherty v. State , 291 Ga.App. 541, 662 S.E.2d 318 (May 16, 2008). Prince v. State, 277 Ga. 230, 587 S.E.2d 637 (October 20, 2003). Trial counsel not ineffective for leaving corrections officer on jury where officer worked at jail where defendant was incarcerated, and who knew defendant. “[T]here was evidence that his retention as a member of the jury was a strategic decision since trial counsel testified he was aware the juror knew [defendant], he consulted with [defendant] concerning the officer’s presence on the juror, and retained him since there are benefits to having a juror who is acquainted with the defendant.” Kirkland v. State, 274 Ga. 778, 560 S.E.2d 6 (February 11, 2002). Burglary and related convictions reversed; trial counsel renders ineffective assistance of counsel upon failure to have removed, for cause, from the venire, owners of stock in the corporation which owns the premises allegedly burglarized by defendant. Joiner v. State, 245 Ga.App. 415, 537 S.E.2d 792 (July 28, 2000). Shoplifting conviction affirmed; trial counsel was not “ineffective in selecting a career prosecutor who ran a ‘tough on crime’ campaign to sit on the jury. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, counsel explained that she chose this juror because she would have a better understanding of the unreliability of eyewitness identification-the main thrust of her client's defense. Counsel also stated that she chose this juror because she ‘is forthright in her dealings....’ This is, in our view, perfectly valid trial strategy.” O’Brien v. State, 242 Ga.App. 344, 529 S.E.2d 657 (February 11, 2000). DUI conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel admittedly struck the wrong juror by accident, “due only to confusion on the part of trial counsel and not as a matter of strategy. Considering, however, that juror Adams was not openly prejudiced against O'Brien and that the evidence supports the verdict, we cannot say that but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 281, 286(7), 368 S.E.2d 742 (1988).” Accord, Eason v. State , 331 Ga.App. 59, 769 S.E.2d 772 (March 10, 2015) (no showing of prejudice despite accidental striking of wrong jurors where defendant “has not attempted to identify which jurors erroneously served on the jury, has not raised even the slightest possibility that the jurors were not qualified, and has not made any showing that any of the jurors who served harbored any prejudice towards him or were disinclined to acquit him based on reasons other than the evidence presented at trial.”). 66. JURY TRIAL, WAIVER Mantooth v. State, 303 Ga.App. 330, 693 S.E.2d 587 (April 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for family violence battery and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance in counsel’s advice to waive jury trial and proceed with bench trial. “‘At the motion for new trial hearing, [Mantooth's] trial counsel testified that he had discussed the advantages and disadvantages of waiving a jury trial in favor of a bench trial with [Mantooth]; that he had discussed the potential for juror bias in a family violence case such as [Mantooth's]; and that he filed [Mantooth's] waiver of jury trial form with [Mantooth's] understanding and consent. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in concluding that [Mantooth] failed to carry his burden of showing that his counsel's performance was deficient for advising him to pursue a bench trial rather than a jury trial.’ Wroge v. State, 278 Ga.App. 753, 755(2), 629 S.E.2d 596 (2006).” Defendant also fails to show “‘a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if tried before a jury.’ Hendrix v. State, 284 Ga. 420, 422(2), 667 S.E.2d 597 (2008).” Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga.App. 115, 656 S.E.2d 238 (January 8, 2008). “Defrancisco’s claim that his waiver of a jury trial was invalid for trial counsel's failure to apprise him of the significance of an election to proceed at a bench trial is likewise without merit. Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he and Defrancisco discussed the merits of a nonjury versus a jury trial three times prior to trial – two times in person and once via an exchange of e-mail; that, unlike a jury trial, only the judge would hear the evidence and decide the case; that, upon learning on the day of trial that his case would be heard by a new trial judge, Defrancisco again elected to proceed before the judge alone; that trial counsel did not pressure Defrancisco to proceed with a bench trial; and that he understood the agreed upon trial strategy as well as its advantages and disadvantages. We therefore find no deficient performance of counsel on this account. Edwards [ v. State, 285 Ga.App. 227, 228(2) (645 S.E.2d 699) (2007)].” Middlebrooks v. State, 289 Ga.App. 91, 656 S.E.2d 224 (January 4, 2008). “Middlebrooks claims that trial counsel advised him inadequately about his right to a jury trial. Before the start of trial, Middlebrooks informed the court that he understood he was waiving his right to a jury trial and was doing so freely and voluntarily. At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he had discussed with Middlebrooks his right to a jury trial and the advantages and disadvantages of a bench trial. Trial counsel had more than ten years of experience in criminal law both as a prosecutor