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and defense attorney. He had determined, given the evidence, that Middlebrooks likely would be found guilty of many of the charges. He also believed that a bench trial would offer Middlebrooks a stronger chance of a lesser conviction than armed robbery , and thus a chance to avoid the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Trial counsel’s advice concerning the bench trial fell within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct, and we find no error. See Marshall v. State, 253 Ga.App. 645, 646 (560 S.E.2d 118) (2002).” Accord, Barr v. State , 302 Ga.App. 60, 690 S.E.2d 643 (January 20, 2010) (counsel thought defendant had better chance at bench trial of conviction of lesser offense of possession or possession with intent to distribute cocaine instead of trafficking). Wafford v. State, 283 Ga.App. 154, 640 S.E.2d 727 (January 3, 2007). “As a general rule, a trial counsel’s decision to recommend a bench trial is a strategic and tactical decision that falls within the broad range of reasonable professional assistance, and Wafford does not show that trial counsel’s recommendation was objectively unreasonable here. See Marshall v. State, 253 Ga.App. 645, 646 (560 S.E.2d 118) (2002).” Counsel “gave Wafford what he believed to be appropriate legal advise, and he then took deliberate steps to ensure that Wafford understood the rights that he was waiving by agreeing to a stipulated bench trial,” after a meeting lasting more than an hour. Accord, Smith v. State , 291 Ga.App. 725, 662 S.E.2d 817 (May 30, 2008). 67. LEADING QUESTIONS, FAILURE TO OBJECT See subheading EVIDENCE/ARGUMENT, FAILURE TO OBJECT, above Carroll v. State, 292 Ga.App. 795, 665 S.E.2d 883 (July 17, 2008). At defendant’s child molestation trial, no ineffective assistance where trial counsel decided not to seek mistrial. Victim’s mother made brief reference to a separate incident involving another act of molestation against another family member, to which counsel quickly objected successfully. “At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he considered but did not request a mistrial because he believed the trial was going well for Carroll and that any damage had been minimized by the court's curative instruction. Trial counsel also testified that he did not move for a mistrial to avoid ‘ring[ing] the bell’ any louder by making a motion he believed would almost certainly be denied. ‘Trial tactics and strategy, however mistaken they may appear with hindsight, are almost never adequate grounds for finding trial counsel ineffective unless they are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.’(Punctuation omitted.) Abernathy v. State, 278 Ga.App. 574, 587(3)(b)(v) (630 S.E.2d 421) (2006). ‘ [C]ounsel's decision whether to move for a mistrial generally falls within the ambit of trial strategy, and we cannot say that counsel's decision fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional conduct.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Berry v. State, 262 Ga.App. 375, 377(2)(c) (585 S.E.2d 679) (2003). Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that Carroll failed to carry his burden of proving that his counsel performed deficiently.” Rowe v. State, 244 Ga.App. 654, 538 S.E.2d 452 (June 27, 2000). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; decision not to move for mistrial was strategic, not deficient. When prosecutor asked victim if she was aware of other complaints of sexual assault, counsel’s objection was sustained before the witness could answer. Counsel testified that he didn’t ask for mistrial “because he did not believe the testimony ‘reached the level of prejudicial conduct or statements that would give rise to a mistrial.’ Even more importantly, he testified that he thought Rowe ‘had a very good jury considering our defense and the charges against’ Rowe and that he did not believe a mistrial “would have been advantageous to our position.” Based on this testimony, his failure to move for mistrial clearly was a matter of trial strategy.” 70. MITIGATION EVIDENCE AT SENTENCING, FAILURE TO PRESENT, See also subheading SENTENCING, below State v. Worsley, 293 Ga. 315, 745 S.E.2d 617 (July 1, 2013). Following defendant’s murder and related convictions and death sentences, trial court’s grant of new trial based on ineffective assistance reversed. 1. No ineffective assistance in pre-trial investigation. “The trial court faulted trial counsel for only communicating with family members before trial by telephone, rather than traveling to North Carolina to visit with them in person, but we find no authority for the proposition that a lawyer always must meet with potential mitigation witnesses in person. And in any event, there is no evidence that trial counsel could have learned anything of importance had they visited North Carolina that they could not learn by telephone.” 2. “[C]ounsel is not required to present all mitigating evidence. See Humphrey v. Nance, 293 Ga. 68. MENTAL EVALUATION/CLAIM OF INCOMPETENCE/INSANITY, FAILURE TO OBTAIN, see subheading INSANITY/MENTAL ILLNESS/MENTAL RETARDATION DEFENSE, FAILURE TO PRESENT, above 69. MISTRIAL, FAILURE TO SEEK