☢ test - Í

189(II)(A)(1), 744 S.E.2d 706 (June 17, 2013); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533(II)(B)(3) (123 SCt 2527, 156 LE2d 471) (2003) (defense counsel not required ‘to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case’); Chandler [ v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1319 (11 th Cir., 2000) (en banc)]. Here, there were good strategic reasons for a lawyer to decline to present such testimony, notwithstanding that it had some potentially mitigating value. In the first place, some of the testimony contradicted the testimony of Dr. Grant, particularly the testimony of Shirley Barrett that Appellee was a ‘pretty good’ student and a ‘fairly intelligent man,’ as well as the testimony of Frances Worsley that Appellee was raised in a close family. Recall that Dr. Grant testified that Appellee was a ‘marginal student,’ that he had a ‘borderline’ IQ score, and that he was raised in a ‘dysfunctional home.’ A reasonable lawyer might reasonably worry about how the jury would perceive such contradictions, and that is one reason given by trial counsel in this case for why they chose not to call family members to testify for Appellee.”). Accord, Trammell v. State , 328 Ga.App. 45, 761 S.E.2d 470 (July 9, 2014) (“The failure to present mitigation evidence is not per se deficient.”). 3. “A reasonable lawyer might also have been reasonably concerned about harmful cross-examination. Trial counsel in this case knew that Appellee had a brother who was serving a prison sentence for murder, a fact that, they believed, the prosecuting attorneys likely would have brought out on cross-examination if any family members testified. As trial counsel acknowledged, they did not ‘want the jury to believe that [Appellee] came from a family of murderers.’” Bates v. State, 322 Ga.App. 319, 744 S.E.2d 841 (June 17, 2013). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to present mitigation evidence at sentencing where “defense counsel testified that he did not have any mitigation evidence to present on Bates's behalf. Defense counsel explained that there were no relatives or local community members who could offer such evidence. And Bates did not proffer any evidence in mitigation that counsel might have presented. Accordingly, ‘we cannot find that counsel's failure to present mitigation evidence was deficient or that it prejudiced [Bates's] case.’ (Footnote and punctuation omitted.) Tyner [ v. State, 313 Ga.App. 557, 565(6)(e) (722 S.E.2d 177) (2012)].” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (April 4, 2011). Reversing grant of federal habeas, California courts properly rejected habeas petition, finding no ineffective assistance for failure to investigate mitigating evidence in capital murder prosecution. Ninth Circuit improperly declared a “constitutional duty to investigate” and a principle that “‘[i]t is prima facie ineffective assistance for counsel to “abandon[ ] their investigation of [the] petitioner's background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources,”’ (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524–525, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)). … The Court of Appeals misapplied Strickland and overlooked ‘the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and ... the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.’ 466 U.S., at 689. Beyond the general requirement of reasonableness, ‘specific guidelines are not appropriate.’ Id., at 688. ‘No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions ... .’ Id., at 688–689. Strickland itself rejected the notion that the same investigation will be required in every case. Id., at 691 (‘[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary’ (emphasis added)). It is ‘[r]are’ that constitutionally competent representation will require ‘any one technique or approach.’ [ Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 106 (131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624) (2011) (slip op. at 17)]. The Court of Appeals erred in attributing strict rules to this Court's recent case law.” As here, “it certainly can be reasonable for attorneys to conclude that creating sympathy for the defendant's family is a better idea because the defendant himself is simply unsympathetic.” The mitigation evidence suggested on habeas here “is of questionable mitigating value. If Pinholster had called Dr. Woods to testify consistently with his psychiatric report, Pinholster would have opened the door to rebuttal by a state expert. See, e.g., Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 130 S.Ct. 383 (2009) (per curiam) (slip op., at 10–12) (taking into account that certain mitigating evidence would have exposed the petitioner to further aggravating evidence). The new evidence relating to Pinholster's family – their more serious substance abuse, mental illness, and criminal problems, … is also by no means clearly mitigating, as the jury might have concluded that Pinholster was simply beyond rehabilitation. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (recognizing that mitigating evidence can be a ‘two-edged sword’ that juries might find to show future dangerousness).” Three justices dissent. Hall v. Lee, 286 Ga. 79, 684 S.E.2d 868 (November 2, 2009). Grant of habeas petition based on alleged ineffective assistance reversed; trial counsel’s pre-trial investigation of potential mitigating evidence in defendant’s capital murder trial was not deficient. 1. “‘ Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence” or even “to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case.’ Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510(II)(B)(3) (123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471) (2003). Therefore, the habeas court erred by requiring that counsel investigate and present all available mitigating evidence in order that their performance not be deemed constitutionally deficient. Trial